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Preface 
The subject of this thesis is one of a group of subjects 
clustering around the character of General Grant taken up for 
study by the seminar class in Arneriaan History conducted by 
Professor James c. Malin of tbe University of Kansas in the 
Swnrner Session of 1929. 
The study of the relations of President Johnson and Gen-
eral Grant during the Reconstruction Period, culminating as 
they did with the unseemly but spectacular quarrel is of in-
I 
terest to every student of .American History. 
The value of such a study is apparent when we remember 
the notorious conflict between President Johnson and Congress 
and recognize that Grant as General of the Army was the focus 
:through which all orders for the execution of the reconstruc-
tion acts of Congress so antagonistic to the President, and 
that while Secretary of War ad interim he played the part of 
moderator between the Executive and Congress. 
The importance of the study is amplified by the realiz-
ation of the definate relationship of the quarrel to Grant's 
candidacy to succeed Johnson as President. 
The relationship of Johnson and Grant has long been mis-
understood due to the inadequate and unfair treatment of the 
subject in our histories. The ridicule and maledictions heap-
ed upon Johnson during the Reconstruction days and the oonse-
quent tainting of the source material of that period with 
·-- propaganda against Johnson have given the historians a :pre.;. 
judiced viewpoint and consequently their writings reflect 
bias. Biogr?-phers·of J'ohnson and Grant.have uniformly in-
terpreted the oontroversy and qti.arr'e1 according to their or-
igtnal predilections ·and· in favor. of the one ·it vrns' their 
purpose to eulogise. Even Stryker, the most recent biograph-
' ' er of J'ohnson, although his work is to be commended as being t 
the most exhaustive and probably the most reliable of any, in 
dealing with the controversy has been ·so anxious to vindicate 
Johnson and give him his rightful place in history.that in 
attempting to do so he M& belittled the character of Grant 
and relegated him to a standing far beneath hj.s deserts. 
In writing this thesis it is our purpose simply to demon-
strate the truth, without partiality and with as much genera-
sity in attributing motives and analyzing the reasons for 
conduct as a conservative interpretation of the facts' will 
permit. 
The objectives of this treatise are: 
First, to review the facts of· the relationship of Pres-
ident Johnson and General Grant. 
Second, to interpret these facts in the light of the other 
events of that period. 
Third, to show the causes of the estrangement of Johnson 
and Grant and of their final quarrel. 
Fourth, to demonstrate the truth and error of the Grant-
J'ohnson correspondence by a critical analysis of the same. 
Fifth, .to evaluate the political importance of the Grant-
Johnson controversy. 
I am indebted to Dr. -James c. Malin and Dr. F. H. 
Hodder of the History Department of the University of 
Kansas for valuable cr1t1~1sms and for suggestions for 
·1mproving the st7~ec::.and form of the manuscript. 
---Russell J. Anderson 
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GRANT AND JOHNSON 1865-1869 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
THE TD.lLES AND CIRCUMST.ANCES 
The reconstruction of a country after a great war is 
always fraught with perplexing problems for those in po-
wer. The stabilizing of the monetary_ system, the reestab-
lishment of normal cornrneroi.al relations within the nation's 
borders and with foreign countries,- the return of the mili-
tary population to civil life, the repair of material dam-
age due to conflict; all must be accomplished before the 
normal conditions of peace may be restored. 
In 1865 at the close of the Civil War Reconstruction 
embraced not only the above propositions awaiting solution, 
but also the political problem of the restoration of the 
seceded states to their normal relations with the Union. 
Reconstruction was all the more complicated because of the 
delicate arrangement of our Federa1·system,, because of the 
questionable status of the freedman, and because the Consti-
tution provided for no such state.of affairs as·existed after 
1 
the conflict. The difficulties were increased by the bit-
terness of feeling between the two sections. Lincoln realiz-
ed the enormity of the problem when he addressed the sere-
naders of Tuesday night.of the last week of his life. 
"Reconstructiqn ••• is fraught vvith great difficulty," he 
declared. "Unlike a case of war between independent nations, 
there is no authorized organ for us to treat with -- no one man 
2. 
has authority t~give up the rebellion for any other man. 
We simply must begin with and mold disorganized and dis-
cordant elements. Nor is it a small additional embarrass-
ment that we, the loyal peo~le, differ among ourselves as 
. . 2 
to the mode, manner, and measure of reconstruction •.•• "· 
Had Lincoln lived through the Reconstruction period 
he would have found that the lack of u~animity ."as to the 
mode, manner, and measure of reconstruction" was an exceed-
ingly great embarrassment. In this divergence of opinion 
is to be. found the key to the pr_oblems of recon.struction. 3 
The solution of these problems was in the harids of the 
Republicans. With the South as yet unrepresented, with the 
Peace Democrats of the North in desrepute and therefore 
powerless and the War Democrats hopelessly in the minority, 
the Republican party was practically unopposed and in undis-
puted possession oi"' the National Government. 
In 1860 the Republicans had been in the.minority. Made 
up of the fragments of th~ old Whig and Know Nothing parties, 
the Free Soilers, the Anti-Nebraska Democrats and the aboli-
tionists, the new party had been some what insecurely bound 
together by the common interest in the liL1i tat ion of slavery. 
It was able to r~main united and to keep the ascendancy of 
power throughout the war because of the urgent necessity of 
showing a united front to the foe, and because the issues 
which might have disrupted the party were overshadowed by 
the common program of :preserving the Union. Now that the 
war was over the_ieaders of the Republicans faced not only 
the many sided program of reconstrtiction but other urgent 
.. 
questions as well. The curteilment of government expenses, 
tax reduction, contraction of the currency, and the tariff. 
were all pressing issues. Other problems destined soon to 
occupy the cente~ of the stage of politics were appearing 
on the horizon. Already there was a demand for redemption 
of National bonds in Greenbacks. There was a growing dis-
satisfaction with the newly established National banks. 
There 1ivere the .beginnings of the Anti-monopoly movement in 
the west. Already the farmers were asking for the regu-
lation of railroad rates and fares. 4 
On these economic issues the Republicans were divided 
roughly according to sections. The industrial and creditor 
classes of the North East were in favor of sound money, the 
contraction of the currency, the extension o~ the National 
Banks, unrestricted opportunity for Big Business and the 
railroads, and protection of industry; while the agrarian 
and debtor classes of the West took an opposite stand on 
these questions. 
Even before the close of the War division had appeared 
in the ranks of the Republicans. In 1864 certain radical 
abolitionists, dissatisfied wit~ Li~coln, whose emanicipa-
tion program was too moderate to suit· them, organized a 
movement to replace him with Frement. 5 Although this :pro-
ject soon collap~ed there remained the antagonism of the 
4. 
Radical group in-Congress toward Lincoln. This antago-
nism developed apace with the President's efforts to ini-
tiate a moderate program of reconstruction for the yield-
ing rebel states. 
Now, while this recalcitrant group in Congress repre-
sented Radical opinion of the North East on the questions 
o~ slavery and reconstruction, they represented the con-
.. serva ti ve interests of, roughly, the same region in business 
and industry. In fact, on the great economic issues which 
concerned finance and industry the North East had differed 
with the rest of the country for generations. During the 
pre-war decades these economically conservative interests 
had made little headway against the agrarian South and West. 
But now that the South lay prostrate and impotent, unrepre-
sented in Congress, the Radicals saw their opportunity to 
continue their work already begun.during the war, of favori~g 
industry, subsidizing the railroads, and promoting Big Busi-
ness. This could only be accomplished by keeping the South 
out of Congress; for they realized that should the South be 
restored the South and West could outvote the conservative 
business groups. By keeping war hatreds alive, by magnifying 
the problems of Southern reconstruction and prolonging their 
existance, and by keeping economic issues in the back ground 
they could gain time to make their power supreme. 6 
The probability of success of the Radical cause was aug-
mented by the fact that their program of Congressional con-
trol in the Southern States followed the general tendency of 
5. 
the age toward the centralization of power in the hands 
I 
of the National Governruent. The States Rights principle 
had been repudiated .by Northern success in the recent con-
test in arms.? The spirit of Nationalism, increased by the 
tildal surge of patriotism incident to the war, now dictated 
that the National. Government, should safeguard the fruits of 
victory; should make secure the national principles of Unity 
·and Freedom won at so great a sacrifice. This should be 
done by the National Government even to the disregard of the 
-
Constitution and almost to the obliteration o~ state lines• 
The Radicals had only to steer their program into the wake 
of the war spirit and the undertow of Nationalism would 
carry it to realization. 
It is a matter of recorded history now, that the Rad-
ical~ were eminently successful in carrying out their pur-
poses •. Beale· comments. 6n their· success as follows: "During 
long years when vreconstrriction' monopolised Northern politics, 
unperceived changes took place, the nationwide significance 
of which overshadows temporary experiments in remaking an 
unwilling South; a new social and economic order under Rad-
ical favors grew to ·maturity; the age of Big Business dawned; 
and the factors underlying modern agrarian unrest gained strength.us· 
An understanding of the purposes of the Radicals serves 
to explain what happened in the South: military domination 
and economic exploitation, the distranchisment of ex-confed-
erates and the enfranchisement of the negro, and carpet-bag 
6. 
rule and misgovernment. To a degree it explains the met-
hods they used to attain their ends: the campaign of pro-
paganda, the play upon the bogie that if the Democrats got 
back into power the Rebellion would be triumphant, the mis-
representation of conditions in the South, and the vituper-
ation against "copperheadism". Jmd what is more important 
to us in our consideration of the subject confined to the 
more narrow scope of this paper, it explains to a marked 
degree the personal ridicule and abuse heaped upon President 
Johnson by· the Radicals, their courtship of General Grant, 
and their efforts to bring about an estrangement between 
the two. 
The problems of Reconstruction were many, and diverse, 
and difficult. It is one of the facts of history much to 
be regretted that assassination removed the leader best 
fitted to cope with them. Abraham Lincoln, with his winn-
in~ personality, his ability to handle men, his diplomacy, 
his political sagacity, with the prestige which the victory 
in war had given him, would have had many advantages Which 
his successor lacked. Lincoln was a ~ortherner and knew 
the temper of the North and.the personalities of its lead-
ers. He was at the head of the powerful party machine and 
controlled it through his political influence. The man who 
followed him in office, a Southerner and a War Democrat, 
did not succeed to Lincoln's position of leadership in the 
7. 
ruling party,-and could not succeed to the control of the 
Republican political machine. 9- With the executive lacking 
party support in ordinary times it is disastero~s; in times 
like those of the Reconstruction days it is nothing short 
·of' calami t.ou s • 
The conflict b~tween President Johnson and Congress is 
historic. The President's work of reconstruc~ion by execu-
tive orders, the repudiation of the same by Con.grass, the 
labors of the Reconstruction committee, the Reconstruction 
laws passed by Congress and the executive vetoes; all are 
commonplace facts of history. The crisis came in the elec-
· tion of 1966. 10 The Radicals were victori0!i_s over the 
President and the Conservatives because of their campaign 
of misrepresentation, claptrap and vituperation, and their 
insidious play upon postwar histeria.11 The election gave 
the Radicals an overwhelming majority in Congressj enabling 
them to carry out their program roughshod over the President 
and the Constitution. Theit power was extended to the con~ 
trol of the War Department and executive removals from office. 
Even the power of the Supreme Court was impaired; its rune-
tions curtailed. The impeachment project, had it been suc-
cessful, might have resulted in the change of our govern-
ment into the parlismentary type of Europe. The Reconstnuc-
tion period was truly one of the most critical of all periods 
in our history. 
The conflict between the President and Congress, their 
rivalry for popular support of their respective programs, and 
8 . 
. 
the political complications involved in the struggle af_tect-
ed the relations of President Johnson and General Grant to 
.the ex~ent that it may b~ said their relationship was prac-
tically controlled by these exigencies. However the fac-
tors of personality .and character are always potent deter-
minants of .human action. An understanding,· therefore, of 
the traits of ch~racter and personality of the two princi-
pals of this study will assist in·explaining the vicissi-
tudes of their relations~ip to each other. 
ANDREW JOHNSON 
Our history abounds with the stories of men who, start-
ing life in lowly circumstances, by dint of hard labor and 
perseverance, .came up through extreme difficulties and hard-
ships to positions of eminence and power. We have no better 
example than the life of Andrew Johnson•· 
Born of poor parents in the slave state of North Carolina 
where poor whites were looked down upon and free labor was 
considered a disgrace, and left an orphan when but a small 
boy by the death of his father, Johnson faced life with ser-
ious handicaps. He was apprenticed to a tailor at the age 
of ten. He had no opportunity to go to school. Possessed 
with a burning desire for knowledge he tuto~ed himself to 
read'and then spent hours of his spare time studying ora-
tions of famous British statesmen. He early became ambit-
.ious to become an orator and enter public life.12 
Ability to read ~as the extent or his ed.uca~tton when 
9. 
at the age of eighteen he removed from Raleigh, North Car-
olina to Greenville, Tennessee, with his mother' and sister, 
who were dependent upon him for support. After his marri-
age at the age of nineteen, his wife, who was an accomplish-
ed young school teacher taught him to write and to cipher. 13 
Forced to earn his l_iving by hard work he learned while 
he plied his needle and shears as a tailor. His shop became 
his schoolroom where he learned much of history and political 
lore by having his wife or some one else read to him. His 
neighbors came in so frequently to discuss with Johnson the 
news of the times that his shop was vitually a political.fdrum.14 
He became interested in debate and joined the debating 
club at Greenville college. For several years he took part 
in debate and engaged in political discussion of every kind. 
He develope?- into one of the best informed and most forceful 
speakers of his community. 
Johnson's stubborn ambition brought him into politics 
at an early age. In 1828 when he was twenty years old he 
was elected alderman. He served two years in.this position 
and was then elected mayor. In a slave state where free 
labor was degraded and the slave holding aristocracy in con-
trol of the government it was a noteworthy ~ohievement for 
an uneducated tradesman to rise in polities~, Yet Andrew 
Johnson rose rapidly and by his own merit and perseverence • 
. ·{·;{~·:~ 
ttHe owed nothing to luck," says McCulloch, Jri.i. Men and Mea-
~ ·:~~:-: -- -- --
su~ of Half a Century. , ''He was his own architect. To 
nothing was he indebted for his rise except the strong 
10. 
qualities which he had inherited, and an .open field for their 
development and exercise."15 After serving several terms as ' 
mayor he became a candidate for representative in the lower 
house of the state Legislature and was elected• His next 
office was that of State Senator. Hav~n~ pleased his con-
stituents in state offices they honored him by electing him 
their representative to Congress in 1843. He was probably 
the first tradesman ever sent to C0ngress from a slave state. 
He represented his destrict in Congress until 1853, when he 
was elected Governor of Tennessee·. In 1857 he entered the 
United States Senate to which he had b.een elected the year 
before. In 1862 he was appointed by President Lincoln mili-
tary Governor of Tennessee •. He was occupying· this position 
when elected Vice-li>resident in 1864. 16 
Until 1861 Johnson was a Democrat and a supporter of 
the leading measures of his party. His greatest boast was 
that he was a common man, the friend of common men. "I am 
a Demo era t, nov1," he said in 1862; "I have been one all my 
life; I expect to·live and die one •.• they shall .never divert 
me from the polar star by which I have ever been guided from 
early life--the great principles of Democracy upon which thi~ 
Government rests.n17 In 1860 he supported the campaign of 
Breckenridge and Lane but in l861 severed his relations with 
that wing. of the Democratic party and became a staunch, sup-
porter of the Union, "the only distinguished politician of 




Johnson was not a demagogue. 19 He was fearless in his 
support of a ~rinciple he believed to be right and would 
boldly denounce a measure which was in his opinion unjust 
or corrupt regardless of the opinions or prejudices of his 
constituency. During the secession movement he was uncom-
promising in his support of the Union. His speeche~ in the 
Senate were strong and bold for the preservation of the Govern-
ment. A~ he had disregarded threats of personal violence 
in the rough-and-tumble politics of Tennessee so in the 
National Senate he refused to be affected by threatened 
) 
danger involved in his bold denunciation of secession. 20 
His services as Military Govenor of Tennessee were 
difficult but were faithfully performed and that state was 
the first of the disloyal commonwealths to come back into 
the Union. · 
Tradition has given a very unfair picture of .Andrew 
Johnson to the popular mind. His political enemies ~µd 
a mendacious press have caracatured Johnson as a vulgar, 
drunken tailor, honest and well meaning, but illiterate, 
ill-mannered, stubborn, quarrelsome; a willing tool of 
Copperheads, a drunken wretch, whose incompetency was a 
disgrace to the White House and a calamity to the nation. 21 
Many people even tqday .. have a distorted idea of Johnson 
and think of him in terms of dontempt. 
Much of the defaming of Johnson's character has been 
due to-propaganda. 22 It has been charged that he was a 
12. 
drunkard·; that at different times he disgraced himself 
in public by being intoxicated. On one important oocaston, 
that of hit;> inaugural as Vice-President on March 4, 1864, 
Johnson did conduct himself in an unseemly manner due to 
the imfluence of liquor. He gave a very poor rambling 
speech which shocked his hearers and the public and gave 
his enemies an opportunity to ridicule him. But when it 
is realized that the Vice-President had just been through 
a siege of fever and that on the morning of the inaugural 
he was ill and only took a lit.tle whisky as a stimulant, 
and.that there is no evidence that he ever became intoxi-· 
cated.afterward, Johnson cannot be branded as a drunkard. 
Shortly after the unfortunate inatigural incident, Lincoln 
said to a cabinet member, "I have known Andy Johnson for 
many years; he made a bad slip the other day, but you 
need not be scared; Andy ain't a drunkard. 023 Jefferson 
Davis, Major Truman who was. Johnson's private secretary, 
Crook, Johnson's body-guard, Senator Doolittle, Secre-
taries Welles and Mccullock, and other influential men 
of the times testify to Johnson's sobriety. 24 
Recent historians and biographers have done much 
to correct the misconception of the ture character of 
this much abused man. 
Howard·K. Beale in his book, The Critical Year, A 
Study of Andre~ Johnson and Reconstruction, gives the 
following pen -portrait of Johnson: nor only average 
13. 
height, he was none the less broad-shouldered and imposing. 
His co~plexion wa~ swarthy, his features good. He had spark-
\ 
ling, penetrating eyes. A mass of thi'nk dark hair topped· 
his head. Deep lined into his countenance was a look of 
mingled determination and distress. A stolidity resulting 
fr~m patient su~fering under accustomed hardship, and a 
somber serious-mindedness not often relieved by any sign of 
joviality, were characteri~tic. His greatest physical asset 
was a voibe, mellow and pleising in tone, but of .such power 
that without appearing to raise it, he could make himself 
heard to the outer edge of vast throngs of people. His 
manner and the peculiar magnetism bf his personality as be 
spoke to ~ crowd, lent a vigor and dignity to speeches 
that in print wereti.nimpressive.n25 
Johnson was a good debater and when he took time for 
preparation he was capable of making excellent speeches. 
His state papers compare ~avorably with those of_ other 
presidents. Johnson was ~a-thod.i.eal.. He insti·tuted what 
the White House had never before possessed, a system of 
records of a11· business transacted.· He carefully preserv-
ed all letters received and kept a scrap book of the times. 
He handled the great amount of work which reconstruction impos-
ed, with orderlines and efficiency.26 
Johnson was industrious. He possessed tremendous energy 
and was tireless in his devotion to duty. His days were long 
and difficult. Besides receiving throngs of visitors, he 
handled the routine of government administration and spent 
14. 
long hours in reading• writing and holding conferences. He 
had little time for, recreation. 27 
Johnson possessed positive characteristics of honesty, 
truthfulness, incorruptibility, coµrage and industry which 
had brought him advancement. ttThe President,tt comments 
Welles, "has great capacity, is conversant with our public 
affairs beyond most men, has much.experience~ possesses 
great firmness, sincere patriotism, a sacred regard for the 
cons.ti tut ion, is humane and benevolent. n 28 
Unfortunately for Johnson he was handicapped by certai"ii 
peculiarities of character, and mannerisms which marked him 
as being ot plebian origin and which were serious drawbacks 
upon his usefulness in public life. He possessed a sp:lrit of 
combativeness which made him enjoy controversy, and this love 
of controversy couple~ with his lack of tact sometimes caused 
him to make very serious blunders which he might have avoid-
ed. His speeches which he made off .hand were ofte~ c~ude 
and when encouraged by hecklers he sometimes engaged in un-
becoming personalities.29 
He was naturally distrustful and was reluctant to. give 
his confidence to anyone. Gidean \~elles, a member of Pres-
ident Johnson's cabinet writes that, "1v1any of his most im-
portant steps have been taken wit~out the knowledge of any 
person whatever. He has wonderful self-reliance and im-
movable firmness in maintaining what he believes .to be right, 
is disenclined to be familiar with men in prominent posi-
tions, or to be intimate with those who fill the public 
eye.n30 
15. 
One of Johnson's weaknesses was his inordinate faith 
in his own power. of persuasion •. He thought that if he 
could only present his case to the people in person they 
would be bound to support him. He was never really popu-
la·r. He possessed none of the charm which makes men po-
pular. His reserve deprived him of many close friends. 
People did not know ·the true Andrew Johnson and therefore 
could not love him. 31 · 
Johnson's habit of boasting of his humble origin was 
unfortunate.. In political campaigns he had learned .to ex-
ploit successfully the fact that he had risen from a low~ 
ly trade to a high place in the state. But it was bad 
taste for him as President ;t,q make references to his hurn-
bl.e past. 32 
His indecision was perhaps his most costly fault.33 
He did not know whose advice to shun; what counsel to take. 
And while he waited, indecisive, the Radicals acted and 
too often Johnson was thereby put to a disadvantage which 
was costly to his program. Johnson once said ·or himself; 
ttThe elements of my nature, the pursuits of my life, have 
not made me either in my feelings or in my practice, ag-
gressive. My nature, on the contrary, is ra~her defensi~e· 
in its character".34 
Once his mind was made up Johnson became uncompromis-
ing. When he became convinced of the righteousness of a 
cause or the justice or a decision he •. could not be moved. 
"He could not", says Beale, "accept the situation as he found 
16. 
it, turn partial support to his ends, or yield on details 
to attain large advantages. In the restora.tion of the 
Southern States, Johnson saw the salvation and future hap-
piness of the country; fundamental principles were at 
stake; both his duty and his honor were involved. He could 
gladly face death or political ruin, but he could not be 
swerved from the path whither every fiber of his passionate 
soul told him duty led •••• In other times and other men, 
Americans have lauded this quality. But it was disastrous 
at a time when infinite tact, yielding here, forcing there, 
35 was necessary." 
Nominated for Vice-President by the Republicans in 1864 
to forestall the criticism that theirs was a sectional party, 
and to win the Union Democratic vote, it was only natural that 
Johnson, h~ving all his political life been an apostle of 
Jeffersonian Democracy, q.:sh,.9,µld. ~.nter the Presid~ncy. with 
ideals and principles at variance with the dominant party 
in Congress. In a sense Johnson represented the repudiat-
ed principle of States Rights while Congress, representing 
Northern sentiment, was atune to the rising spirit of Nation-
alism and alive to the opportunities for l\ationalizing the 
Government through the control of Reconstruction by the North.· 
Having been reared in the South and having labored publicly 
for years in the interests of the Southern people Johnson 
was naturally sympathetic with their problems. Knowing the 
peculiar relations of the white people to the colored race 
and the problems of the social and industrial life of the 
17. 
south, he was predisposed to consider the arbitrary recon~ 
struction measures of Congress as the attempt of the trium-
phant North to subjugate and humiliate the conquered South. 
Realizing all of this there is no wonder at Johnson's oppos-
ition to the Radical Congress nor at his efforts to miti-
gate the harshness of the reconstruction laws which he believed 
so unjust and so flagrantly unconstitutional. 
Johnson would have been lenient with the South. His 
policy of reconstruction (a better term for it would be "restora-
tion") followed that of Lincoln. 36 Johnson assumed that the 
subdued Southern states were still in the Union; 37 that the 
rebellion had been made up of individuals fighting against 
the Federal Government. He offered these individuals, with 
certain exceptions, general amnesty, when they should take 
a solemn oath of allegiance. Those of the excepted classes 
might be pardoned upon personal application.38 Upon ful-
filling certain just and fundamental requirements, rep.ea1.:.. 
ing their ordinances of secession, ratifying the thirteenth 
amendment, and repudiating their \Yar debts39 the recalci-
trant states might.resume all the privilege~ of states in the 
Union. 
But Congress chose to repudiate the policy and undo the 
work of Johnson, and to fasten upon the South military rule 
and negro suffrage. And .tuner i cans today are ashamed of the 
page in history which records what followed. While unpre-
judiced students of that period of history now acknowledge 
that Johnson's policy was both just and unquestionably con-
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. sti tutional. Andrew Johnson, for his accomplishments in 
spite of handicaps and hardships, and for· his staunch support 
of the principles which he believed to be right, deserves a 
far more dignified place in history than has been accorded 
him in the past. 
ULYSSES S. GR.A.NT 
The story of the life of General Ulysses S. Grant illus~ 
trates·to a remarkable degree ho~ rapidly a ~an.in lowly cir-
~umstances and with no apparent opportunity to succeed in 
life may, through the chances of rapid promotion in time of 
war and through the focus of the attention of the public up-
on the leaders in conflict, rise to heights of fame and acc-
omplishment. 
Prior to the Civil War Grant lived an obscure life. 
There was little indication that he possessed extraordinary 
qualities of leadership or resourcefulness, of superior in-
telleot or driving ambition... His appointment to West Point 
came to him not because he was ambitious"for that honor .but 
through the efforts of his father to secure for him an edu-
cation without cost. He was loath to attend' the military 
academy after his appointment, and his decision to go was 
largely because of his desire to travel. The trip to West 
Point would give him the opporttinity of visiting Philadel-
phia and New York. 40 
At West Point Grant showed no special aptitude.for 
study or drill. 41 He was, in all branches except math-
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ematics, below mediocrity in his class and graduated twenty-
first in a class of thirty-riine.42 
After gradua t·ion Grant showed little ambition for. promotion 
in the army. He served with credit throughout the Mexican War 
and for more than four years afterward remained an officer of 
regulars. But he did not rise rapidly in the service. Dur-
ing his later days as a Captain in the army in California he 
fell into habits of intemperence·and for a time a cloud was 
over his life. In 1854 he resigned from the Army and be~an 
the life of a farmer on his wife's farm near st. Louis. 43 
Grant. found it hard to adjust himself to civilian life 
and failed to succeed in one after another Of business ·en-
terpr~ses. Agu·e and fever drove him from the farm. He did 
not stay in his next occupation, the real estate business, 
long enough to be successful. When the Civil War broke out 
he was working for the meager salary of eight hundred dol-
lars a year in his father's leather store at Galena; Ill-
inois. 44 
Although Grant seemed to have little capacity for bus-
iness and at the age of thirty-nine was an ap~arent failure, 
he really possessed qualities of character which only need-
ed the st~rring scenes and challenging problems of warfare 
to bring out. His natural indolent and sluggish nature re-
quired great crises to become thoroughly aroused. Had tt 
·not been for the War, there is little doubt that he would 
have lived a poor man and died in obscurity.45 But in ~he 
War his characteristics of indo~itable resolution, perfect 
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self possession and dauntless courage .were ~roused and as-
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serted when those qualities would count ·the most. 
Grant's early successes gave him ·confidence ·.tn his own 
powers, and self-confidence is an excellent quality for a 
general. Grant was said to be absolutely without fear. In 
battle he seemed almost insensible to danger. The over-
throw of the enemy absorbed his every thought and he had 
none to give to fear or concern about his own welfare. His 
bulldog tenacity of purpose is probably best epitomised in 
his famous statement after the terrible battle of Spottsyla-
vania that he would "fight it out on this line if i~ took 
all summer." 
Grant was not the clever tactitian that Lee was, nor 
did he have the great organizing ability of McClellan, but 
he understood both th~ duties and the responsibilities of 
a commander. "His business was to fight", c01m11ents Iv:LcCulloch, 
"to persistently push the enemy at all :points, and at all 
sacrifices, was, in his opinion, the surest as well as the 
speedest way of terminating the Ymr .• n46 
Grant's skill in handling large bodie~·of troops i? 
well proven in the Vicksburg campaign which was entirely 
planned by him, and executed in spite of many difficulties. 
He had a clear perception of the War as a whole and knowing 
the conditions of the South planned the campaigns of the 
Northern armies with strategy on a grand scale which fin-
ally won the war. 
That Grant was a great commander of troops in war, ·rew 
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critics will question. That he was personally honest of 
heart, pure in thought, gener~u~2toward defeated foes, and 
.kind to the weak and helpless is the common conception of 
every one. Had Grant's public services ended with Ap:po-
mattox or even if he had confined further services to mil-
itary affairs his life as a whole would have been more o~ 
a·· success. Grant's subsequent career in politics and as 
the chief executive of the nation added little to his ere-
dit; and the corruption in high places, the misgovernment, 
the unwise policies of state during his administration, 
combined to detract from his prestige and to lessen the 
universal admiration of a greatful people. 
Grant did not possess a broad comprehension either of 
the principles of Goverrunent or of practical politics. 
Prior to the war he had ·taken so little interest in uolit-. . J -
ical aff;airs that he had voted only once in apresidential 
election. After the War he was not a close student of the 
pr.inciples of government, being inclined to ~ake the mos~ 
commonly accepted viewpoints and ideas as his own and. to 
follow the advice of his intimate friends. He made no 
close distinction in regard to the constitutionality of 
the Reconstruction Acts but was rather inclined to justify 
the action or Congress on the grounds of expediency, con-
sidering the majority as being infallible.47 
Having lived most of his life in the army or in the 
simple pursuits of farming and trading Grant had little 
knowledge of the wiles and artifices of the politicians 
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and was easily influenced by them. He wa~ very suscep-
tible to flattery and wa·s always ready to accept gifts, 
sometimes returning favors to the givers without realizing 
that such action was not proper for a public officer. 
His use of patronage led many to believe that it was irt 
return for favors he had personally received. He was not 
I 
a good judge of .men and accepted the advice of those who 
were irresponsible and dishonest.48 · 
"He had few affections" says Badeau in his ;'Grant !11 
Peace~', "but these were intense; he did not hate many, but 
he .could be implacable.n49 
General Grant, although brave and pos~essing.indomi-
table courage was simple in his manner and unpretentious 
in demeanor. He was naturally undemonstrative, even giv-
ing the appearance of stolidity. However he had the abi-
lity to express himself clearly apd directly and his con-
versation was to the point without exaggeration. He could 
think clearly, possessed a ready and accurate memory and 
. k i hi d . . 50 was qu1c n s ec1s1ons. 
Perhaps Grant's greatest weaknesses· .as a civil offi-
cer were his lack of an understanding of political affairs 
and his consequent reliance upon the opinions of others. 
'); 
Grant's opinions and i..J.~hs unquestionably were the reflec-
tions of the opinions and ideas of those with whom he as-
sociated. Politicians, by appealing to his patriotism, 
which was unquestioned, could influence him to pursue a 
course favorable to their ends. Yfhile General of the Army 
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·Grant vras· influenced by General Rawlins, ,secretary Stanton 
a~d others. Badeau asserts that Rawlins~ especially had 
"at intervals enormous influence with Grant."51 Throughout 
his tenure of the off ice of Secretary of War ad interim 
there are repeated evidences of Grant being influenced by 
Radical advisers. "Obviously he has been tampered with 
and flattered by the Radicals, who are using him and his 
name for their selfish and partisan :purposes," writes Gideon· 
Welles in his ::n1ar_y1 · August 22, 1867. 52 
This susceptibility to the influence of his political 
satellites is to a marked degree explained by the fact tnat 
Grant lacked moral courage.53 This peculiar trait Grant 
himself acknowledges several times in his !v1emoirs. In civil 
mat.ters where he was on unfamiliar ground this concern for 
the opinion.of others, coupled with.his natural easy going 
disposition made him prcin~ t6 follow the opinions of the 
majority rather than take the trouble to think out a course 
of action for himself. To blaze out an independent trail 
of precedure in the tangle of Washington politics might 
jeopardize his popularity and his reputation for wisdom 
and good judgemen~ Grant took the course pointed out to him~ 
During Johnson's administration Grant held a very im-
portant position. As General of the Army he held a :pivotal 
place in the execution of the reconstruction laws. While 
Secretary of War ad interim he was in the :position of a 
moderator between the President and Congress. Distrusti~g. 
-the President,· Congress in trusted the administration of the 
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military laws of reconstruction to Grant and his subordin-
ates. Hence Grant was compelled, much agains~ his inclin-
ations to take a stand in ~olitical affairs. In the posi-
tion he was forced to assume he stood between the President 
and Congress. The place was one of great difficulties; 
friction was inevitable. 
More over, Grant, as the successful commander of the 
Union troops was the most popular man in the country. His 
military fume made him a logical tiandidate for the Pres~-
dency; hence he became the object· ·or solicitude of both po-
litical parties. He became the center of .political storm· 
and ·stress.· Johnson ·repeatedly· tried to strengthen his 
cause by gaining Grant's support. When Grant's real. sup-
pott could not be secured Johnson arranged matters so as 
to have his apparent support. The Radicals too_, courted 
his favor. 
As the conflict between the President and Congress 
approached its climax the difficulties of Grant increased; 
the friction became greater. The Presidential campaign 
was in the offing and Grant was hailed as the next Presi-
dent. In~rigue and political strife centered around Grant. 
On one hand Johnson·accosted him for his assistance in his 
fight against Congres~. On the other.side were the "Radi-
cals,and the most mischievous of them, ... hounding and 
t 1 1 ti d t . . h . ft 54 s· mu a ng an cau ion1ng im. The strain must have 
been terrible. Something had to give way. It did. The 
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violent quarrel·between the.President and Grant was but the 
• natural oonsequ.ence of all that had gone before. 
Yet through all this turmoil Grantts conduct was d1r..:. 
ected more by circumstances than by personal ambition~ His 
purpose in deceiving th~ President was a pa~riotic one, not 
for self. He quarreled with the President because circum-
stances forced him to, not because he realized the politi-
cal consequences of such action. 55 
Grant was above all a patriot. His services in the 
Civil War were inspired by a spirit of loyalty to his coun-
try. While it is true that after the war Grant became am-
bitious for office, and that his later career was marred 
by an unbecoming runbttion for a third term of the Presi-
dency, yet his character was such that he always put the 
interests of' his country before his own desires for advance-
ment.56 For this trait and his characteristics of simple 
unpretentousness, resolution, and courage, the memory of. 
Grant will always be honored and beloved by a grateful 
people 
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Chapter 2 Passive Acquiescence 
When Andrew Johnson took up the reins of the Federal 
Government after the death of Lincoln in"April 1865, Gen-
eral Grant was in complete harmony with the new ~resident 
in politics as well as in personal relations~ "General 
Grant was a democrat and thought and acted in harmony ~ith 
President Johnson in nolitics and ~econstruction for a ·"· 
time after the close of the War" says Major A. E. H. Johnson, 
confidential clerk for Grant.~ The Generai, in fact, had 
no strong political beas. 2 He had never taken much inter-
est in political affairs. As a soldier he believed it was 
his simple duty to obey the orders of the government and 
that it was not his concern how policies of the,administra-
tion were formulated.3 
If he had any political affiliations they were with 
the Democratic party. The only time that he had ever votea 
in a Presidential election, he voted for the democratic 
candidate (Buchanan in 1856). The Democrats .now claimed 
him. Early in 1865 it was suggested to Grant through his 
confidential seqretaryAdam Badeau, that he become the 
Democratic candidate for the Presidency .in 1868. The lead-
er of the Democrats· in the House of Representatives, James 
Brooks, made overtures to Grant with that end in view. He 
predic.ted that Grant would be the next President, .and he 
was avowedly anxious to secure him for the Democrats. Gen-
eral Grant did not indicate whether or not he was so much 
as pleased wit~ the suggestion and took no steps· toward 
2?. 
securing the favor of the Democrats with the view of becom-
ing a candidate. He gave no evidence of pol~tical ambition 
at this time.4 
Although Grant did not actively give support or encour-
agement to the Democrats the Republicans distr~sted him. 5 
lt was evident that he was on the most cordial terms with 
the President. ·The. latter did much to make these cordial 
relations apparent. He was not slow to see .that Grant's 
popularity in the North made it highly important that the 
administration have his support. ·Moreover, sine~ General 
Grant's demonstration of magnanimity toward the conquered 
foe at Appomattox he had had the confidence of the people 
·of the South and his personal and political support of 
Sohnson would be an influential factor in making the Pres-
ident's plan of the reconstruction of the Southern states 
a success. Consequently Johnson tried to cultivate the 
friendship of General Grant. He. formed the habi~ of drop-
ping in casually at Grant's home or office.6 He sent 
him personal and familiar notes and cards, some times re-
questing that Grant call to see him. He often enclosed 
slips from Southern Newspapers, complimenting Grant on his 
magnanimity and predicting that he would support the Pres-
ident in his reconstruction policy.? ·These attentions con-
tinued as Congress became more hostile to Johnson's efforts 
of reconstruction. Throughout the e~rly months of the ad-
ministration Grant accepted the President's overtures with 
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good grace and without comment. He would riot commit himself 
to any line of policy. 8 
In the spring of 1866 General and Mrs. Grant gave an 
evening reception. nThere had been," writes Welles 'in his 
Diary, "some pre-understanding on the part of the Radicals, 
or a portion of them, to attend and to appropriate General 
Grant, or at least his name and influence to themselves. 
But, most unexpectedly to them .•• the President and his 
two daughters appeared early, and Montgomery Blair ,., also 
Alexander H. Stevens, Vice-preside.nt of the late Confederacy, 
so called. When, therefore Thad Stevens, Trumbull, and 
others, not ex~ctly homogeneous though now acting together, 
came in, they were evidently astonished and amazed. r19 
President Johnson stood by the side of Grant and received 
the guests and, ttthe circumstanqeu, said Badeau, "was 
heralded all over the country as an indication of the cor-
dial political understanding between them.nlO 
'The Gen~ral held himself to be merely a military offi-
cer, and would not intrude in civil matters. He believed 
that Congress should have been called in specia~· s~ssion to 
meet the problems of reconstruction but since Go_ngress was 
not summoned and some system of reconstruction was indis-
pensable, he acquiesced in the action of the President. 
But, Badeau in his ·biography of Grant writes, "He always 
maintained that the action was provisional; that Congress,. 
as the representative of the peopl~, must eventually decide 
what should be done, and to that decision all must bow.· 
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I frequently heard him express .this view."11 
With respect to the treatment of ·p~roled Confederate 
leaders there was at first disagreement between the Pres-
ident and General Grant. A United States Judge at Nor-
folk had a grand jury find indictments against some of the 
former Confederate leaders, and when Robert E. Lee heard 
that he, too would be indicted he wrote to General Grant 
reminding him of the protection he understood was gr~nted 
by his parole and in a separate letter applied for amnesty 
and pardon. Grant sent bot~ of these letters to the Pres-
ident with. the recommendation that the pardon be granted 
and with the statement that the officers and men parolled 
at Appomattox could not be tried so long as they observed 
their paroles. He went in person to discuss these papers 
with the President but Johnson was not satisfied and wanted, 
he said, "to make treason odious." 
"When can these men be· tried?" he asked. 
t'Never, n said Grant, "unless they violate their paro-
les. "12 "I insisted on it that General Lee would not have 
surrendered his army and given up all their arms if he had 
supposed that after surrender, he was going to be tried for 
treason and hanged." said. Grant, later. nr thought we got 
a very good equivnlent for the lives of a few leaders in 
getting all their arms and getting themselves under con-
trol bound by their oaths to obey the laws. That was the 
consideration, which I insisted upon we had received."13 
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The President still insisted that the time must come 
when the Southern leaders would be tried und punished and 
his Attorn~y-Peneral wrote an official letter in opposit~6nt 
to Grant's arguments. Finally.· Grant· declared that he would 
resign his commission in the army unless the terms of parole 
which he had granted were confirmed. The President, realiz-
ing Grant's popularity, relented and orders were given to 
discontinue the proceedings against Lee. 14 
Many other Southern officers besides Lee applied to 
Grant for protection and hundreds .of civilians who wished· 
to be granted amnesty requested his favorable endorsement' 
and in most all of the cases he saw fit to use his influ-
ence favorably in their behalf .15 He urged the restora-
tion of .confiscated property as well as genera~ amnesty. 
In consequence there developed a remarkably warm feeling 
for Grant among the Southern people. 
In April 1865 Grant wrote to his wire from North.Car-
olina that the suffering that must exist in the South the 
next year would be beyond conc~ption. "People", he said, 
"who talk of further retaliation and punishment, except of 
the political leaders, either do not conceive of the suf-
fering endured already or they.are hea~tless and unfeeling 
and wish to stay at home out of danger while punishment is 
being inf~icted.nl6 
Grant was anxious-to prevent unnecessary friction be-
tween the officers and troops quartered in the So.uth and the 
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·people. In August 1865, he suggested to Stanton that 
officers "should be appointed who can act from facts and 
not.always be guided by prejudice in favor of color."17 
In March, 1866 he prevented a negro celebration organized 
by the ?adicals which threatened disorder in Richmond. 18 
He urged Stanton to muster out the colored troops as ra-
pidly as practicable because they were apt to cause out-
bursts of violence.19 
With eight .states reconstructed according to the Pres-
idential plan and awaiting action ·or Congress on the admis-
sion of Congressmen, Grant was sent by Johnson to the South-
ern States to ascertain the feeling among the people there 
who had lately been in rebellion. Johnson wished to make 
a favorable report to Congress. Grant l~ft Washington 
November 29, 1865 and visited Raleigh, Charle.ston, Savan-
nah, Atlanta and other cities. His trip was shorti but 
everywhere he conversed freely with the citizens and with 
the Generals of the army who had been sta~ioned among them.20 
When he returned he gave both an oral and a written report,. 
and in both he declared that he was satisfied that the peo-
ple of the South.accepted the new situation in good faith. 
"My observations lead me to the conclusion that the ctti-
zens 6f the Southern States are anxious to return to self-
government within the Union as soon as possible; that while 
reconstruoting they.want and.require protection from the 
~overnment, not humiliating to them as citizens, and that 
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if such a course was ,pointed out they would pursue it in 
good .faith.'' Neither officers of the Government nor citi-
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zens thought it practical .to withdraw the troop$.21 
Grant .criticised the Freedman's Bureau. stating that in 
his opinion.its affairs had not been conducted .. with good 
judgm~nt or.economy. 22 He characterized the officers,of 
the Bureau ~s "a useless and dangerous set'~ and .recommended 
that they be replaced with military officers.23 Ho~ever~ 
' ' .I .J I 
he thought that the con~itions necessitated that the Bureau 
be continued for a few. years· to car·3 for. the negroes and 
give them counsel. He believed that the North should be 
tolerant. "It ;s to be regretted that there cannot be a 
greater co-mingling at th~s time between the. citizens of 
the two sections and pa:t;ticularly of those entrusted with 
the lav1 making power," he .asserted •. Grant thought :that 
every consideration called for the early reestablishment 
of the Union.24 
Although there is no express commendation of presi-
dential _reconstruction to be ·found. in his reports or else-
where, yet we see that Grant's obse-rvations and recommend-:-
ations .were quite in line with Johnson's plans. 
Gideon Welles, who was throughly in sympathy with the 
Presiden~'s 6onciliatory policy thought that Grant's views 
were "sensible, patriotic and wise.n 25 In the country at 
large the report of Grant was taken to be an endorsement 
and support of the restoration views of Johnson, and placed 
him in opposition to the Radicals in Congress.26 However 
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Grant's support ;of ·Johnson was probably unintentional.· 
John~on;s ingr~tiating personai a~tentibn~ had not succeed-
ed in making him a" staunch per.sonal supporter. They rather 
~nnoyed than pleased him. 'H~ ~id not have confidence in · 
·Johnson's judgn1ent. Coolidge, in· his biography of Grant,-
asserts that Grant in talking to General James H. Wilson 
. . 49 . .· , . 
in command at Macon, Georgia (during his trip to the South) 
"did not.hesitate to discredit the judgment of Andrew Johnson". 
On trie other hand· he did ·not c6nceal his dislike for Stanton's 
arbitrary ways. "He distruste~ the senatorial group with 
which Stanton was associated and·d~clared that his own vie~s 
were not only thoroughly conservative, but thoroughly kind 
a~ to the generals and politici~ns of the South.n27 iffe may 
safely conclude that Grant, although not ac~vely giving 
. ' ' . 
his support to Johnionts reconstruction policy at least 
acquiesced to what had been accomplished up to the time Of 
the meeting of Congress in December, 1865. 
It is apparent that through-out· the iear 1865 and most 
of the following year Grant avo~ded taking sides in the polit-
ical controversy on Reconstruction. "I put on the uniform of 
no party" he asserted.. By March 1866, however, he began to 
emphasize a little more' markedly the difference between the 
President ts plan of reconstruction and his ovm~ "It is pro-
bably also" says Garland in his Life of Grant, "that Rawlins, 
Babcock, and others of the politicians on his staff .had pro-
duced an effect by harping on the belief that he was to be 
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the irresistible choice for the Presidency at the end of 
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Johnson's term. Grant admitted his asperations at this 
time but said he was too young to become a candidate in 
1868, but he might think of becoming a candidate in 1872."28 
It is certain that the Radical politicians in Congress 
were trying to win Grant over to their standard. In July, 
1866 Congress passed a law reviving the grade of General, 
with the purpose in view, of course, of Grant's promotion 
to that exceptional office. The bill had been for a long 
time hung up in a committee when Secretary of War, Stanton, 
thinking to.turn Grant from Johnson's influence and secure ,., 
his loyalty to Congress went to the committee and gave 
reasons which, although entirely political, were neverthe-
less accepted as s'uff icient for the passage of the bill; and 
it was passed.29 Stanton recommended to the President that 
the bill be approved. Johnson hesitated, considering the 
law unnecessary and stating that an additional grade would 
not give more effect tt> Grant's services than had already 
been done bi 6onferring upon him the rank he then held. 
The bill was finally signed, July 25, 1866. 
Grant understood that the law reviving the grade of 
General was passed for his benefit. He called at the Exe-
cutive Mansion, and requested that when his name was sent 
to the Senate for approval, General Sherman's should accom-
pany it for Lieutenant General. 30 Stanton gave hi~ personal 
attention to the promotion and took pains to let Grant know 
that he wanted it. 31 
Johnson wished to have it appear that General Grant 
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supported him in his reconstruction policies. Especially was 
this important to his interests in the on-coming congressional 
elections in the fall of 1866. 
On August 18, a committee from the political conventiqn 
at Philadelphia, held to promote the interests of the Demo-
cratic party, called on the President to present resolutions 
of sympathy. Late in the morning of their arrival Johnson· 
sent a note to General Grant requesting that he be present 
at the reception, which was to take place at one o'clock. :~: 
Grant felt obliged to obey the sumrnons although he did not 
wish. to hai~ his presenc~ indicate that he supported the 
President politically. He called at the White House with the 
intention of excusing himself, but opportunity to do so did 
not offer itself. so Grant, out of courtesy to the Presi-
dent's wishes was compelled to stand by Johnson during the 
entire demonstration, greatly to his own disgust and cha-
grin. 32 During his speech to the delegation Johnson made 
reference to the heroism of the soldiers in the war (turn-
ing to Grant) and stated that their support was ~till need-
ed to aid ·the efforts being then made to restore the govern-
ment and perpetuate peace •. Badeau, Grant's secretary, 
later wrote that the General .'.!returned to his headquarters 
afterward full of indignation ~t the device .bY which he 
had been entrapped, and beginning to detest the policy of 
the President, if for nothing else, because of his petty 
!lJ.aneuveringn. 33 
36. 
In August of 1866 President Johnson determined to.make 
a speaking tour of the northern states for the purpose of 
carrying the issues of reconstruction to the people. It 
was important :ror the success of his :program that the Rad-
icals should not win in the fall Congressional elections. 
He had been asked to speak at the ceremony of laying the 
cornerstone to the Douglas monument in Chicago. Osten-
sibly his trip was made with th~t end in view, but the ex-
cursion was made to include visits to important cities quite 
distant from the direct route to his destination. 
The pr~sidential party included Secretaries Seward arid 
Welles of the Cabinet, Admiral Farragut and General Grant 
and other celebrities who had won fame in the late war. 
General Grant, on being invited to go with the party, had 
offered repeated excuses and f inallj consented only because 
of the urgent personal solicitation of the President.34 
The political friends of Grant, believing the Presi-
dent had asked him to accompany him in order that it might 
be apparent that he had the General's political support, 
urged him not· to go,35 but the General considered it his 
duty to obey his superior officer. He thought that since 
he was a soldier and not a political candidate for office 
the political considerations of the trip would not effect 
him. 36 However, Grant saw that his presence in the party 
would be constrewed to mean that he was supporting the 
Administration's po.licies and resolved to be noncommital 
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on the subject of politics. During the trip the President 
and Mr. Seward gave put implications designed to convey the 
impression that General Grant was a political supporter of 
the President's policy.3? Johnson, speaking at a banquet 
at Delmonico's at New York said, "I know, as you know, that 
we have just passed through a bloody, perilous conflict; we 
have gentlemen who are associated with us ori this occasion 
who have shared their part and participated in these strug-
. gles for the preservation of the Union. (Great appl.ause.) 
Here is the Army, (pointing to the right, where sat General 
Grant) and here the Navy, (pointing to the left in .the dir-
ection of Admiral Farragut.) They have performed their 
part in restoring the Government to its present condition 
of safety and security; • . . .As for the humblC? i)ldividual 
who now stands before you, and to whom you have so kindly 
and pleasantly alluded, as to what part he has performed 
in this g~eat drama, in this struggle for the restoration 
of the Government and the suppression of rebellion, I will 
say that I feel, though I may be included in this summing 
up, that the ·Government has done its duty. (Cheers) But 
though the Government has done its duty ••• there is' still 
a greater and more impo:rt$.n.:t ... :tµ.s}( fpr ,you,, .a11<). others to 
perform. (Cheers)"38 Two other references were made to 
Grant in the same speech, one of which was as follows: "I 
have helped my distinguished friend on the right, General 
Grant, to fight the rebels South, and I must not forget a 
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peculiar phrase,the.t he was going to fight it out on that 
line. (Applause and laughter) I was with him, and did all 
that I could; and when we whipped them at one end of the 
line, I want to say to you that I am for whipping them at 
the other end of the line. (Great applause and laughter) 
I thank God that if he is not in the field,_ militarily 
speaking, thank God! he is civilly in the- field on the other 
side. (Cheers for Grant) n39 
As is well known the ,speaking tour prove~ to be a very 
unprofitable one for the President. Hi~ ~ddre~~e~ were not 
well received and many times the. crowd h_eck.l_ed.~ ... ".At Cleve-
land there was evidently a concerted plan tq preveµt _the 
President from speaking or embarrass him in his renia.rks", 
wrote Welles in his diary. "Grant, I think_ha~_been advised 
of this and it affected. him unfavorably_ •. u40 The _President 
in his speeches at Cleveland and elsewhere greatly lowered 
his dignity by answering those who would p.eckl.e ~im from 
the crowd. Everywhere Grant was the popula~ hero. Johnson 
continued to lose favor •. At Chioagq. it was wi tp. _difficulty 
that the board of trade and the city o;rricials.w~re brought 
to offer a decent welcome to the President. 41 .. ~uplic i_nter-
est seemed to center around Grant and Farragu~. _At the meet-
ing at Springfield the calls for Grant _wer.t? so i.ns is tent and 
powerful that the President quite lost his_he~d and cried out, 
"We are not here in the character of candtda~es .. for office 
run_~ing against each other!" Later, to tlios.e.v{Po were dis-
39. 
posed to disturb, he shouted, "I am in the.line vvith General 
Grant, contending for the union of the Stat~s.tt42 
Grant was generally reticent throughout the journey, 
not being persuaded to speak, or take part i.n. th.e poli ~ical 
discussion. However in Cincinnati the demonstration for 
Grant became so marl{ed that the General f~l t. obli.dged to 
talk. He said that he stood next to the Pre~id~nt as the 
head of the army, but that he was not t~e le~de~ of a po-
litical party; that he did not consider the army a.place 
for politicians, and would not therefore b~ commiijtedto 
the support of the present political party, . qr . consent that 
the army be made a party machine~ .He would ~9t.al~ow ~ny-
thing to be said which would seem.to fqreshad9w.his resig-
nation from the army and his.candidacy for political office.43 
The meetings at Indianapolis and at Pittsb'~rg were 
sto·rmy and turbulent. At the latter place the. cr.owd became 
so noisy that the President could not· be heard •. Cries for 
Grant were so loud and incessant that the Presid~µt·called 
the General to the front of the :platform. . .Tlie .. c:x;qwc1 .. res-, 
ponded with mighty cheers. When he bowed anc1 reti.r~d the · 
President found it impossible to get a furthe~ hearing.44 
During the tour General Grant left the Pr.esidential 
party on two different occasions, aiter .each of which he 
rejoined Johnson. 45 Arter. the President's u:p.plea.sa.nt ex-
perience with the crowd at Cleveland, General Q-rant, with 
his close friend, General Rawlins, left the party and went 
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by boat to Detroit. 46 The Radical press made much of this, 
stating that General Grant had separate·d r·rom the party out 
of disgust at Johnson's "drunken di~playtt in Cleveland. At 
the Southern Loyalist's Convention which was then in session 
at Philadefphia, the report came that Grant and Farragut had 
. i 
deserted the Pr.esident. · This dispatch was .greeted.with "the 
wildest enthusiasm, tbe entire Convent~on ~ising and waving 
their hats, and giving three cheers fqr .Grant and Farragut."47 
From the reports in the papers many people got the impression 
tha.t Grant had really deserted the· President, but Grant rejoin-
ed Johnson's party at Chioago.48 
Welles tells us that the reason for Grant's first absence 
from the party was due to in toxic.at ion. . t'Gran t, n he says, "left 
the party at Cleveland and went by st~a,.mer ~o.D~troit. He 
had abstained from liqu<?r, until our ~rrival·Lr~.Buffalo. 
Thence through the day until we re~ohed Qleveland_he became 
garrulous and communicative to Mrs. F(arragutL as .she after-
warQ. informed me, and was with surgeon Gen. Buvo_is put on 
board the steamer for Detroit, both of them in.toxica ted. n49 
Grant's second absence was oc~asioned by. th;e. vi.sit he 
paid to his father in Ohio. He left th~ party at St •. Louis 
and rejoined Johnson at Cincinnati. Whil~ :waiting. for the 
Presidential party at Cincinnati an .. attempt was_ made_ by the 
Radicals there, to stage a demonstrati9n for ~tm, but this 
Grant would not allow, but he promised that, .in company with 
. 50 the President he would be glad to see them the next day. 
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Very apparently there were deliberate plans of concerted 
action back of the demonstrations .for Grant ~nd. the persecution 
of the President. Gideon Welles in his.Diary writ~s that at 
Columbus a.nd other places there was ttsome. sch~ming to antago-
nize General Grant and the President a~d _malrn i.t appear that 
the interest was especially for the for~er .... Gr.eat :pains have 
been ta~en by partisans to misr~pr~sent the Prestd~nt and mis-
state facts and to decieve and prejudice the_people against 
hifu. There is special.vindiciiv~~ess and 4~~r~gar4 of truth 
by members of Congress everywhere. tt51 An9.. in ~nether. place 
Welles writes ttGeneral Grant whom the Radi.cals.have striven 
to use and to offset against the President, who generally.re-
aeived louder cheers and c~led out mqre a:tten~ion .than the 
President himself,.~. saw,as did all oth~rs,.~h~ ~a~tisan 
designs and schemes of the Radicals. 0 52 
Welles believed that Grant still retained .convJ.ctions 
in harmony v1i th the administration. In a personal interview 
with Welles the General agreed with him that the Union eho.uld . ' . ' ' ' . . . ' . ~ ' . . . . '' " " 
be reestablished at once in all of its primitiye_vJgor and 
53 that all of the states should be representated tn Congress. 
But if Grant still·entertained views on reconstruction 
similar to the President's, he could hardly b~ expected to 
retain aonf idence in and remain on. g9od terms with the Pres-
ident :personally, disliking as he di.d the pet;ty ~~neuvers of 
Johnson to inplicate him in the ~pparent sup9~rt of his po-
1 ic ies. Moreover, Johnson's undignified contep.tions with the 
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hecklers in the meetings, the ·demonstrations. ag~inst the Pres-
ident and the running comment of cri tic'is~ an.d ridi9,1:lle in the 
newspapers were all conducive to lowering his estimation of 
the President. 
Stanton commented as follows: "The exhibition now going 
on" ~f "the head of our.nation reeling through the country as 
set· forth daily in the :public prints~ ••. ttwould do more to 
bring the General to his senses than anything I can possible 
dot'. 54 
"For more than h~lf of our journey" declared Welles, 
"Grant clung to the President •..• But first at Detroit, then 
at Chicago, St. Louis, and finally at Cincinnati, it became. 
obvious he had begun to listen.to the seductive appeals of 
the Radical conspirators. The influence of his father . .. 
finally carried him into the Radical ranks". 55 Before the 
tour was completed Grant, excusing himself on the grountl;s 
·of illness, left the Presidential party in disgust and re-
turned to Washington.56 
The events of the ttswing Around the Circle 0 did much to 
alienate Grant from the President. The General could no long- · 
er hold in respect the man who had endeavored to use him un-
fairly for political purposes and who had lost so much in the 
public's estimation. Just how much the Radicals succeeded in 
influencing Grant to change his personal views on Reconstruc~ 
tion is difficult to estimate. It is certain, however, that 
the antipathy and distrust with which Grant henceforth held the 
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President precluded further confidence of the General in his 
chief and made him ready to take an oppbsite stand on polit-
ical issues. 
44. 
Chapter III Secret Mistrust 
Several influences contributed to aliena.te General Grant 
from the President and to make him sympathetic to, if not 
quite won over to the Radical Cause• As pointed out above, 
"thl . 
the events of the "Swing 'Round the Circle'' loweredJ(General' s 
esteem for the President. It must be remembered aiso that a 
heated polftical campaign was being fought• The Radicals 
were using every means to discredit the President and his 
policy. Johnson was held up to ridicule. He was called a 
"trickster", a "calamitous and traitorous Executive", a "drunk-
er tailor" .a "purjured and usurping traitortt, ana a "demo-
gogue ••• consumed with egotism".l Thomas Nast caracatured 
him unmercifully in the papers, while ·1n the humorous writ-
ings of "Petroleum Nasby" Johnson's dignity suffered disastrous-
ly.2 
Johnson's policy was condemned. He was blamed for the 
riots at New Orleans and Memphis. 3 General Logan predicted 
tha.t Johnson's plan would "inaugurate another revolution and 
more bloodshed."4 The Radical papers--and nearly all of· 
the Republican journals and small town newspapers were Radi-
cal, 5 --were arrayed against the President. False reports 
were common. A good example of a very damaging report is 
found in the widely published story of Johnson's plot to 
overthrow Congress. 
On October 11, the Philadelphia Ledger, pr1nted what 
purported to be a verbatim copy of a list of questions sub-
mitted by Johnson to Attorney-General Stanberry on the con-
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stitutionality of the actual Congress. Reports had been rife 
during the summer that Johnson was planning to use the army 
to overthrow Congress and to set up in its place a new body 
composed of Southerners and Copperheads. These questions, 
first appearing in the Philadelphia Ledger, were wisely 
printed throughout the C?untry as proof of Johnson's plot.6 
When traced to their source it was discovered that the 
questions had been written by Henry.·M. Flint, the Ledger'~ .. 
Washington correspondent and then sent to the paper as a 
,y 
verbatim copy of Johnson's. Flint had heard indirectly, 
that the President had recently stated to an intimate friend 
"that he had never made any hasty or unconsidered statements 
about the constitutionality or legality of the present Con-
gress, and that all that he ha~ sa.id he intended to abide 
by, and that the Radical leaders of Congress seemed disposed 
to carry matters with a high hand next winter but that un-
questionably the Gonstitution conferred certain powers up-
on him, ••• which he would not shrink from performing, bu~ 
) 
that he would take no step ••• without consulting his con-
stitutional legal adviser and would be governed by his ad-
vice." Flint had also learned that a paper had been seen 
in the Attorney-General's office, but by _accident and only 
for a moment, purporting to have come from the President's 
office. 7 
Upon these inferences, then, Flint had built his story 
and concocted the questions himself. Never-~he-less the story 
was believed by many who had no chance to read .the facts. 
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It is not known whether or nor General Grant believed 
this story. When a witness before an investigating com-
mittee of Congress in the spring of 1868 he testified that 
he had heard Johnson say "that if the.North carried thee-
lection .by members enough to give them, with the Southern 
members, a majority why should they not be the Congress of 
the United States" .8 Grant nov1 possibly thought Johnson 
might attempt to overthrow the Radical Congress by force of 
arms. Certainly he became suspicious that the Pres id.ant was 
contemplating some "disloyaltt act as we shall see later. g 
The influence of his Radical friends who urged upon 
Grant the idea that he was to be the choice for the Pres-
idencylO at the end of Johns9n's term undoubtedly affected 
the General's attitude toward Johnson. 
General Rawlins had been willing for Grant to continue 
on the tri:p with John~on to Chicago. It would, he had said, 
"do.Grant good, whatever may be his asperations in the fu-
ture, and fix him in the confidence of Mr. Johnson,. enab-
ling him to fix up the army as it should be, and exert such 
influence as will be of benefit t.o the country. ull But when 
Johnson's defeat in the elections of' 1866 was certain Rawlins 
changed his attitude toward the President.12 James H. Wilson 
in his biography of Rawlins writes that Rawlins was now con-
vinced nthat Grant's chances for the succession would be 
injured by further indentification with Johnson and his po-
l i.cy. ,,13 
In October Grant gave such assurances to his Radical 
friends that his supnorters in Illinois predicted he would be 
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the choice for the Presidency in 1868.14 
Unquestionably the overwhelming Radical victory in the 
election of 1866 helped to convert Grant to the Radical Gause. 
To this.Badeau testifies as follows:. "Grant had taken no 
decided step up to the time of the election of 1866~ but wh~n 
the will of those who had won the war was definately known, 
he declared that their decision should be accepted •.•• 
Grant had ••• a double reason for disapproving Johnson's 
course; not only the deliberate decision of the people was 
against the President, but the voice of the vast majority 
of Union men had reached their leader."15 
Grant now used his ·influence to prevail on the south 
to accept the results of the election. Many· southerners 
who came to Washington visited Grant's headquarters. The 
General pleaded with them to acqept the terms of the North. 
He told them that submission would secure a lightening of 
the conditions about to be imposed• He even advised the 
President about the course he thought he (Johnson) should 
take,· in view of the verdict of the late elections. 16 
Heno eforth, General Grant was to worl\: in opposition to 
the President, believing as he did that Johnson was hinder-
ing the work of bringing the North and the South once more 
into :peaceful union. "He avoided offending, and he never 
disobeyed the President", says Badeau. '1There was still 
no open rupture, no appearance of difference before the 
public; and a~ the very time when many at the North sus-
-peoted Grant of favoring the President's, he was in reality 
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doing more than al..l the country besides to thwart Johnson's 
designs."17 
That General Grant thoroughly distrusted the President 
in the fall bf 1866 is proven by the following letter which 
he wrote to General Sheridan at New Orleans. The letter is 
dated Oct. 12, 1866. 
(Confide'ntial) 
Armies of the United States, 
i/fashington, D. C. 
Dear General,--! regret to say that since the 
unfortunate differences between the President and 
Congress, the former becomes more violent with the 
opposition he meets with, until now but few people 
who were loyal to the Government during the Rebell~ 
ion seem to have any confidence with him. None have· 
unless they join.in a crusade against Congress, and 
4eolare their ao~s, the principa~ ones, illegal and 
indeed I much fear that we are fast approaching the 
time when he will want to declare the body itself 
illegal, unconstit~tional, and revolutionary. Com-
manders in Southern States will have to take great 
care to see, if a crisis does come, that no armed 
headway can be made against, the Union. For this rea-
son it will be very desirable that Texas should have 
no reasonable excuse for calling out the militia 
auttrorized by their legislature·• Indeed it should be 
prevented. I write this in strict confidence, but 
to let you know how matters stand in my opinion, so 
that you may square your official action accordingly. 
Very respectfully, your obedient se;rvant, 
U. s. Grant 
To Major-General P. H. Sheridan 
P.S.--I gave orders quietly two or three weeks since 
for the removal of all arms in store in the Southern 
'States·:to N'orthern arsenals. I wish you would see that 
'those t'rom Ba ton Rouge and other places within your 
command are being moved rapidly by the ordinance offi-
cers having the matter in charge. u.s.G.18 
Duririg the month of October 1866, while the election diff-
iculties in Maryland were pending President Johnson decided 
to send Grant on a mission to Mexico. 
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Napoleon III had not yet removed his army f'rom Mexico. 
The existence. of the Maxmillian empire supported by French 
troops had, for years been a problem confronting our State 
Department. In March of 1866, however, Napoleon under 
pressure of Secretary Sewardts diplomacy and in apprehension 
of difficulties.at home gave directions for the gradual with-
drawal ot the French troops.19 
In bringing pressure to bear on France, .Seward let it 
be known that he might accredit an envoy to the Mexiaan Re-
public, thus recognizing the J"uarez Gover~ent. 20 Later the 
State Department proceeded to carry out this plan. Lewis.D. 
Campbell was appointed plenipotentiary to the tTuarez Govern-
ment in May 1866.21 However the envoy was prevented from 
proceeding immediately to Mexico because of the disturbed 
conditions there. Finally in O~tober it was determined that 
Campbell should go and that General:Grant should accompany 
him as his military advisor. 
General Grant had shown great inte'rest in the Mexican 
question. He had repeatedly urged Johnson to send ~n army 
to Mexico, arguing that the Nortli'~nd South\w~uld be united 
by a war with a foreigh country. He had even gone so far 
as to give secret orders to General Schofield to organize 
if necessary an army of American volunteers in Texas for 
enrollment under the Liberal Government of Mexico 'to drive 
out the French. 22 Since Grant had taken such an interest 
in Mexico he would be the logical man.to accompany Campbell. 
Moreover this diplomatic mission would take on an air of 
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greater importance than otherwise the President thought, 
if the famous General was a party to it.23 
The official instructions to Campbell stated that "some 
disposition of the land and naval forces of the United States, 
without violating the laws of neutralitytt might be made, "which 
would be useful in favoring the restoration of law, order, 
and re.publican government in that countryfl1exicQ)'." ttThe Gen-
eral. of the United States Army possesses already, discretion-
ary authority as to the location of the forces of the United 
States in the vicinity of Mexico. His military experience 
will enable him to advise you concerning such questions as 
may arise during the transition stage of Mexico, from a 
military seige by a foreign enemy, to a condition of pract-
ical self government. At the same time it will be in his 
power, being near the scene of action, to issue any orders 
which may be· expedient or necessary for maintaining the 
obligations resting upon the United States in regard to pro-
ceedings upon the borders of Mexico. 
"For these reasons he has been requested and instructed 
by the President to proceed with you to your destination.n24 
Johnson sent for Grant on the 17th of October 1866, and 
mentioned the subject of sending him on the mission to Mex-
ico. Gr~nt at that conference seemed to show satisfaction 
with the proposed arrangements.25 However he states that 
he wished to be in Washington on the return of Congress in 
December. President Johnson assured him that this could be 
done. During the course of the conversation, the President 
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aslced Grant if there was any objection to General Sherman 
coming to Washington for a few days. Grant replied, of 
course, th~t there was.none, The General in accordance 
with the will Of the President wrote to Sherman requesting 
that he come to the city.26 
On Thursday the 18th the instruct'ions to Mr. Campbell 
were completed and were read to General Grant to ascertain 
whether or not he had any suggestions to make. Grant said 
that he had-none to submit. 27 
However, the General, after some consideration decided 
that he did not wish to go on the mission and in cabinet 
meeting declared that he did not think it expedient for him 
to go out of the country. Stanton had expres.sed these same 
views at a previous cabinet meeting.28 
On Sunday the 21st Grant addressed a letter to the 
President in which he begged to be excused from the proposed 
duty. ttit is a diplomatic service for which I am not fitted 
either by education or taste," he said. ttit has necessarily 
to be conducted under the.state Department with which my 
duties do not connect·me."29 
Notwithstanding this refusal, in a day or two Grant was 
summoned to a full cabinet meeting when the instructions were 
read to him by the Secretary of State exaotly as if he had 
not declined to accept the mission. The General, now aroused, 
declared his unwillingness to go.- The President, becoming 
angry, asked.the Attorney General if there was any reason why 
General Grant should not obey his order. "Is he in any way 
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ineligible to this position?tt he inquired. Grant started to 
his feet and exclaimed, "I can answer that question~ Mr. Pres-
ident, without referring to the Attorney General. I am an 
.American Citizen, and eligible to any office to which any 
American is eligible. I am an officer of the army and bound· 
to obey your military orders. But this is a civil office, a 
purely diplomatic duty, and I cannot be compelled to under~ake 
it. _ti,ny legal military order you give me I will obey; but 
this is civil and not military; and I decline the duty. No 
power on earth can compel me to do it!'' No one replied and 
Grant immediately left the cabinet room.30 
Grant had declared that he was not bound to obey orders 
of the State Department. The formal letter of Seward, however 
expressly stated "By direction of the President, I request you 
· to proceed to Mexico .•.• " To meet General Grant's objection 
Johnson decided to give direct.ions through the War Department. 
Accordingly he drew up a letter to the Secretary of War direc-
ting him to ttinstruct General Ulysses s. Grant comman~ing the 
armies of the United States to proceed to Mexico •.•• n 3: 
This letter was submtl:tted to the cabinet, when after con-
sideration, it was decided, that as the duty asked of General 
Grant was of a civil character and might be open to question 
as to the authority of the government to send him on such a 
mission, the communication to Stanton was· modified to ask the 
secretary of V'lar to "request G~neral Grant to :proceed to some 
point on our Mexican frontier most suitable and convenient 
for communication with our minister, or (if General Grant 
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deems it best) to accompany him to his destination in Mexico, 
and t·o give him the aid of his advice in carrying out the in-
structions of the Secretary of State" etc. 32 · 
Receiving the instructions \through the Secretary of War, 
Grant in a. note to tha:t"·Official once more declined to· accept 
the proffered duty. He gave as an additional reason to those 
already mentioned that the reorganization of the army and the 
redistribution of the troops required that he keep within tel-
egraphic communication with the department commanders and 
with Washington from where orders must eminate. He suggested 
that either General Sheridan or General Hancock who were 
already in the Southwestern United States or General Sherman 
who was in command of the ·western Military Division might 
be sent instead of himself. "If it is desirable that our 
minister communicate.with me,'' Grant continued, "he can do 
so through the officer who may accompany him, ••• I might 
say that I would not dare counsel the minister ·1n any matter 
beyond the consent of the'administration. That concurrence 
could. be more speedily had with me here than if I were on 
the frontier.u33 
In the meantime General Sherman had arrived in Wash-
ington. He went'immediately to Grant's home as Grant had. 
invited him to do 'and the latter explained the situation 
to him. Grant felt that there had been a plot to get rid 
of himself and told Sherman so.· He declared that he was de-
termined to disobey the order and stand the consequences.34 
' 
General Sherman then went to call upon the President · 
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who. informed him that Grant was to be sent to Mexico and that 
he was to command the army in the absence of the General-in-
Chief. Sherman assured Johnson that Grant could not be per• 
suaded to go and s~id plainly that the President could not 
afford to quarrel with Grant at that time. The President 
"seemed amazed," Vlrote Sherman in his memotrs • .Johnson "said 
that it was generally understood that General Grant constru-
ed the occupation of the territdries of our neighbor, Mex-
ico by French troops, ••. as hostile to republican Americ·an 
... that Mr. Campbell had been accredited to Juarez., and 
the fact that he was accompanied by so distinguished a sold-
ier as General Grant, would emphasize the act of the United 
States"35 
Sherman indicated his own willingness to go instead of 
Grant and the President agreed to, the substitution.. "Cer-
tainly," he said, "if you will go, that will answer perfect-
lytt36 
As the vessel carrying Sherman on his mission left New 
York harbor, General Sherman remarked to a friend, "My mission 
is already .ended. By substitution myself I have prevented a 
s·erious quarrel between the administration and Grant. n 37 
Two questions naturally arise in regard to the attempt 
to send Grant to Mexico. First, what were the President's 
real motives in thus desiring that the General-in-Chief should 
leave Washington on a diplomatic mission of such a useless 
character? Secondly, what were the real influences which 
prompted Grant's refusal to go? 
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In answer to the first question it may be said that 
there is much evidence to show that Johnson wished to get 
rid of Gener~l Grant, temporairly at least,· so that Sherman, 
who was more friendly to the President's reconstruction 
program could be put in his place. General Sherman s{!:y_s in 
his memoirs, "I am sure this whole movement was got u:p for 
the purpose of getting General Grant away from Washington.n38 
Since the return of· the Presidential party from the Swing 
Around the Circle in September Grant had been working against "' . 
Johnson's Southern policy. While Johnson was urging the 
Southern States to reject the 14.th Amendment39 which had been 
submitted to the states for ratification, Gra·nt was using 
every opportunity presented to him to advise the people of 
the South to accept the amendment and conform to the situa-
tfon that was thrust upon them by the North. He argued, thus, 
to a deputation of men from Arkansas who were visiting Wash-
ington for political reasons. Yvi th every Southerner: he,0met, · 
and many came to see him, he pleaded the necessity of submis-
sion to the will of the North.40 
In thu~ engaging in politics, Grant's motive' was not so 
much to thwart the President as to keep peace in· the land 
and to save the country from turmoil and strife.41 But cer-
tainly he was working against the President's interests and 
his presence in Washington was to that extent objectionable. 
Sherman in a letter to the President the preceding February 
had strongly endorsed the President's policy of reconstruc-
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tion. On the day that Johnson first proposed to General 
Grant the trip to Mexico he read Sherman's letter to Grant, 
at its conclusion remarking that he thought of publishing 
it. Grant expressed disapproval, saying that military men 
did not like expressions of .theirs which were calculated 
to array them on one or the other side of antagonistic 
political parties to be brought before the public.42 The 
fact that Johnson wished to publish Sherman's letter of appro-
val at the time he was calling him to Washington and sending 
Grant away on a useless mission, coupled with the rumors 
published in the newspapers that Stanton would resign and 
be sent as Ambassador to Spain seem to ind.icate that it was 
the President's intention to elevate Sherman to the position 
.of ~ecretary of War.43 This could most gracefully be accom-
plished while the Commander-tn-Ch,ief. of the army was away 
and Sherman was in acting command at Washington. 
Badeau states that Grant's course in the Maryland Eleet-
ions had helped to convince the President that Grant could not 
be used by him in his schemes.44 This could hardly be the 
case because Grant had declined to go on this Mexican trip 
on the 2lst~45 of October while he did not write the letter 
to Johnson arguing agaipst military intervention in Mary-
land until October 24. 46 
As to the influences which kept Grant from accepting 
the duty of accompaning Campbell, it may be said with cer-
tainty that Grant suspected Johnson of designing to get rid 
of him so that he could not obstruct the President in carry-
ing out his policies. That jealousy of Sherma.n',s pro-
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motion to a position superior to his own was one of his motives 
for refusing to relinquish direct contr~l of· the army is pro-
bably not true. During the war when Congress had under con-
sideration a proposal to make General Sherman Lieutenant Gen-
eral and eligible to command the army and some thought that 
Sherman should surplant General Grant, the latter wrote to· 
'Sherman as ,··.follows:< r'Tf you should be put in command and I 
, -~..: , .. , / .. . . 
put subordinate, it would not change our relations .in the 
least. I would make the same exertions to support you that 
you have done to support me and I would do all in my power 
to make our cause win.n4? Sherman declared that Grant was 
willing that he should be Secretary of War but he (Sherman) 
was not.48 Sherman always expressed a loathing for politics 
in general and in particular he did not wish to be involved 
in the intrigue at Washington. 
Undoubtedly the,rumors which were afloat that the Pres-
ident would not recognize the Congress when it met in Dec-
ember, and might even at tempt to disperse· it by force of 
arms had come to Grant and made him suspicious of Johnson's 
motives in wishing to send him to Mexico.49 In this he was 
influenced by Stanton's attitude of opposition toward the 
President. No doubt Grant had been influenced by the Rad-
ical Republicans as his actions certainly reflected their 
proi:>aganda.50 Grant believed that whatever Johnson's mo-
tives were, his actions were highly suspicious in view of 
the political situation, and conceived that it was his duty 
to stay in Washington at the head of the army in order to be 
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able to thwart any movement which Johnson might make to use 
the power of the army for disloyal purposes.51 
Stanton had told Grant that Johnson wanted to get rid of 
him in order that he {cTohnson) might use ,the army against 
eongress.52 c. B. Comstock recorded in his diary that Grant 
believed the story. 53 Unquestionably Grant was opposed to 
the President's policy now and distrusted his motives. Un-
doubte.dly he wanted to remain to reorganize the army. Comstock 
suggests in his diary that Grant feared that if he went on 
the mission and the negotiations failed, "it would not fail 
to damage him,while if he did anything, Seward, whom he dis-
likes thoroughly would either overrule or appropriate the 
credit.n54 This was possibly an influential factor but when 
all of the evidence of Grant's distrust of the President is 
considered it is clear that it was Grant's fear of a coup 
d'~tat against Congress that was the determining factor in 
his decision to remain in Washington. 
As the time for the fall elections approached it was 
further demonstrated that Grant had swung over to the side 
of the Radioal~. and that he completely distrusted the Pres-
ident. Riots threatened the cit~ of Baltimore. In the month 
of Octoper, 1866 the authorities in Maryland were engaged in 
the work of registering the voters in all parts of the State. 
At that time the Democrats were in control of the state go-
vernm·ent • It was claimed by the Radical Republicans that 
many thousands who had engaged in the rebellion and.who were 
legally excluded under the constitution had been registered 
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by the authorities and especially by the poihice commiss-
ioners of Bal~imore.55 
The newspapers took up the controversy. Forney in the 
Chronicle, and other radical editors denounced the Democra-
tic Governor Swann and his adherents and called on the Rad-
icals of other states to be prepared to assist in putting 
down the state suthorities. Governor Swann conferred repeat-
edly with President Johnson, appealing to him for armed sup-
port.56 
At the same time the Radicals were carrying their side of 
the question to the Secretary of War. One of the leading Rad-
icals, Judge Bond, conferred with Mr. Stanton as often as the 
Governor' consulted the President.57 
Johnson believed that steps should be taken. to preserve. 
the peace. He consulted G~neral,Grant, requesting that troops 
be sent to the vicinty of Baltimore. Grant distrusted the 
President'8,m<;>tives. He and -Stanton thought that in the ex-
cited state of feeling of the people the use of troops would 
be exasperating. Could it be possible that the President wish-
ed to tempt his Radical opponents to cormnit some illegal act 
which would result in conflict and thus stigmatise the Radi-
cal element as being in rebellion to the Government? Grant 
believed that Johnson would be glad to put those who opposed 
his folicy into the position of rebels while. the Southerners 
would seem to be loyal to the Governor. 58 Grant protested 
against the sending of troops. In a letter to the President 
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dated October 24, 1866 he said, nrt is a contingency I hope. 
never to see arise in this country whilst I occµpy·the pos-
ition of General-in-Chief of the Army, to have to send troops 
into a state in full relations with the Gene.r.E11 Government, 
on the eve of an election, to preserve the peace. If insurr-
ection does come, the. law provides .the method of .. calling out 
forces to suppress it. No 1:such condition seems to .exist 
now.n59 
In the mean time the Radicals had set up a rival board 
of Police Commissioners in Baltimore.60 
Johnson, on the 25th of October wrote General Grant 
that "From recent developments serious troubles are appre-
handed from a conflict of authority between the executive 
of the state of Maryland and the police conunis~ioners <fJf 
the gity of Baltimore I therefore request that you in-
form me of the number of Federal troops at present stationed 
in Baltimore and vicinity."61 
General Grant on· the 27th reported to ·the J?resident that 
\ 
there ~ere 1,550 troops available.62 
It was known that there were ov·er five-hundred disbanded, 
but armea,·· negro soldiers in Baltimore. The P+e~ident and the 
Cabinet, with the exception of Stanton, who no d.oubt was· in 
conspiracy with the Radicals, thought that there should be add-
itional troops in the vicinity. Johnson realized that if 
there was a riot and bloodshed and the United.States troops 
were not there he would be much oritieized. He also knew 
that if he sent troops to Baltimore, he would be accused of 
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trying to control the election by military force. 63 Very 11:k~."'.' .. 
ly that was the reason why he did not take the responsibtlity 
of giving a direct order~or sending the trqop~ himself. 
Having failed in his attempts to induce Grant. to _seD:d troops 
. . I . 
to the disaffected city he took the circuitous method of writ-
ing to .the Secretary of War on November ls~, as. 1'.ollows: 
"In view of the prevalence in various portions. of the country 
of a revolutionary and turbulent disposition whicp. might at 
I 
any .. m6m~nt assume insurrectionary proportions and lead. to 
serious disorders, and of the duty of the government to be 
at all times prepared to act with decisio~ and effect, this 
force pf 1550. TneUJ is not deemed adequate for the protection 
and security of the seat of government.n64 
Secretary Stanton referred the President's.letter to Gen-
eral Grant with instructions to 'ntake such measures as in his 
judgment are proper and within his power to carry into oper-
ation the within directions of the President.tt As a result 
of this order six or eight companies from New York on their 
way to join regiments in the South were detained at Fory 
Henry, an~ a regiment in Washington was under orders to be 
ready to move upon motice. 65 Whereas, in his letter to 
Stanton on the 1st of November Johnson expressed anxiety 
for the: security. of ttthe seat of government," in another let-
ter to the Secretary of War on the following day he expressed 
concern for the 01.ty of Baltimore, evidently he wished to 
attain his ends wi thou·t a break with the General of the Army 
or he would have given 4 direct order for troops to be con-
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centrated at Baltimore.66 He wished to make it ap:pear that 
Stanton and Grant were ooopera·ting in the movement for the 
support of the legal authorities in Maryland, thus in a mea-
sure, relieving himself of the responsibility of what the 
Radio.als would term "interference" in the elections, the out:... 
come of which was so vital to his own interests. 
The elections passed without any disturbance in Balti-
more. The legal comJn.issioners had been imprisoned and the 
illegal ones kept in place until after the election. 67 · 
General Grant used his personal influence to prevent blood-
shed, making two visits to Baltimore and confe.rring with both 
parties to the. dispu.te. He persuaded them to leave the dec-
ision to the courts. 68 When the election was over and the 
Radicals were beaten, the judge ordered the legitimate com-
missioners of the city to be freed and ordered the Radical 
commissioners to vaca.te their position.69 
Whether or not General Grant by his person~~ influence 
prevented a riot in Baltimore, it would be speculative to 
try to answer. At any rate he was honest in trying.to pre-
vent any opportunity being given the President, whom so many 
including himself distrusted, to attempt any movement which 
would be harmful to the country. Grant thought that the 
President might attempt a coup d' etat and possible ever set 
aside the Congress of the United States. He thoroughly shar-
ed the Radicals' distrust of Johnson and looked u:pon every move 
~of the President with suspicion. 70 
62. 
That Grant was biased in favor of the Radicals is shown 
by the fact that when there were threats of disturbances by 
Conservatives in Tennessee at election time in July 1867 sim-
ilar to the circumstances in Maryland in the fall of 1866 
Grant telegraphed to Stanton recommending that Federal troops 
be used to preserve order. 
In the Fall of 1866 Grant became thoroughly committed to 
the Radical viewpoint of Reconstruction. As we have noticed 
he recommended to the Southern leaders that the. 14th Amend-
ment be adopted. 
In order that Congress should have more apparent cause 
for passing reconstruction legislation for the military rule 
of the South, Grant cooperated with Stanton in securing evi-
dence of violence in the Southern States. In a letter dated 
Jan. 18, 186? to General Howard, commanding the Freedmen's 
bureau, he asked th~t official to send him~ "a-~ist of authen-
ticated cases of murder and other violence_ ~pcm _fre(3dmen, 
northern or other Union men, refugees, etc. in the Southern 
I I 
states for the past six months or a year. My object in this,n 
he said, "is to make a report showing that the courts in the 
states eicluded from Congress afford no s~curity to life or 
property of the classes here referred to, and to recommend 
that martial law be declared over such districts as do not 
afford the; proper protection."71 
More than four months before, Congress had asked the 
.President for facts concerning any failure to enforee the 
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Civil Rights Law. At the request of Johnson all of the mem• 
bers of the Cabinet except Stanton had prepared re~orts. 
Stanton waited until ·General Grant through reports from the 
Freedman's Bureau had secured a mass of evidence. About the 
middle bf February 1867 when Congress was considering the 
St~vens' Reconstruction bill, Stantori submitted to the Pres-
ident his report accompanied by one also from General Grant 
and the evidence gathered by General Howard of murders; neigh-
borhood strife and troubles in the south. This evidence was 
turned over to Congress. 72 Gidean Welles .in commenting on 
the action of Stanton wrote that "Stanton had delaye~ his· 
answer until Howard and his subordinates. soatt_ered over the 
South could hunt up all the rwnors of negro quarrels and party 
scandal and malignity and pass them, through General Grant, 
on to the President. It would help generate difference be-
tween the President and the General, and if sent out to the 
.country under the call for information by Congress, would be s 
used by the demagogues to injure the President, and perhaps 
Grant also." 73 
It is plain that the report was to be a justification 
for Congress passing the law establishing military governments 
over the Southern States. Welles believed that "there had 
been evident preconcert in the matter, and Radical congress-
men were acting in concert with the War Department." "I could 
peroeive,u said Welles, "Grant had been strqngiy but unmis-
_takably prejudiced,perhaps seduced, worked over, and enlisted, 
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and that gradually the Administration was. coming_ under the 
War de:partment."74 
Johnson.took no steps ·to f'ind out how far Grant was in-
volved in the matter. 75 
The Military Reconstruction Act was drawn up with the 
advice of General Grant. Badeau, his se.cretary, says that 
·Grant was constantly consulted during the preparation·of the 
bili. 76 As originally passed by the House of Representatives 
the bill authorized the General of the .Armies (instead of the 
President) to appoint the commanders of the military districts. 
This, however, Grant disadvised. He urged that the appoint-
ment of district commanders should be left with the President 
and that the President, rather than the General o~ the Armies 
should have supervisory authority over reconstruction.77 
n In the Senate the bill was amended so as to place the 
power of appointment of departmental commanders in the hands 
of the President, and in this manner it was finally pass~d by 
the House which was at this.time contemplating the passage 
of the Army Appropriation Rider. Concocted by Stanton and 
Boutwell this amendment to the Army Appropriation bill as pass-
ed provided that the President should transmit all military or{ 
ders through the General.of· the army. Thus it was planned to 
prevent any possible attempt by the President to overthrow 
78 Congress by force, and to safe guard congres·sional recon-
-struction from possible obstructive ~ction on the part of the 
President by permitting the General of the Army, who had the 
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conf i_dence of Congress to visage all military orders. At the 
same time a trap was being laid. for the President so that Con-
gress might find legal ·grounds for impeachment.79 
Grant believed the Reconstruction measure of Congress 
to be the solution of the Southern problem80 and predicted 
that everything would be well under the new act n1r the Ad-
ministration and copperhead influence do not defeat the ob-
jects of that measure." In a letter to his friend Washburne, 
in April 186'7, Grant said, ur see no possible chance of gett-
ing abroad this year •••• Congress has made it my duty to 
perform certain offices, and while there is an antagonism 
between the Executive and the Legislative bEanches o:t' the 
Government, I feel the same obligation to stand at my post 
that I did whilst there were rebel armies in tlJ..e field to 
contend with •••• n 81 
Thus,w..e aoe- that Grant was completely won over to the 
Radical viewpoint. He even accepted the doctrine that negro 
suffrage, because of the diss~tisfaction at the South,- was a 
necessary expedient to preserve the Union and t9 prevent the 
Southerners from returning to their former position of power 
in the Union. "The· process of conversi.on (bf Gran.t) was slow, n 
wrote Badeau, "and the convert unwilling but when once he 
accepted the new faith, he remained firm.n82 
In the administration of the Reconstruction act Grant 
acted in harmony,with its apparent meaning and endeavored 
. ,. . 83 to carry out the intentions of the framers of the law. 
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When General Sheridan in command ·at New Orleans removed 
certain civil officers, President Johnson imrneQ.iat~ly declareJ' 
that district commanders had no pov1er under the law.· to make 
such removals. In this he was supported by the Attorney Gen-
e·ral··. Grant telegraphed to Sheridan, approving· his course, 
but advi~ed that he should make no further removals unless· 
84 absolutely necessary. 
On 4pril 5, 1867, Grant wrote to Sheridan as follows: 
"There is decided hostility to the whole Congressional plan 
of reconstruction at the ·white House, and a disposition to 
remove you from the c.ornmand you now have. _Both the Secretary 
of War and myself oppose any such move •••• There is nothing 
clearer to my mind than that Congress intended to give Dis-
trict Commanders entire control over the Civil government 
of these districts, for a specific· purpose, and only recog-
nized present civil authorities within these districts ·at 
all, for the convenience of their comr.aanders to make use of, 
or so much ot as suited them and as would aid them in carry-
ing out the congress'ional plan of restoring loyal :permanent 
governments. tt He again advised Sheridan not to remove off.~-
. 85 cers unless he found it apsolutely necessary. Grant ad-
vised the military commanders that in case civil officers ob-
structed the laws they should be suspended and tried by mil-
itary commission. This he believed to be unquestionably the 
right and province of the district commanders to do.86 In 
so instructing them he t~ied to avdid direct conflict with 
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the President. 
General Grant's dispatch to Gener(:rlPope? April 11, 1867 
was of such a character that Badeau in commenting upon it re-
marked: .. "There are passages in this letter which in ordinary 
times might have subjected its writer to trial by court mar-
tial for insubordination and disrespect to the President." 
The dispatch reads in part as follows: 
"My Dear General: •.•• My views are that District Com-
manders are res:ponsible for the faithful execution of the 
Reconstruction Act of Congress, and that in civil matters I 
cannot give them an order. I oan give them my ·views, however, 
for what they are worth and above all, I can advise them of 
views and opinions here which may serve to put them on their 
guard. 
"When Sheridan·removed civil officers in the State of 
Lou~siana, an act which delighted. the loyal North, ·and no~e 
more than the supporters of the Congressional Reconstruction 
Bill ,in Congress, it created quite a stir, and gaiVe expression 
to the opinion in other quarters, that he had exceeded his 
authority. • •• Rest assured that all you have done meets the 
·approval of all who wish to see the Act of Congress executed 
in good faith."87 
In carrying on the registration of voters required by 
the reconstruction act the District Commanders found that.many 
people were taking false oaths and thus a great many men were 
being registered whom Congress in~ended should be disfranchised. 
The Attorney General drew up an interpretation of the Reconstruc-
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tion law in Which he denied the right Of boards Of registra-
tion to adopt any measures for pratecting the ballot against 
false oaths of applicants for registration. According to his 
opinion no man could be disqualified who was willing to swear 
that he was qualified. 88 
This liberal opinion of the At.torney Gen_eral 's was sent 
out to the military._commanders the 20th of J"une 1867. When 
General Pope, one of the District Commanders, wrote to Grant 
inquiring whether the Attorney.General's opinion was to be 
treated as a presidential order to him to conform his action, 
to that opini.on Grant replied, ttEnforce yo~r own construction 
of the military bill until ordered to do otherwise. The opin-· 
ion of the Attorney General has not been distributed to com-
manders in language or manner entitling it to the force of 
an order; nor can I suppose that, the President intended it 
to have such force. tt He gave similar instructions to Gen-· 
er al Sheridan when that official i.nquired a.s to whether he 
was to regard the opinion of the Attorney General as an or-
der. 89 
:l In writing to General Ord he said, "the· lavv, • • • makes 
district commanders their own interpreters of the power and 
duty under it.~90 
Congress· soon passed s11pplementary reconst~uction legis-
lation leaving no doubt as.to the power of the District Com-
manders. They were given the right to suspend or remove ci-
vil officers. The conditions of registration were defined 
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so t;tiat it would be impossible to evade the intention of th~ 
law. The acts of the bistrict Commanders were made subject 
to the approval of the General of the army, while the same 
original power of removal and suspension Of civil Officers 
was conferred on him which they enjoyed, and it was made his 
duty to exercise .this power whenever necessary to carry out 
the purpose of the law. Thus we see Congress now had complete 
confidence in General Grant and conferred upon him the res-
ponsibility of supervising reconstruction. 91 
Grant had been consulted in the drafting of the supple~ 
mentary reconstruction act. But his couasel vms on the side 
of moderation. He probably was not ambitious for additional 
power. Certainly he shrank from assuming an attitud~ of su-
periority or of avowed antagonism to the President.92 He 
maint~ined the·appearance of amicable relations with Johnson 
and showed him the deference due his office.93 
Grant at this time was exceedingly popular. His generals 
in the South took his advice as orders. He had the confidence 
of the people.9~ Both political parties were anxious to have 
him considered as belonging to them. But if he had any po-
litical aspirations at this time he did not make them ~nown.95 
Johnson, of course, was aware that Grant was worki~g in 
harmony with Congress but because of the great :popularity of 
the General, the President doubtless felt that it would be 
unwise to remove him.96 
Secretary Stanton had been secretly working for the in-
terests of the Radicals df Congress for a long time and was 
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more or less ~penly hostile to the President's policies. 
Congress had hoped to ~arry out military reconstruction 
97 through the Secretary of War and the gene.rals of the army. 
In order that Stanton might not be removed from office by 
the President, Congress passed the Tenure-of-Office Act 
.which required the concurrence of the Senate in the removal 
of Cabinet or other officials appointed by the Presi~ent with 
the consent of the Senate. 
Stanton's relations with the General of the Army had been 
strained on account of the farmer's harsh and austere manner. 
The Secretary seemed to take delight in showing his authority, 
sending for Grant to come to his office on all sorts of occas-
ions and ift~all sorts of weather·. Perhaps he believed it to 
be his duty to assert the superiority of the civil over the 
military. 98 
Notwithstanding his personal annoyance at Stanton's 
arrogance Grant cooperated with the Secretary of ·war in their 
common efforts to thwart the :purposes of the President. They 
consulted often how they might execute the will of .Congress 
and neutralize the opposition of Johnson. Grant felt that eit-
her he or Stanton should· be in Washington ~t all times and if 
necessary both should be on duty ready to confuse any "disloyalt' 
schemings of Pr~sident Johnson,99 
Grant on a visit to West Point suddenly returned to Wash-
1ngton in response to a telegram from the Assistant Adjutant . " 
General at his own head quarters containing only the words . 
"you are needed here." This was in consequence of an agree-
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ment between him and Stanton that he whould be surrunoned in 
this way should the President be plotting to go against their 
plans. 100 
In whatever the District Military Commanders did which 
was clearly in harmony with the reconstruction acts of Con-
gress, Grant supported them and defended them before the 
President when the latter was disposed to criticise. As ear-
ly as July 1866 the President was dissatisfied with General Sher-
idan's arbitrary actions at New Orleans. Sheridan's course 
at the time of the riot at that 'place was the subject of warm 
contention between Graht and tlle President. O-:rant UI'ged the 
President to have all of Sheridan's ·dispatches on the subject 
of the riots published in order· that the publ.ic might get a 
fair opinion of Sheridan's actions not hitherto obtainable 
in the partial publications of h~s d±~patches which ha~ ap-
peared. In writing to Sheridan at the time Grant said, 
"Persevere exactly in the course your own good judgment die-
tates. It has never led you astray as a military commander, 
n6r in the administration of the affairs of your military 
division.nlOl 
Y7hen in March 1867, Sheridan removed from· office the 
Attorney General of the State of Louisiana, the Mayor of New 
Orleans, and the Judge of the First District Court of thetcity, 
Grant worte to him approving of his action.102 
When rumors were afloat in May that Sheridan would pro-
bably be removed Grant wrote again to that officer of his 
assurance that he had the confidence Of himself and of .Sec-
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retary Stanton and "the loyal people generally." ''You have 
carried out the acts of Congress," he said, "aµd it will be 
diff~cult to get a general offioer who will not. Let me say, 
dismiss all.embarrassments on account of rumors_ of removal. 
Such an act will not reflect on you.nl03 
In June af'ter Sheridan had removed Gove.rnor Wells ntha t 
officer having made himself a!l;··~:impediment to the f'ai thful 
execution of the Reconstruction acttt, Grant wrote him a 
commendatory letter as follows: nr have no doubt myself 
.that the removal of Governor Wells will do great good to 
your command, if you are sustained, but great harm if you are 
not sustained. I shall do all I can to sustain yoq in it."104 
'73. 
Chapter IV Open Opposition 
President Johnson had been foiled in his endeavors to re-
move the harshness from military reconstruction. Stanton,· 
Grant and the military department commanders had all worked to 
neutralize his efforts and to carry out the litera1:;_,intentions 
of Congress. For months the President had considered the advis-
ability of removini the objectionable Stanton and certain of the 
District Commanders. Now that his authority was growing less 
and less and the power of the mi1itary more secure he determin-
ed to aot. He proposed first of all to remove the "fountain 
head of rnischieftt, the Secretary of War.1 And to this impo'r-
tant position thus vacgted he decided to appoint General 
Grant! 
The man who, next to Stanton, had probably been mo·st in-
fluential in ·carrying out the Radicals' plans of administrat-
ing the reconstruction act was to be Stanton's successor! 
What could be Johnson's purpose in naming Grant as Secretary 
of WarZ Probably he did not know of the Gene_ral 's secret 
consultations with the Radical leaders, of his conm'iden:tial 
advice and suggestions to the military commanders. But 
something of this he. must certainly have surmised. 
Johnson realized that·Grant's appointment would help 
to silence criticism for suspending Stanton. Replacing 
Stanton with the popular war-hero could not be a serious 
blunder in the eyes of the people. Grant, as a member of the 
Cabim.et would surely strengthen Johnson with the people, and 
74. 
as ~ormerly he had entertained the idea of Grant's advance-
ment to position in the cabinet with the view of strengthen-
ing himself, so now that probably was one of his chief motives. 2 
Grant had so well ·concealed his opposition to the President 
t?romr:the public knowledge that the mass of the people could 
easily be led to suppose he was Johnson's adherent. 3 As 
J"ohnson had earlier in his administration endeavored to make 
it appear that Grant was in accord with him so now it was, no 
doubt, the President's purpose to give the impression that he 
had Grant'.s support as his chief lieutenant. 4 
Considered from every angle Grant was a pivotal man. · His 
great power of appointment given him by the Military Appro-
priation Act, his influence with the Army commanders; his po-
pularity with the p~~ple and his potentiality as a presiden-
tial candidate ciade it extremely desirable that he be attach-
ed to Johnson's cause~ If he could be won over to become a ,· 
whole hearted supporter of the President it would be a great 
victory. 
On the 1st of August President J"ohnson sent for General 
Grant and on his arrival inforn1ed him of his intentions to 
remove both Stanton and Sheridan and stated that he would be 
pleased to have the General act as Sec~e·tary of 7/ar. Grant 
remonstrated against the removal of Stanton arguing that those 
who sought Stanton's removal were genera~ly persons who had 
opposed the.War. He said there were many c~aims pending in 
the War Deyartment of which he (Grant) knew.nothing and doubted 
if he would be able to handle them. Mr. Johnson answered that 
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his action was not based upon any personal hostility toward 
Mr. Stanton, but upon "public considerations of a high char-
acter"; that as to the pending claims they could be examined 
and settled by a special connni,ssion or referred to Congress; 
and that he did not wish. to plage the General in the att'i tude 
of seeking the position of Secretary of War. 
General Grant replied that he would not shirk from the 
~erformance of any public duty that might be imposed upon 
him, but again stated his opinion that the proposed removal 
was not a good policy. 5 
rrihat same day Grant wrote a long letter to the President 
in which he remonstrated against the ~reposed removals of 
Stanton and SlTerid·an. Concerning Stanton, Grant. declared 
. that n11is removal canpot be effected against hi-s will with-
out the consent of the Senatett. , He urged that it was the 
intention of Congress to place Cabinet ministers beyond the 
yower of executive removal· and that it was "pretty well under-
stoodtt that the Tenure-of-Office Billn was intendedespecially 
to prot~ct the Secretary of War in w~om the country felt great 
confidence."5 
Johnson told Secretary Welles of ·the ·conference with 
~rant and showed him the letter Grant had written •. Welles 
wrote in his diary that this letter was not such as he would 
have expected from Grant. Welles thought that Grant had 
"perhaps without being aware of it; had his opinions worked 
over and modified within the year. rt 
1l.S.W~lles finished reading the letter and handed it back 
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to Johnson, he remarked, "Grant is going over". "Yes," said 
Johnson, "I am aware of it. I have no doubt most of these 
offensive measures have emanated from the War Department." 
"Not only that'' remarked Welles, "but almost all the offi-
cers of the army have been insiduously alienated from your 
support by the same influences." 7 
After,, Grant's letter of protest against the removal of 
Stanton there were several inter;gievts between the President'.;~,J;. 
and Grant.within the next ·few days at which the General tried 
to disuade his superior against the proposed removal. 
When the President had first made known to him his in-
tention of removing Stanton and Sheridan, Grant had immediate-
ly gone to see Stanton and discussed with him the course he 
should pursue in case ~ohnson persisted in carrying out his 
plans.8 Grant explained that if he should conclude· to accept 
the appointment of Secretary of War, it would be for no pur-
pose whatever beyond that of preventing the War Department 
from falling into the hapds of some one of Johnson's adher-
ents who would use it for the subversion of Congress. 9 Thus, 
it will be noticed, Grant proposed to a~cept the position with 
the intention of working.in harmony, not with the chief exe-
cutive but with his enemies. Grant consulted others beside 
Stanton. However since ncongress was not in session," Badeau 
explains H-fhe principal people whom he might have consulted 
were abse~t.nlO The General was evid~ntly in the habi~of 
:Consul ting Radical Congressmen. · 
On the fifth of August, President johuson sent to Stanton 
the following note: 
77. 
Executive Mansion, Washington, D.C., Aug. 5, 186? 
Sir: Public considerations of a high character constrain me 
to say that your resignation as Secret.ary of War will be ac-
cepted. Very respectfully, Andrew Johnson." 
To which Stanton replied the same ··day.:"}' ••• I have the honor 
to say that public considerations of a high character, which 
alone. have induced me to continue· at the'; head of this Depart-
ment, constrain me not to resign the office of Secretary of 
War before the next meeting of Congress.nl2 
Whereupon the President made up his mind to suspend 
Stanton until Congress should convene in December and appoint 
Grant, Secretary or War ad interim. But before taking this 
final step he thought it wise to sound out Grant's position. 
Accordingly on August 11th the President conferred with Grant, 
telling him of his decision to suspend Stanton and remarking 
that the place th~s vacated must be filled, and the question 
was, whether it would not be better that the General should 
be made acting Secretary than that a stranger should be select-
ed for the position. J"ohnson went on to say tha.t as comma.nding 
General of the Army Grant understood th~, want and interests 
of the service, and besides was intimately comnected by the 
I reconstruction acts with their execution. The President 
wished to know if General Grant would take the place if ap-
pointed. · General Grant replied that he would of course obey 
orders. The President then said that he thought that he had 
a-·right to ask if there was any thing between them, (the Gen-
eral and himself). He had heard it intimated that there was, 
and he would now really like to know how it was. General 
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Grant replied that _he ·knew.,:.of nothing personal between them, 
and then alluded to the difference of opinion betweenithe 
President and himself respecting the constitutional amendment 
and the reconstruction acts. Here the interview ended.13 
The next day Johnson sent a note to Secretary Stanton 
suspending him from his off ice and instructing him to turn 
the War Department over to General Grant. At the same time 
he notified Grant of his appointment to _the position of Sec-
retary of War ad interim. 14 Whereupon Grant wrote to Stanton 
transmitting his letter of appointment from the President. 
"In· notifying you of my acceptance," he said, "I cannot let the 
opportunity pass without expressing_ my appreciation of the 
zeal, patriotism, firmness, and ability with which you have 
ever discharged the duties of Secretary of Vlar."15 
Stanton replied, denying th~ right of the President to 
suspend him from office. "But in as much as the President 
has assumed to suspend me from office as Secretary of War," 
he wrote, ttand you have notified me of your acceptance IBf 
the appointment of Secretary of War ad interim, I have no 
alternative but to submit, under protest, to the superior 
force of the President." 
In recognition of Grant's expressions of appreciation he 
said, ''You will please accept my acl<nowledgement of the kind 
terms in which you have notified me of your acceptance ~f 
the President'~ appointment, and my cordial reciprocation of 
the sentiments expressed."16 
Stanton was manifestly displeased with Grant's accep-
'\ 
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tance, while the General was nettled by Stanton's letter which 
seemed to imply that he was 'in accord with the ·President.17 
The purpose of Stanton's language, ho_wever, was p.robably 
not so much to reprove General Grant (he wrote to Johnson in 
the same words saying "I have no aiternative but to submit, 
under protest, to· the superior force of the President. rt) as 
to give the impression to the public that he was forced to 
leave his post by the President through the military, thus 
putting Johnson in a bad light and justifying his own action 
before the Radi'oals who had u~ged him to stayi.in offioe.18 
When President Johnson first mentioned to General Gra.nt 
his intentions· of removing Stanton from the War Department he. 
also disclosed his desire of relieving General Sheridan from 
his command of the 5th military district com:paising the un-
reconstructed states of Louisiana and Texas. There were many 
reasons why the President w)'fished to ~emove Sheridan. The 
\ latter had used his authority in a very arbitrary manner as 
we have noticed above, removing civil officers and replacing 
t 
them with his own appointees. ~ Sheridan's most a:;gravating of-
~a 
fence was the writing of disrespectful and disobedient remarks 
about President Johnson _in a letter to General Grant which was 
published by the Radical press to the discomfort of President 
Johnson and his supporters.19· 
In this letter he criticised Stanbery's interpretation 
of the law in.regard to registration in the South. "Mr. Stan-
~ery's interpretation,~ he said, "is :practically in regis-
tnation opening a broad macadamized road for perjury and fraud 
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to travel on."20 He then said, "I regret that I should have 
to differ with the President, but it must be recollected that 
I have been ordered ta ,execute a law to which the President 
has be~n in~bitter antagonism.tt21 
Late in July 1867, Sheridan removed Governor Throckmorton 
of Texas and put E. M. Pease in his place, whom Throckmorton, 
by a vote of six to one had defeated for that off ice twenty 
months before. He also dismissed the legislature because 
there was a disagreement between it and the Governor. 22 More-
over the General continued to enforce the Reconstruction act 
according to his own interpretation and not that of the At-
torney General• In doing this he was only following the coun-
cil of General Grant who had instructed him to nEnforce your 
own construction of the military.bill until ordered to do 
otherwise.n23 But J~hnson did D;Ot know that Grant was secret-
ly influencing his subordinate.24 
If Grant secretly advised Sheridan to act contrary to the 
wishei of the President, he·openly defended his subordinate 
~ 
when .the chief executive proposed to remove him. In a let-
ter dated August 1, 1867, he wrote to the President commend-
ing Sheridan for his valiant service in the War and for his 
capable civil administration in the 5th district. In con-
alusion he stated that it was his opinion that "It is more than 
the loyal people of this country will quietly submit to, to 
see the very men of all others whom they have expressed con-
fidence in removed."25 
After writing thus to the President, Grant directed one 
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of his staff to write to Sheridan as follows:' naeneral Grant 
wishes me to write to you that President Johnson has made up 
his mind to remove you and also the Secretary of War. He 
sent for General Grant yesterday and told him this. The Gen-
eral said all proper for him to say against such a course, 
and when he came back :t;re put his views in writing and sent 
them to Mr. Johnson. I send you a copy of 'this letter. The 
Gen~ral wishes me to say to you to go on your course exactly 
as if this communication had not been sent to you, and without 
fear of consequences. That so ·1ong as you pursue the same 
line of duty that you have followed thus far in the service 
you will receive the entire support of these headquarters."26 
On August 1st Sheridan.removed twenty-two New Orleans 
aldermen and appointed others in their stead. Later in the 
same month he removed the City Treasurer,, the Chief of Police, 
and the City Attorney, and a number of officers outside of 
the city. 27 
On the 17th of August, Johnson decided to act, and sent 
to General Grant orders relieving General Sher,idan of his 
command at New Orleans and assigning him to the department 
of the Missouri and appointing General George H. Thomas ,to 
take Sheridan's place. Accompanying the order was a note to 
General Grant saying "1'efore you issue instructions to carry 
into effect the enclosed order, I would be pleased to hear 
any suggestions you may deem necessary respecting the assign-
ment to which the ord:er refers.n28 
General Grant promptly replied as follows: ttI am plea·sed 
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to avail myself' of' t.his invitation to urge, earnestly urge, 
urge in the name of a patriotic people who haye sacrifieed 
hundreds of' thousands of' lives, and thousands o~ millions of 
treasure to preserve the integrity and union of this country 
that this order b~ not insisted upon. It is unmistakably the 
expressed wish of the country that General Sheridan should not 
be·removed from his present command." 
"This is a republic," he continued, ttwhe're ·the will of 
the ~eople is the law of the land. I beg that their voice be 
heard. tt He further urged that the removal of Sheridan would 
be regarded as an effort to defeat the laws of Congress and 
would embolden the Southern people to renewed opposition.29 
There was reason for Grant believing that the feople 
would not stand for the removal of Sheridan. ''The editor and 
speakers", wrote Welles "have undertaken to control the course 
of the Govermnen't as regards Sheridan, and Grant, if not a par-
ticipant with, has been led away by them. Undoubtly many peo-
ple have read the newspapers and come to the conclusion that 
the President could not--dared not--remove Sheridan. ,;3o 
Grant, no doubt, also remembered that the House of Re-
presentatives in July had by a strict party vote tendered 
Sheridan its thanl\:s for the nable and faithful performance 
31' 
of his duties" when he wrote that it was "unmistakable the 
expressed will of the country, that Sheridan should not be 
removed from his present comnand." 
To this urgent appeal in behalf o~ Sheridan the Presi-
"dent replied that he was nnot aware that the question of re-
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taining General Sheridan in the command \of the Fifth Mili-
tary District has ever been submitted to" the p~ople the:m-
sel ves for determination. tt "General Sheridan,." he continued, 
"has ex~rcised the power conferred by Congress and still more 
so by the_r~sort to authority not granted by· law •••• His 
removal therefore, cannot be regarded as an effo~t to defeat 
-~he laws of Congress. n32 
"The correspondence between the President and Grant in 
rela:tion to the re2:1oval of Sheridan has been published •••• " 
Welles wrote later in his Diary ltQf course the Radical Press 
will indorse and extoll Grant, but he certainly does not in 
this matter appear to advantage. His letter is weak, his 
logic is weak, the thing is feeble. The letter was written· 
plainly for publication, but the Presidentts·reply is digni-
fied and conclusive.n33 
,, 
Upon receiving the Presidentts reply on the 19th Grant 
went to see the President "and after a brief conversation,1t 
the President's private secretary Colonel Moore relates, 
naoquiesced in the President's reasons for the change of 
commanders in the Fifth Military District; expressing the 
belief that Sheridan, who he said was familiar with the 
Western aountry, would do admirably in a command in the In-
dian region. 034· 
ttHe said, however," continues Col.Moore, "that it had 
been rumored that first Sheridan would be removed by the 
President, then the o~her Fistrict commanders, and finally 
himself. The President smiled, and reminded the General 
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that long ago he had desired him to act .as secretary of vrar. 
The .General replied ~Yes, he did not see the use of a civil-
ian as Secretary of Vifa·r.' and gave .the President to under-
stand that after ~ll the removal or suspension of Mr. Stanton 
was not a bad thtng. ,,35 . ·· 
Here it appears that General Grant either was actually 
won over to the President's point of view or let the President 
believe that he was convinced of the righteousness of the 
latter's ·act ions. Or perhaps Johnson was too ready to inter-
pret Grant's matter of fact statements too. liberally. Sec-
retary 1~lelles writes '.'that later he baow:ne satisfied that 
) 
nsheridan had been secretly :prompted and· influenced by ·Grant 
in his reprehensible'course in.i{ew Orleans and Texas.t' "Ivrost 
of. the viceroys, or military governors,~' he thoug~t.· "had se-
cret· telegrams, ·or oral instruct~ons from the. General-in·-
. · Ch~.~zr, who was fn collusio:rm. with. Stanton· (whom, . however, he 
disliked) anq. the c.hief Radica.l conspirators. · .In all this 
period, Grant with.great duplicity and vulgar cunning suc-
ceeded in deceiving not ·only :·the ~~President but the rest of 
1. .. , ' { '.: .! ' ,,_. ' ~ 
us. Sheridan was flattered· by the confidential c.ommunica-
tions and encouraged .in his insolence and insubordination 
towards ·the Presi~ent by his superior o.fficer, ··who had. become 
enlisted in the Conspiracy against the chief magistrate.n36 
Soon after issuing of the order for the change of com-
manders at New Orleans the President found tt expedient to 
remove General Sickles from command in the Carolinas. 
J,ohnson had previously contrived to haYe Sickles give up his· 
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command by first offering him collectorship of New York and 
then various diplomatic positions. When a mission to Neather-
lands was proposed to him Sicl\:les',;Wrote\.to Gra!1.1i,: .and declar-
ed that unless the General-in Chief desired a change he would 
prefer to rema:lii in his military command. Grant informed 
Sickles that. he had no wish to supercede him and so Sickle$' ... 
declined the diplomatic appointment.37. 
Sickles had counseled with Grant how best to carry out 
the policy of Congress and 1!las entirely set ag&.inst the Pres-
ident. 38 
On the 23rd of August a dispatch from General Sickles was 
laid before the cabinet. It rela~ed to his order No. ~O ab-
structing by military farce the judgments and processes of 
all the courts within the Carolinas. He gave as his reason 
that if he.did not the court would pass on the Reconstruction 
acts and pronounce them unoonsti tutional.. General Grant said 
that he had at first countermanded Sickle's ord~r in so far 
as ·it applied to United States Courts, as he promised he would, 
bu~, after thinking of it, he had come to the conclusion that 
General Sickles might have had his reasons for what he was 
doing, and as there are always two sides to a question, he 
had countermanded his order that Sickles might have an.oppor-
tunity to be heard. Congress had put in his (Grant's) hands 
the execution of this law, and he intended to see it. was exe-
cuted. 39 
General Grant was feeling his.responsibility to Congress, 
and no doubt believed it was his ~atriotic duty to support 
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congressional reconstruction regardless of the constitution. 
General Sickles was soon removed, being :peplaced by 
General Canby. A month later Grant presented Sickles' case 
in Cabinet meeting stating thet Sickles wished to have a court 
of inquiry. Grant thought an officer could demand a court 
of inquiry.. Obviously it was the purpose of Sickles, (and 
of Grant} to vindicate the farmer's conduct in J,i.econstruction;. 
as Welles puts it ttto try the President and Attorney· General 
for disapproving his conduct.n40 
On the 22nd of August Gideaon Welles had a long conver-
sation with Grant where-in the latter expressed his radical 
views on reconstruction. "It pained me to see how little he 
@ran:fil understood of the fundamental ~rinciples and struc-
ture of our Government, and of the constitution it self, tt 
confided Welles to his Diary, non the subject·or differences 
between the President and Congress, and the attempt to sub-
ject tH~~p@dple to military force, there were, he saidj in 
Congress, fifty at least of the best lawyers of the coun-
try who had voted for the Reconstruction law, and were not, 
he asked, the combined wisdom and talent of these fifty to 
have more weight than Mr. Johnson, who was only one to fifty? 
Congress had enacted this law, and was not the President 
co.mpelled to carry it into execution? VIas not Congress su-
perior to the President? He thought Congress might pass any 
law, and the President and all others must obey and support 
it until the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional." 
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"He thought" continued Welles, "that where the constitution 
says that Congress may by law confer inferior appointments on heads 
of depurtments. 'Are not those districts under General Sickles 
and other Generals departments?' Gran~ asked. He said the 
will of the people was the law in this country, and the repre-
sentatives of the people made the laws. He believed in the 
conquered territory idea; Southern States under complete 
jurisdiction of Congress, Congress to say who should vote and 
direct when ·and how these states were to be. readmitted."41 
Having heard Grant's political views Welles went to see 
the President and told him of his apprehensions concerning 
Grant. He also called on Judge Blair and requested him to "see 
Grant, talk with him, g·et others who are right minded to talk 
with him also, and write him, --enlighten him. He needs instruct ion. tt 42 
On the. 26th Welles significantly confided to his Diary 
that Grant "has been wil_ling to be courted but is not qui~e pre-
pared to have it published that the parties are engaged and to be 
married." ttThe President is still reluctant to believe that Grant 
is unfaithful." 43 
On the 26th of August President Johnson issued his order for-
the relief of General Sickles from his command in North and South 
Carolina, replacing him with General Canby. 
On the same day he modified his orders relative to. the 
commandant of the 5th military district. On the 17th he had 
ordered General Thomas to take Sheridan's place in New Orleans. 
Since that time General Grant had given him infor-
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mation which showed that General Thomas was in ill health and 
urged that Thomas should not, therefore be sent. Accordingly 
the President now issued his modified order appointing Gener-
al Hanoo.ck to the position at New Orleans instead of General 
Thomas. Johnson was secretly glad to have the excuse to ap-
point Hancock to the position vacated by Sheridan, for Han-
cock was in harmony with the administration while Thomas sy.m-
pathised wi~h the ~adi~als.44 
Tuesday August 27~h witnessed a vary important Cabinet 
meeting in which the Secretary of War ad interim openly in-
dioated his purpose to support Congress even to.the extent~ 
of disobeying the President. The Governor of Idaho terri-
tory had been suspected of being a swindler and a cheat, 
and the President had nominated a man to succeed him. The 
matter of- confirmation of the P~esident's appointment had 
been before the Senate and had not been def in~tely settled 
when that body adjourned in July. Could a successor be ap-
pointed or would the Tenure-of-Office Act prevent it? And 
if a new appointment could be made, suppose the first incum-
bent would not give up the office? What should then be done·'? 
Secretary Mccullock was ready with an answer. He ·suggested 
that if the Governor refused to vacate, the militia should 
be cal.led out. All. looked toward Grant for an answer to 
this bold suggestion. Grant an~wered that in such a case 
the "military" would not respond. They would sustain the 
Tenure-of-Office bill, which Congress had anacted, until the 
judges ~aid it was unconstitutiona1. 45 
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Here was indeed a :r>resumptive insubordinate statement 
•' 
by the new Secretary of War. He looked to Cdmgress rather 
than the· President for orders and considered himself the 
rightful interpreter of the will of Congress. ·rn the same 
Cabinet meeting Grant proceeded to Turing up his objections 
to the Executive orders of the preceding day relative to 
Generals Sheridan and Thomas •. He thought now that Sheridan 
should remain in New Orleans ·until Thomas was able to re-
lieve him.. When Sheridan was relieved Grant ·wished him grant-
ed leave to visit Washing~on. The law, Grant yvent on to say, 
placed the ex~cution of the Reconstruction acts in.pis (Gi,'antffi~) 
hands. He had not been consulted when he received orders, 
and those orders counteracted,. in their terms some of his 
orders. While he had no wish to.conflict with any one, he 
had a duty to J?erform. He must 'see· the Reconstruction law 
executed. "The President," recorded Welles, nwas very cool, 
calm and deliberate in his reply to this studied and pre-
I 
meditated speech. He ffi1i:@ Presidenf} reminded General. Grant 
that he himself had brought the Surgeon's certificate in 
regard to General T~omas health, had stated it was such that 
he thought it imprudent.for General Thomas to go at this time 
to Ne~ Orleans, and had asked to have the order suspended. 
That as regarded a leave to Sheridan that could as well be 
granted after he reported on the frontier as before. Let 
h~m repair to Leavenworth or Denver and relieve General Hancock , 
then, if he can be spared for a v~sit; he can take his time 
and the several orders would be carried into effect." 
90. 
Johnson nov1 let General Grant know his place in no uncertain 
terms. "General Grant," he said, ttwill understand· it is my 
duty to see the laws are executed, and also·that when I assign 
officers to their duty my orders must by obeyed. I have made 
this arrangement and performed this work deliberately, and 
it will go with as little delay as possible. n46 . 
Grant was hum.hled by this r·ebuke and changed the subject.· 
He said if General Sickles was to be detached, no better man 
than General Canby (the man whom the President had appointed} 
could succeed him. Canby could not, however, be very well 
·spared from Washington, where he was familiar with details, 
and above all his services were important on the Board of Claims. 
As regarded General Sickles, two of his orders, the one in-
tended as a stay law and the one establishing a coee,, were 
unauthorized. Both were· good in their selves, he said, but 
General Sickles had no authority to issue such orders.47 
The President said he was glad that there wa~ concurrence 
of view in regard to General Canby and that as for his being 
on the Board of Claims, it v1ould not weigh much since the 
board itself was of little importance. 
Grant then proceeded to say in a subdued manner, that he 
wished to say that while it was proper he should discharge the 
duties ad interim of the Secretary of War, he was no politi-
cian and preferred not to be mixed up in political questions. 
He would, therefore prefer not to sit at the Cabinet consul-
tations and :pass opi.nions on the subjects which came u1) for 
consideration and decision~48 The President told him that was 
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his own option. Grant then excused himself, saying he had 
h k t t d t t th ~ D . t t 49 muc wor o en o a e ~ar epar men • 
Notwithstandi:ng Grant's declaration that he wished to 
be excused from political discussion, on that very day at 
three o'clock in the after noon there was handed to Pres-
ident Johns·on a letter from General Grant, most of it being 
on matters uolitical. 
' .... . 
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Chapter V Violent C-0ntroversy 
· When President Johnson _suspended Secretary Stanton from 
the War Department in August, he was only ridding himself tem-
porarily of that objectionable officer. He only postponed the 
settlement of the question of whether or not he could legally 
remove a subord~nate off ioer without the concurrence of the 
Senate in that removal. The Tenure-of-Office Act had provided 
that any suspension in accordance with the provisions of that 
act, which the President might make during a recess of the Sen-, 
ate, wou;).d be subject to the a:-::Yproval of the Senate when that 
body met in its next session.l 
Mr. Johnson could fore-see that. the Senate ·would likely 
refuse to concur in the suspension of Mr. Stanton, and would 
thus reinstate that officer to his former. :position as ;Secre-
tary of War. Here, thought the President, would be an oppor-
tuni ty to test the comst1tutional ty of the Tenure-of-Office, 
Act. If the Secretary-of-War ad interim would refuse to give 
up the office to Mr. Stanton upon the latter's reinstatement,. 
the question as to who should occupy the office would be set-
tled in court, where the President's confident view that the 
law was unconstitutional could be vindicated. But could Gen~ 
eral Grant be depended upon to hold on to the off ice in event 
of the Senate attempting to restore Mr. Stanton to office? 
Sometime after the appoin.tment of Grant as Secretary-of-
War ad interim President Johnson called upon him to ascertain 
what would be his action should an attempt be made to restore 
Mr. Stanton to the War department. 2 
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As to what General Grant actually promised the President he 
would do under those circumstances, not definate assertions 
can be made since the two parties to that conversation later 
gave different accounts. 
Grant's version is as follows: ttThe President asked me 
my views as to the course Mr. Stanton would have to pursue, 
in case the Senate should not concur in his suspension, to 
obtain possession of his office. My reply was, in substance, 
that Mr. Stanton would have to_ appeal to the courts to rein-
state him, illustrating my position by citing the ground I 
had taken in the case of the Baltimore police commissions. 
"In that case I did not doubt the technical right of 
Governor Swann to remove the old co:rmnissioners and to appoint 
their successors as the old commissioners refused to give up; 
however, I contended that no resource'was left but to appeal 
to the courts. 
nFinding that the President was desirous of keeping M.r. 
Stanton out of office, whether sustained in the suspension 
or not, I stated that I had not looked particularly into the '1 
Tenure-of-Office bill, but what I had stated was a. general 
principle, and if I should change my mind in this particular 
case I would inform him of the :ract.n3 
President Johnsonts recollection of what transpired is 
quite different: 
"I sought that interview calling myself at the War De-
partment. My sole object in then bringing the subject to 
your attention was to ascertain def inately what would be 
your own action should such an attempt be made for his 
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(Stanton!sJ restoration to the War Department. That object was 
accompllshecl., for the interview terminated with the distinct 
understandipg that if, upon reflection, you should prefer not 
to beccime a party to the controversy, or should conclude that 
it would be your duty to surrender the department to :rvir. Stanton, 
upon action in his favor by the Senate, you were to return the 
office to me prior to a decision by the Senate, in order that, 
if I desired to do so, I might designate some one to succeed 
you. n4 
Thus the President believed he had a positive understand-
ing with General Grant, that the latter intended to remain 
in the office after the Senate's action thus forcing Stanton 
to resort to legal preoedure and that if he should change his 
mind in regard to remaining in office he would give the Pres-
ident notioe so that Johnson might have time to make another 
appointment. 
But according to General Grant, he only promised to let 
the President know of his change of mind in regard to the 
method he thought Stanton would have to use in reestablish-
ing himself in the 9ffice of Secretary of. War; he did not 
agree to aid the President in carrying the matter to the courts 
nor to resign in order that the President might appoint a 
successor who would perform that function for the President. 
Whatever Grant may or may not have promised the President 
at this interview, he at least understood that it was the 
President's purpose to use him to prevent Mr. Stanton from 
securing the War office. -~d it must have been apparent to 
him, even though there was nothing said in regard to it,_ that 
should he decline to aid the President in this project it was 
the President's purpose to telieve him from the further dis-
charge of the duties of the Secretary-of-War ad interim, and 
.to appoiµt some other person in that capacity. 
The Presj_dent had later conversation with Grant on the 
subject of his retaining the office of Secretary-of-War, all 
of them leading the President to believe that General Grant 
would cooperate with him. 5 
In pursuance with the requirements of the Tenure-of-Off-
ice law President Johnson on December 12th 1868, sent to the 
Senate his reasons for the suspension of Mr. Stanton. The 
newspapers took up the discussion of the possibility of the 
reinstatement of Stanton and of Grant's probable action in 
that event• On the seventh of January the President's secre-
tary called the attention of his Chief to certain of these 
newspaper reports v1hich asserted that General Grant had ex-
pressed an intention to transfer the War Department to Mr. 
Stanton in ca~e the Senate should decide in the latter's 
favor. The President answered that General Grant ha.d told him 
that his action would be limited to withdrawing from the de-
partment and leaving it in the hands of the President as fully 
as when it was conferred upon gim. 0 Thus it is apparent that 
Johnson trusted that·Grant would not turn the office back to 
Stanton in any case. 
The Prexident at that time expressed to his secretary 
tn.e opinion that perhaps it would be well for the Senate to 
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reinstate Stanton, as he could at once be removed, and in the 
mean time General Grant be gotten out of the War department. 
Grant, he remarked, had served the purpose for which he had 
been selected, and it was desirable that he should be super-. 
c~ded in the War office by another.7 
On that sam~ d~y by the direction of the President Col. 
Moore prepared a letter o.f removal for Mr. Stanton and also a 
brief message to the Senate informing that 13ody;pf the termin-
ations of Stanton's connection with the War department. The 
President wished to have these pa_pers ready for use. 8 
The time approached when the Senate was expected to reach 
a decision in regard to the suspension of Stanton. General 
Sherman, who was on duty in Washington as President of a 
board to revise the regulations of the army, was very intimate 
with General Grant, the two conversing frequently on the 
affairs of the times. On January 11th, General Grant in con-
versation with General Sherman discussed the question of 
Stanton's reenstatement and of his probable action in that 
event. General Sherman has left us an interesting account 
of this conversation in his Memoirs. He recounts that G:an-
eral Grant said that he had more carefully read the Tenure-
of-Off ice law, and that it was different from what he had 
supposed; that in case the Senate did not consent to the re-
moval of Secretary-or·-war Stanton, and he (Grant) should 
hold on, he should incur a liability of ten thousand dollars 
and five years imprisonment. "We al.l expected," relates 
Sherman, "'the resolution of Senator Howard, of Michigan vir-
tually restoring Mr. Stanton to his office, would ~ass the 
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Senate, and knowing that the President expected .. General Grant 
to hold on, I inquired if he had given notice of his change 
of purpose; he answered that there was no hurry, because he 
supposed Mr. Stanton would pursue toward him (Grant) the same 
course which he {Stanton) had required of him the preceding 
August, viz, would address him a letter claiming the office, 
and allow him a couple of days for the change. Still, he s~~, 
he would go to the White House the same·day and notify the 
President of .his intended action.~9 
It seems strange that General Grant would need to be 
prompted by Sherman to make good his promise to notify the 
President of his change of mind in regard to holding to his· 
office. 
General Grant proceeded to the White House the after-
noon of Saturday the 11th and had a protracted interview with 
the President. -~s subsequently related by Grant in his let-
ter of January 28th, 1868 to President Johnson the interview 
was as follows; 
"Taking this view of the matter, (that he could not, 
without violation of the law refuse to vacate the .office of 
Secre~arf of War the moment Mr. Stanton was reinstated) I 
went to the President for the sole purpose of making this 
decision known and did ·so make it known.n "The President, 
however, instead of accepting my view of the requirements of 
the Tenure-of-office bill, contended that he had suspended 
Mr. Stanton under the authority given by the constitution •••• 
That, having appointed me under the authority given by the 
constitution, and not under any act of Congress, I could not 
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. be governed by the Act. I stated that the law was binding on 
me, constitutional or not~ .until set aside by the proper tri-
bunal. An hour or more was consumed each reiterating his 
·viavvs on this subject, until ge.tting l_ate, the President said 
he would see me again. 
"I did not agree to call on Monday, nor ·at any other de-
finate time, nor w~s I sent for by the President until the . 
f 11 . T d nlQ ) o ovnng ues ay. ,· .. -~ 
President Johnson in his letter of January .,31, 1868, to 
Genera). ·1 Gra.n t, gives a d if £-en en t account : 
'1After a pro:Practed interview,· during whJ.ch the prov is-
ions of the Tenure-or-Office bill were freelydisaussed, you 
said that, as had been agreed upon in our first conference, 
... 
you would either return a suecessor before final acti9n by 
the Senate upon Mr. Stanton's suspension, or would remain at 
its head, awaiting a decision of the question by judicial pro-
ceedings. It was then understood that there would be a fur-
ther conference.on Monday, by which time I supposed you would 
be prepared to inform me of your. final decision.ll 
Thus, according to Grant he had literally ful,filled his 
one promise of giving the President notice of his change of 
mind. Johnson on the other hand, understood the General.~o 
be still indecisive about retaining the office and that he would 
let him know definately on Monday. 
Commenting on the matter Gidean Welles wrote in his Diary 
January 13th as follows; nr cannot but think, from what I 
see and hear, that General Grant is acting in concert with 
them, (the Radical leaders) though the President on Saturday 
,.1; .. ··1i;. 
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(the 11th) was unwilling to believe that Grant was false and 
was deceiving him.12 
General Grant was not anxious to see Mr. Stanton return 
to the War office. He believed that Stanton could do no fur-
ther good in the. War department and that the Govermnent's 
actions would be needlessly thwarted by Stanton's unwelcome 
return. 13 Grant had never personally liked Stanton. At the 
time of Stanton's suspension in August 1867, Grant had been. 
offended by Stanton's ungracious manner of relinquishing the 
War department to hirn.14 Now, probably for personal reasons 
as well as out of consideration for the welfare of the coun-
try he wished to see someone else in the War offi~e. 15 
General Sherman, being friendly to the President, was · 
anxious that there be no conflict between the Executive and 
Congress over the Btanton episode, and thought that the best 
way out of the difficulty was for the President to nominate 
some good man as Secretary-of-War whose confirmation by the 
Senate would fall within the provisions of the law. At the 
suggestion of Sherman Honorable Reverdy J"ohnson, Senator 
from Maryland, called on the President on Sunday (the 12th) 
and advised him to appoint Gerieral J. D. Cox of Ohio, a 
Republican of the more.moderate type, as Secretary of War. 
But President Johnson had made up his mind to continue 'in 
the course he had started regardless of consequences. Gen-
eral Sherman in conference vvi th General Gr.ant on. Sunday the 
12th told him of his plan for the President to send in hhe 
.name of Cox to the Senate. "So anxious was he (Gran] about 
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it" wrote Sherman in his.Memoirs, nthat he came to our room 
at the Vlar Department the next morning (M:onday) the 13th, and 
asked me to go in person to the White House to urge the Pres-
ident to send in the name of General Cox. 015 Sherman did in~ 
terview the President on Monday but Johnson did not consider 
the suggestion of Cox's nomination favorably. Thomas D. Ewing 
in a letter of Jan. 12 also recommended to the President that 
he nominate General Cox for the War office, but Johnson was 
determ'ined to bring matters squarely to an issue with Congress. 17 
Monday afternoon at six o'clock, after a lond executive 
session, the Senate resolved that the eauses f~or removing 
Stanton were insufficient, thus refusing to C~Dcur in the sus-
pension. Notices of this action were sent to General Grant 
and to the President, and Mr. Stanton was inrned.iately informed 
by a friend. 18 
That same. evening General Grant attended a levee given 
by the President. The General had opportunity_to advise_the 
President of his intentions in regard to the War off ice but 
remained silent on the question. 19 Either Grant honestly 
believed the matter settled and thought Johnson understood . 
his intentions, or he was deliberately holding al~of in or-
der to prevent.the President from settling the matter in 
the courts. 
Early on the morning of the 14th (Tuesday} General Grant 
went to the office of the Secr~tary of War, locked and bolted 
the door on the outside, and ha.nded the l\:ey to the Adjutant 
General, E. D. Townsend·~-20 saying, "I am to be found over at 
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my office at arm~ head-quarters. I was served with a copy 
of the Senate resolutions last evening." General Townsend 
went upstairs and delivered the key to Mr. Stanton who was 
there waiting for it.21 
General Grant, after thus relinquishing the office of 
Secretary of War, immediately sent a formal note to the Pres-
ident announcing that he had received notice of the Senate's 
action and that by the terms of the Tenure-of-Office act his 
functions as Secretary of War ad interim ceased from the mo-
ment 9f the receipt of the notice. 22 
The question now arises: had General Grant and Mr. 
Stanton made a previous arrangement for the transfer of the 
office? Evidence is conclusive that they had not. w. s. 
Hellyer,'who seems to have been a friend of both the Pres-
ident and General Grant, had conversations with General Grant 
and General Rawlins and wrote to Johnson January 14, as fol-
lows: "I am now fully satisfied that General Grant never had 
any conversation or collusion with l·.1Ir. Stanton i~ regard ·to 
his (Stanton's) restoration to the War officer. That ·Grant 
never expected that Stanton would resume the duties of ·the 
War Office. 023 George o. Gorham the biographer of Stanton 
states that "Mr. Stanton went directly to the War Department, 
and took possession without any show of ceremony or any call 
upon General Grant.24 
"General Grant did not like the way in which Mr. Stanton 
resumed control of the War office," wrote James G. Blaine in 
h_+~ Twenty Years in Congress. "He did not think that he had 
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been treated with the same courtesy which he had shown to 
Mr. ·stanton when he succeeded him the preceding August. In 
fact, he had not expected, no~ did he desire the restoration 
of Mr. Stanton, and but for differences that arose between 
him and the President might have used his influence against 
Mr. Stanton's remaining.n25 
Gorham explains why Stanton took over the o~f ice so un-
ceremoniously. "If Stanton could have known that General 
Grant would immediately notify the President as he dicl., that 
he regarded the vote of the Senate as terminating his functions 
as Secretary ad-interim, he.would undoubtedly have extended.the 
same courtesies that under similar circumstances had been 
shown to him. But being in doubt as to the General's position, 
he pursued the prudent course of entering upon the possession 
of the off ice without conceding ttie right of any person to be 
consuited."26 
Grant wished to avoid any possible infraction of the law 
by relinquishing the office immediately upon receipt of notice. 
Whether or not Stanton immediately reestablished himself in 
the War Department Grant probably considered as being of none 
of his aff,irs. He was living up tq his .conception of the law, 
and probabll considered himself to be literally fulfilling his 
promise to Johnson to deliver the office back to the President 
in the same condition it was in when he was appointed to the 
position. Locking the office and sending immediate notice to 
the President, he no doubt thought, would literally fulfill 
that :promise. 
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When the President received Grant's notice of his .re-
linquishment of the War office he sent word to the General 
requesting him to be present at the Cabinet meeting that after"."'. / . .. . 
noon. Grant obeyed the summons and wl1en he arrived was address-
ed as "Tull'. Secretary". The General disclaimed the title say-
ing that he had notified the President that he could no longer 
serve in that ~osition.27 
President Johnson was convinced of Grant's duplicity. 
He had heard that it had been asserted by some one that pre-
vious to the General's attendance .at the levee, the General and 
Secretary Stanton had had a confere·nce at the _former' s resi~ 
dence and agreed upon a course of action, and laughed at the 
fact the Radicals had actually legislated Grant, their favor-
ite for the Presidency, out of the War department. The failure 
of Grant to give up the office till the Senate had a.cted and 
the immediate reoccupation by Mr. Stanton seemed to bear out 
the rumors of Grant's intrigue with Stanton. 28 J'ohnson now 
demanded an explanation of Grant's apparent misconduct. Five 
members of the Cabinet: Seward, McCulloch, Randall, Welles, 
and Browning were presen~. Welles, faithfully preserved an 
account of the meeting and it is related here as recorded 
in his diary. 
"The President asked if this proceeding conformed to 
previous understanding, etc. General Grant without answering 
directly, said he had prbmised sometime ago that he would give 
the President notice before .relinquishing the office; but 
that he had not then examined closely the 2nd and.5th sections 
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of the Tenure-of-Office bill. He was not willing to suffer 
fiye year imprisonment· and pay ten thousand dollars but pre-
ferred to give up the office~ 
rtThe President asked why, when he had read the sections 
and come to the conclusion to leave he had not informed him 
as agreed and remarked that he would undergo the whole impri-
sonment and fine himself, which might be adjudged against Gen-
eral Grant and said he so told Grant on s·aturday when he spoke 
of apprehensions. 
"The General said he was not aware of the penalities in 
the Tenure-of-Office b.ill,. until he saw the discussion in the 
papers; did not know when he had his first talk w~th the Pres-
ident; and he came over on Saturday expressly to take up fuhis 
subject. Had spoken of these difficulties at that time, and 
expected to see the President aga~n on Monday, but he was busy 
with General Sherman, an·d had a good many little matters to 
attend to. He did not suppose the Senate intended to act so 
soon. 
"'Was not our understanding --- did you not assure me 
sometime ago, and again on Saturday, that if you did not hold 
on to the office yourself, you would place it in my hands that 
I might select another?' said the President. 'That,' said 
Grant, 'was my intention. I thought some satisfactory arrange-
ment would be made to dispose of the subject~ Mr. Johnson 
(Reverdy) and General Sherman spent a great deal of time with 
me Sunday. Didn't Mr. Johnsoti: come to see you? I sent Gen-
eral Sherman yesterday after talking the matter over. Didn't 
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you see Sherman?' The ~resident said he saw each of them,. 
but he did not see what the interview with either had to do 
with giving back into his hands the place agreeably to the 
understanding. 'Why did you give up the keys to M:r. Stanton 
and leave the Department?' General Grant said he gave the 
key .to the Adjutant General and sent word to the President 
by General Comstock, 'Yes,' said the President, 'but that, 
you know, was not our understanding.' 
"Grant attempted some further apoligies about being 
very busy, stannnered, hesitated, ·said Sherman had taken up a 
great deal of his time,' but he had· intended to call on the 
President on Monday; asked to be excused, and left .·u29 
Welles says, "This is, as near as I recollect, the sub-
stance of the conversation as it ocou:rred, I do not claim to 
give the precise words, though in ~any instances I probably 
ha~e· done so •. My ~ntention and wish is to do injustice to 
neither, but fairly present.what took place and the remarks 
of both. I wrote this on the evening of Tuesday'-· the 14th, 
while th~ subject is fresh in my mind. tt 
"The President," says Welles, in de:scribing the scene, 
'twas oalin.- and dignified, though manifestly disappo:tnted and 
displeased. Generai Grant was humble, hesitating, and he 
evidently felt that his position was equivocal and not to 
his credit. There was, I think, an impressio!1- on the minds 
of ail present (there certainly was on mine) th~t a conscious-
ness tha~ he had acted with duplicity--not been faithful and 
true to the man who had confided in and trusted him--oppressed ~ 
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General Grant. His manner, never very commanding,.· was al-
most abject, and he left the room with less respect, I appre-
hend, from those present than ever before. The President though 
disturbed and not wholly able to conceal his chagrin from those 
familiar with him, used no harsh expression, nor committed any-
thing approaching incivility, yet Grant felt the few words pttt 
to him, and the cold and surprised disd~in of the President in 
all their force.»30 
That sane afternoon General Sherman went over to Army 
headquarters where he found General Grant, who expressed him-
self as being much displeased v1i th the manner in which Mr. 
Stanton had regained his office. He stated that Mr. Stanton 
had sent a messenger for him .that morning as of old, with the 
word that tthe wanted to see him." Grant and Sherman, before 
they separated arranged to go toge'ther. the next morning to see 
the President.31 They, no.doubt, planned to make some sort 
of explanation of Grant's conduct. 
The next morning (Wednesday the 15th) in the National 
Intelligencer, a Washington newspaper friendly to the Pres-
ident, appeared a long arti"Qle on ttThe Stanton Affair", in 
which was related an account of General Grant's relinquishment 
of the War office and its.subsequent accupation by Mr. Stanton. 
The article accused General Grant of having acted in bad.faith 
to the President. It told of the Cabinet meeting of the day 
before and stated that upon being reminded by the President 
of his reiterated promise, and especially of the ~romise made 
only the last Saturday morning. General Grant admitted the 
promise in the presence of members of the Cabinet.32 
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Because of the article in the Intelligencer; Gr~nt was 
loath to accompany Sherman to see the President as they had· 
previously arranged but did finally go with him. The Pres-
ident received them promptly and kindly. Being seated Gen-
eral Grant said, "Mr. President, whoever gave the facts for 
the article of the Intelligencer of this·morning has made 
some serious mistakes.n33 
"General Grant, let me inte:erupt you just there," replied 
the President. "I have not seen the Intelligencer of this 
morning, and have no knowledge of any article there in.n 
General Grant then went on: "Well, the idea is given there 
that I have not kept faith with you~ Now, Mr. President, I 
remember, when you spoke to me on this subject last summer, 
I did say that, like the case of the Baltimore police Commis-
sioners, I did suppose Mr. Stanton could not regain his office 
except by a process through the courts." The President stat-
ed that he ·remembered the reference to the case of the Balti-
more Commissioners. Grant resumed: "I said if I changed my 
opinion I would give you notice, and put things as they were be-
fore my appointment as secret.ary of War ad interim. n34 
The President and his guests then engaged in friendly con-
versation, both Grant and the President professing to be sat-
isfied. The President claimed that he had always been most 
friendly to General Grant and Grant insisted that he had taken 
the off ice of Secretary of War ad interim, not for honor of 
profit, but in the general interests of .the army. General. 
Grant volunteered to call on Stanton and urge upon him that 
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"the good of the service required his resignation.35 
As the two Generals withdrew, Grant at the door said, 
"Mr. President, you should make some order that we of the army 
are not bound to obey the orders of Iv1r. Stan ton as Secretary 
of War. rt The President intimated that he would do so. 36 
It appears that a reconciliation of the President and Gen-
eral Grant was now in sight, thanks to General Shermants ef-
forts. "To-day the mutual explanations are ful:! .. and partially 
satisfactory," wrote Sherman to his wife.37 
After the departure of his visitors the President re-
quested his secretary to read the .Article in the Intelligencer. 
Both the President and Secretary Welles who called on the Pres-
ident later in the morning, agreed that the li.rticle was sub-
stantially correct so far as it related to what had taken place 
at the Cabinet M~eting. 38 
At the close of the Cabinet meeting, Friday January 17. 
President J"ohnson desired to know of the Cabinet members whet-
her or not their recollection of the interview. between himself 
and Grant on Tuesday corresponded with h.i·s own. He then dir-
ected Colonel Moore to read a compendium of the articles in 
the Intelligencer describing'the Cabinet· meeting. Each of the 
members present, (Seward having already left) McCulloch, 
Randall, Browning and Wells concurred in the correctness of 
tha stntement.39 
General Sherman was deeply troubled by the tangle of 
affairs in the War Department. He was especially anxious that 
the misunderstanding between General Grant and the President 
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should be completely straightened out. Sherman believed tha.t 
Stanton had no right to hold a position in the Cabinet against 
the President's wishes. 40 However Sherman thought that rather 
than ·resort to legal methods or to resort to force ·to expel Mr. 
Stanton from the War office, the President should ignore Stanton 
and send his orders direct to the General of the Army. 4·l 
General Sherman exerted himself to further the reconcil-
iation between the President and General·Grant. After inter-
viewing the President on the morning of January the 18th, 
Sherman conversed with General Grant and offered to go with him 
on the following Monday to Mr. Stanton, and to say that it was 
their joint opinion he should resign. But this was found to 
be impossible because of General Grant's proposed trip to Rich-
mond. Sherman wrote to the President the same day as follows:-
ttThe General {Grant) proposed this c:-0>urse: He will call on you 
tomorrow, and offer to go to Mr. Stanton to .say, for the good 
of the Army and of the country, he ought to resign. This on 
Sunday. On Monday I will call on you, and if you think it 
necessary, I will do the same, viz., go to Mr. Stanton and tell 
him he should resign."42 
The next morning General Grant called upon the President 
as agreed. In the course of the conversation Grant spoke of 
the insignificance to which i\'1r. Stan ton could be reduced in his 
position. The President agreed and said that Stanton would a-
mount t~ .nothing more than a clerk. General Grant then stated 
that he vmuld not obey Mr. Stan ton's orders, unless he knew 
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they emanated from the President. Johnson replied that the 
General would be doing right in pursuing such a course and 
asserted that he {the President) did not consider l\.iir. Stanton 
as authorized to act as Secretary of War; he_ had suspended 
him from office, and did not intend to recognize him.43 "All 
that Mr. Johnson said was pacific and compromising," Gra·nt 
wrote to Sherman, "while _I think he wanted the consti tutiona-
lity of the 'Tenure Bill' tested, I think now he would be glad 
either to get the vacancy of Secretary of War, or have the 
office just where it was during suspension. 0 44 
On the same day Grant called on Mr. Stanton with the in-
tention of asking him to resign but somehow was so overawed by 
Stanton's imperious bearing and gruff demeanor that he failed 
to do so. nr soon found," he wrote to Sherman, nthat to re-
commend resignation to Mr. Stanton would haye no. ef:fect, un-
less it was to incur further his displeasure; and, therefore 
did not directly suggest it to him. 45 I explained to him, 
however, the course I supposed he would pursue, and what I ex-
:pected to do in that case, namely to notify the President of 
his intentions and thus leave him to violate _the 'Tanure-of-
Offioe Bill' if he chose, instead of having me do ~t. 
"~:;would advisre:," he continued in his letter to Sherman, 
"that you say nothing to Ivir. Stanton on the sµbject_uriless he 
asks your advice. It will do no good and may embarrass you.n46 
Generfil Grant's position was now very embarassing. He 
greatly disliked Stanton, whose arrogant roonners and oondesoend-
L ing demeanor he had endured for so long. He_ had not. colluded 
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with Stanton to turn over 'the War Department to him and had 
become very angry at Mr. Stanton's taking such ~arly and un-
announced possession of the War off ice on the morning of the 
January 14th. Stanton had sent for him that morning in the 
usual manner, by an orderly, announcing that he "wanted to 
see him". This condescension on the :par"t; of the $ecretary 
had so nettled General Grant that he declared .to Sherman that 
he would never again enter the Department while Stanton was 
its head, unless sent for. 47 To General Schofield, on whom 
he called in Richmond January 22nd, Grant conf~ded that Stanton's 
conduct had been nintolerable'' to him, and in emphatic terms 
declared his intention to demand either Stant.op.·' s removal, or 
the acceptance of his own resignation.48 
But ·General Grant did not make any demand for Stanton(J:.s 
removal; neither did he offer his' own resignation~ To do 
either would have·been inconsistent with his record of adher-
ence to the Radical side of the conflict bei;ween the President 
and Congress. To demand Stanton's removal would have meant 
taking the President's side and furthering his interests. 
Such a demand would have been a condemnation. of the Tenure-of-
Office Act and·Grant-believed in the authority o~ t4e Tenure-
of-Offioe Act. 
To resign the position of General of the .f--..rmy would not 
only mean personal sacrifice. It would remove the officer in 
whom Congress had, according to his oppi:riion, intrusted the 
responsibility of administering military reconstruction in the 
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South. 
But, to remain as General of the Army subord,inate to the 
Secretary of War would be extremely embarrassing.to him. As a 
subordinate ~o both the President and Secr.etai-y s.tanton he wap 
subject to receive orders and instructions froµi either of them. 
• .• . .• 1 -
In conversing with the President on the 19th of .J~nuary Grant 
had made the statement that he would not obey Mr. S~anton's 
orders unless he knew they emanated from the :}?resident. The 
President had assented to this and had said that he did not 
consider Mr. Stanton as authorized to act as Seqretary.of War 
and did not intend to recognize him. Here w~s an agreement 
between the President and Grant that the lat.ter .should not obey 
Stanton. But it vtas not an order; at least not a:. writt~n one. 
Grant must hav.e began to realize that to proceed to. igno.:r~ ... the 
orders of Secretary Stanton, the·officer purporting to be his 
legal superior, without being officially authorized to do so 
by the President would be a dangerous course •. Should it be 
proven that Stanton had a lawful right to .his .office, Grant 
having ignored his orders would be guilty of . insub.ordination. 
Why should he run this risk, take this resI_)ons.ibility, .fight 
this battle for the President, who was apparen~ly trying to 
use him and profit by his d,oing the unautho.riz.ed act without 
burning his own fingers? Certainly it was more tban could 
be expected of the General of the Army, a military office~, 
to presume to choose to disobey a civil officer ~urporting to 
be his superior. It ·was not for him to decide this question.· 
··Thus Grant must have reasoned to himself .. 
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As to whether or not Grant received·orders from the War 
Department authorities differ. General Sherman wrote to his 
wife on J'anuary 23rd as follows: 't ••• Stanton is. still in office 
and makes no sign of retiring. He makes no orders to the A:rmy 
and therefore cannot test his power. Sooner or la.ter this will 
cause and bring about a direct collis.ion. aµd C9ngress stands 
ready and willing to impeach if Mr. Johnsqn _doe~ any positive 
act of breach of law.n49 
.According to Badeau, Grant twice "received important or-
ders from Stanton requir~ng immediate action.Einq iµclosing com-
munications from the Treasury which recognize.d Stanton as Sec-
retary of War. n50 
At any rate General Grant., mistrusting. the President and 
feeling apprehensions aB to personal danger i~ proceeding to 
disregard Stanton's orders wi th01.l;t wri tt_en authority decided 
to ask for written orders from the President. On.January 24th 
he wrote to Johnson requesting to have, "i!l writing the order 
I 
which the President gave me Grant ve.!'bally ori. Sunday, the 19th; . 
instant', to disregard the orders of th,e. Hon. E •. M •. Stanton, as 
Secretary of War, until I Grant knew from. th_e_ ]?resident. him-
self that they were his orders."551 
cTohnson must have been puz,zled by this note. What were 
Grant's moti'iies? Was Grant working with.his Rad.ical friends 
to trap Johnson? Was the purpose of this _requ~st for orders 
to provide written evidence on which the impeachment con-
spirators would claim that J'ohnson was a law b~e~ker? 
Johnson concluded that he would not furnish this _evidence. 
114. 
To his secretary, Colonel M:oore, he remark:ed that he did not 
think he would give the order; that the General had been very 
restive under I1:1r. Stanton, had evidently been v~r.y glad to get 
rid of him, had now put him back in i;he war Department; and he 
thought he would let them fight it put. 52 
However, Johnson did send a message to ~eneral Grant re-
lative to his duties but ·wrote no or~er.53 
President Johnson could not fGrgive_General Grant for his 
apparent duplicity in giving up the War office )jo Mr. Stanton. 
Grant had promised to see Stanton a11d as~ him. tq :resign. This 
he had not done; if he had, Johnson had no krio~ledge _of it. 
Johnson had relied upon Grant and Sherman. to. help extricate 
him from his difficulties.54 Grant had refuf:?eq._ to t.ake the 
responsibility to d~regard or oppose Stanto:r;i •. The President 
now turned to General Sherman for assistan_ce •... Sherman had 
been sympathetic with Johnson's one-man f_ight aga~nst Congress; 
had expressed his good will to the PresJ_den~; 55. ?-nd_ had signi-
f ied his willingness to help straighten o~t. ~4e 4ifficulties ex-
is.tingubetween t.he Pres~.de.n t . a:n<t _General. O-ran 1i. Johnson was 
now determined to test the constitutio:µalit;y of the Tenure-of-
Office Act. On the day that Grant sent his request for a 
written order Johnson sent for General Sherman and offered to 
appoint him Secretary of War ad interim and tomemove Stanton. 
Sherman doubted the President's power to do this and ex-
pressed a desire for time to consult his 1'ather-in-1aw, Thomas. 
Ewing.56 Both Sherman and Mr. Ewing thought it inadvisable 
, .... to nominate a new secretary at this .time. Sherman thoug;tit 
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that "If the President wants to make an issue ~o go to the 
Supreme Court, why not let the .Secretary of the.Treasury re-
fuse one of his warrants and deny that Stanton is Secretary 
of War, or that his restora.tion is made by t.he Tenure of 
Civil Office Bill?"57 
Evling thought that it was "not expedient for the Pres-
ident to take any action no~v in the case of Stanton. So far 
as he and his interests are concerne~, things are in the 
best possible condition. Stanton is in the Departmen·t;, !!.£! 
his secretary, but the secretary of the Senate, who have taken 
upon themselves his sins, and who place him t~ere under a 
large salary to annoy and obstruct the operations of the Ex-
ecutive. This the people well enough understand, .and he is 
a stench in the nostrils of their own party.n58 .on J"an. 28th 
Sherman wrote to his wife; "On Sunday I saw yo~r father 
Mr. E\ving and got him to write me, a lett~r, which yesterday 
I submitte.d to the President with one of mine, which ends 
this matter •••• u59 
The reinstatement qf Mr. Stanton with all the details 
of the President's plans to carry the matter to the courts, 
·the alleged promise o.f General Grant to hold on to the War 
Office for that purpose, Grant's relinquishment of the office 
. 1 
and its subsequent .reoccupation by $tan ton .together with the 
happenings at the cabinet meeting on the 14th were all the 
subjects of comment by the newspapers. The journals which 
were in sympathr with the President p~int~d Johnson's side 
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of the story in every deta~l. The New York World .had come 
out with big headlines t•The Surrender of. General Grantn, 
condeming Grant's action in giving up the office. The news-
boys had run about the streets of Washington shouti_ng ttThe 
Surrender of General Grant". The contents of. the National 
Intelligencer, the principle organ of the administration, on 
January 18 must have been especially ~nnoyi:p.g to General 
Grant and his friends. After saying that_ Radical newspapers 
were questioning the fact;s of the Stanton-Gr-an_t-J'ohnson epi-
sode published J"anuary 15, this paper published these again 
and followed with these belecose sta t~1nen:ts:. "The above state-
ment of facts was made by us deliberately, carefully, and ad-
visedly. We repeat a'nd reiterate i_t in t_he most. emphatic 
manner. We knew it to be true in all its. length and breadth, 
and we challenge General Grant to'deny 1! in.~ .. single parti-
cular. On this point we refer to .the Wa.Shington Correspon-
dent of the New York World, confirming our statement." Then 
follows an account headed as foll9ws: "INTERVIEW 6'f .ths PRES~ 
~· ' ... ,. ____ ~' 
IDENT--I:.rn. J'Oill\fSON will not RECOGNIZE NIB. STANTON as SECRETARY 
~~~~ ~~ ~- - ·~ ... ·~ ------~-
OF WAR". The account was a special despr;tcl:l to ,,the New York 
World in which the reporter told of an interview with the 
President wherein, the reporter said,. the President gave his 
version of Grant's apparent betrayal of trust. 60 
Saturday January 25, the National Intelligencer :printed 
an account of the Cabinet Meeting of January 17when the Pres-
ident had called the attention of members of the Cabinet to 
the Article in the Intelligencer of ~he 15th $nd they had con-
11?. 
curred as to its accuracy. The account had been furnished by 
the Washington correspondent of the New York World who had 
somehow secured the notes of the cabinet meeti~g.61 It pur-
ported to give literally the comments of the various.members 
of the cabinet upon what transpired when Grant was called be-
fore the cabinet on the 14th to explain his act~ons. These 
comments were distinctly unfavorable to Grant and u:ph.eld the 
President's version of the episode.62 
According to General Sherman, these newspaper articles 
making the most of the notes secured of the cabinet meeting, 
"by wide-spread publication and by rubbing in of the most 
galling partstt63 and·"the constant receipt of l~tters asking 
him if it was possible he had purposely bet~ayed_the Presi-
denttt goaded Grant into action.64 
On the 28th of January General Grant wrote to President 
Johnson a lengthy letter in which he attempt~d to explain his 
side of the controversy. He first renewed his reques·t of the 
24th for written instruction~ not to obey any order of Mr. 
Stanton unless he knew it came from the President. rtTo this 
written request of the 24th," he said, "I received a message 
that had left doubt in my mind of your intentions. To pre-
vent any possible misunderstanding, therefor.a,. :r renew .the 
request that you will give me written instruetions, and, till 
they are received, will suspend action on you~ yerbal ones •. 
'~I am compelled to ask these ins.trµctions_ ~n writing", he 
continued, "in consequence of the many and gross misrepresen-
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tations affecting my personal honor, circul?.ted through the 
press for the last fortnight, purporting to come from the 
President, of conversations which occurred either with the 
President privately in his office, or in cabinet _meetjng. 
Wha.t is written ·ad.mi ts of no misunder.standing._n 
"In view of the misrepresentations referred tot". contin-
ued Grant, "it will be well to state the facts_ of the case." 
He then gave his version of the agreement with _Johnson; that 
he had stated it was his belief that Mr •.. Stanton would have 
to appeal to the courts to reinstate him, th.at. h9wever, he 
had not looked particularly into the tenur.e of office bill but 
that what he stated was a general :princ.iple, .aric1 if he should 
change his mind in this ;particular case he would. inform the 
President of the fact. This :promise, he. said,. had. been ful-
filled when he called upon the President the Sat~rday evening 
of the 11th of January and notified him that upon further . 
study of the Tenure-of-office law he found that he· could not 
hold on to the office without violating the law and that it 
left him no discretion in the matter. He de.nied .that he had 
agreed to call and see the President again o.n .. Mcniday •. 
"From the 11th to the Cabinet meeting on the 14th in-
stant'', Grant wrote, "a doubt never entered my mind about the 
.President's fully understanding ~y position, namely, that if 
the Senate l'eflused to oonour in t,he s11~pensio:n. of Yi.r. Stanton, 
my powers as Secretary of War ad interim would cease, and Mr. 
$.tanton's right to resume at once the functions of his office 
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would under the law be indisputable, and I acted accordingly. 
With Mr. Stanton I had no communication, direct ~r indirect, 
on the subject of his reinstatement during the suspension.n 
Grant denied that he had aver agreed to cont.~nue in the War 
Department until displaced by the courts or .~o.·resign if he 
did not resist the reinstatement of Stanton. He denied that 
at the cabinet meeting of the 14th_ i~stant he had admitted 
that he had made any or the promises.which Johnson alleged that 
he~lhad;·7namely to hold onto the War Office until displaced by 
the courts or resign so as to :place the President where he 
would have been had Grant never aca~pted.the office. 65 
It would be.supposed that, upon receiving such an offen-
sive letter as the foregoing, President Johnson, who had a 
reputation for contentiousness would have been provoked into 
writing an immediate reply.in kind. Had he ~een the aggres-
sor in this quarrel that historians. have commonly pictured 
him he certainly would have taken up the fight. at_ this junc-
ture qut he did not. 
The next day after receiving t~is lengthy and argumenta-
tive letter of Grant's President Johnson wrote on the back of 
Grant's note of January 24th: "As requested in this communi-
cation General Grant is tnstructed, in writing not to obey any 
order from the War Department, assumed to be isst1ed.by the 
direction of tj·1e President, unless such order is known by the 
General commanding the armies of the. United States. to have 
been authorized by the Executive. 066 
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It will be noticed that the President took care to word 
his instructions in such a way as to effect only orders nassum-
ed to be issued by the direction of the President.n Such in-
structions would not violate even the radical Tenure-of-Office 
Act. 
On the· 29th of January President Johnson again sent for 
General Sherman and asked him to take the office of Secreta:r;.y 
of Vlar. 67 He wished to thus test the consti tµt,ionali ty of the 
Tenure-of-Office .Act. Sherman· requested time to th.ink the 
proposition over and the next day wrote the President declin-
ing to accept the office.68 
On the 31st. Sherman wrote to the President as follows: 
"To brine; me to Washington would put three he(3.ds to the army--
yourself, General Grant and myself: and we would be more than 
human if we were not to differ. ·In my judgm~nt .it would ruin 
the army, and would .. be fatal to one, or two of us" "with my 
consent,t' he said with emphasis, nwashington, neve~.n69 
To his wife Sherman wrote as follows~ ''Stanton.' s mere 
sitting in his office don't make him a cabinet officer, but 
he can do certain parts of the office without :the President ,·s. 
consent. I, however, rest my declination o,n the ground that 
I do not want to live in Washington. It is full of spie~ and 
slanderers who stop at nothing to make game, and I should re-
gret even Grant's elevation as that might f'o;rc~_me to this 
position. Grant tells me that he will avoid the nomination 
if he can, but it is doubtful, if Cha?e oan ge~ the votes, and 
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Grant don't want to see Pendleton come in because he was an 
open enemy of the War, which we~ maintain was right~··· 
All sorts of names are bandied about, but Grant's seems 
to be the favorite •••• n70 
General Grant was not satisfied with the written order 
which the President had sent him. on the 28th.. He seemed de-
f:;;._!_, 
termined to quarrel with the President anQ. n~w vrrote him an 
insubordinate and offensive note. He acknowledged the re-
tmm of his note of the 24th January with. the .President's 
endorsement there-on and then continued:; ttI am informed by 
the Secretary of War that he has not receive~ from the Exe-
cutive any order or instructions limiting or impairing his 
authority to issue .orders to the army as has heretofore been 
his practice-under the law and customs .of the department. 
· While this authority tO' the :.War~/Department is no~ counter-
manded, 1 t will be sat isf'actory evidence to me that any or-
ders issued from the War Department, by dir~ction of the 
President, are authorized by the Executive.n71 
Grant's request of the 24th was to have in writing the 
order of the President to disregard the orders of Stanton as 
Secretary of War until he knew from the President that they 
were his (the President's) orders. The President in his en-
dorsement of this note had complied with Grant's request only 
for those orders from the War Department, assumed to be issu-
~ .!?z the direction of the President. This, the President 
had a perfect right to do. And General.Grant was legally 
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bound to obey his chief superior in this order. He may have 
considered it as being foreign to the duties of the General 
of the Army to differentiate between orders "assumed to be 
authorized by the President" and those merely issued by 
Stanton as head of the War Department; to obey the latter and 
not the former. Ordinarly such discrimination would have been 
beside his duties as General. But the circumstances and times 
were extraordinar~ and the President had given him an extra-
ordinary command. General Grant had no legal choice but to 
obey, no matter what his personal opinions may have been as to 
the legal status of Mr. Stanton as secretary of War. The fact 
that Grant, after receiving the order which he had solicited, 
cavilled and refused to obey, stat¢ing that Stanton had receiv-
ed no instructions limiting his authority, shows conclusively 
that he was taking the side of the Radical congressmen and th~r 
Tenure-of-Off ice act and would support them even to the extent 
of' d isobey.ine his commander-in-chief. General Grant was in 
politics pure and simple. His actions also are presumptive evi-
dence that he had conferred with the Radical leaders and was 
under their influence, ~ catspaw to secure writteµ evidence on 
which the impea~hment conspirators would claim that the Presi-
dent was a law breaker. 
rrhere is little wonder that ,Johnson now. took Up the :pen 
to answer Grant's provocative letter of the 28th. On the 
31st of January he wrote Grant a lengthy letter reciting in 
detail his recollections of all that had transpired between 
himself and General Grant relative to the giving up of the 
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War office and flatly contradicting Grant's own account. The 
President :emphatically asserted that there was a distinct 
understanding between General Grant and himself that in case 
General Grant "should prefer not to become a. party to th€07rtro-
versy", or should conclude that it· was his duty to surrender 
the department ot N~. Stanton upon action in ~is favor by 
the Senate, he would return the office to him (the President) 
prior to the decision of the Senate, in oraer that the Pres-
ident might designate someone to succeed him. This promise, 
said Johnson, wa.s reiterated on the Saturday evening of Jan-
uary 11th at which time ·1t was understood General Grant would 
call. on the following Monday for a further conference. "You 
thus, in disregard of the understanding between us", continu-
ed the President, "vacated the office without giving me notice 
of your intention to do so. It· i~ but just, however, to say 
that in your communication you claim that you did inform me 
of your purpose, and thus 'fulfilled the promise made in our 
last preceding conversation on this subject'. The fact that 
such a promise existed is evidence of an arrangement of the 
kind I have mentioned. You had found in our first conference 
'that the President was desirous of keeping Mr •. Stanton ·out 
of office, whether sustained in the suspension or not'. 
You lqlew what reasons had induced the President to ask from 
you a promise; you also knew that in case your views of duty 
did not accord with his own convictions, it was his purpose 
to fill your place by another appointment. Even ignoring the 
existence Of a positive Understanding between US, these oon-
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clusions were plainly deducible from our various conver-
sations. ·It is certain, however, that even under these cir-
cwnstances, you did not offer to return the place to my pos-
session, but according to your own statement, placed your-
self in a position where, could I have anticipated your 
action, I would have been compelled to ask of you, as I was 
·compelled to ask·of your predecessor in the War Department, 
a letter of resignation, or else to resort to ~he more dis~ 
agreeabl~ expe4ient of superseding you by a successor.tt 
Johnson sta.ted that he considered General· Grant's pro-
posal to visit Stanton and ask him to Besign "as a sort of 
reparation for the failurett on Grant's part to act in·accor-
dance with the understanding. 
As for the cabinet meeting of January 14th the Presi-
dent's recollection of what tran~pired was "diametrically the 
reverse" of Grant's narration. Johnson stated that in the pre-
sence of the cabinet Grant admitted the President's version of 
the promise Grant had made to hold on to the War Off ice and 
abide by judicial proceeding or put the President in the same 
position he had been previous to his appointment. The Pres-
ident asserted that Grant also admitted that on the preceding 
Saturday he had stated in response to the President's in-
quiry as to what he ~ntended to do that his action in regard 
to the War Office would be consistent with the understanding 
reached. in former cqnversa t ions. 
"I next asked", the President continued.: u1r, at the 
conclusion of our interview of Saturday it was not understood 
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that we were to have ·another .conference on Monday, before 
final.action by the Senate in the case of Mr. Stanton. You 
replied tha.t such was the und.erstanding, but that you did 
not suppose the Senate would act so soon; that on Monday you 
had ·been engaged in a conference with General. Sherman, and 
werecoccu:pied with 'many little 'matter~', and asked if Gen-
eral Sherman had not called on thaJ day. tt 
"Sincerely anxious ••• to be correct. in my statements'', 
continued Johnson, nr have to-day read this narration of 
what occurred on the 14th instant to the members of the cab-
inet who were then present. They without exception, agree· 
in its accuracy.n72 
On the third of February General Grant againmrote the 
President. He acknowledged the receipt of Johnson's letter 
of January 31st saying; ttI find it to.be but a reiteration, 
• 
••• of the 'many gross misrepresentations' contained in 
these articles [&he articles in the Na.tional Intelligencer 
and the New. York Wo111ldJ and which,my st.atement of facts set 
forth in my letter of the 28th ultimo' was intended to correct; 
and I here reassert the correctness of my statements in that 
letter, anything in yours in reply to it to the _contrary not 
withstanding." He once more denied there existed any promise 
of 
after Saturday the llth,..,January either expressed or implied 
that he would hold on to the office of Secretary of War ad 
interim against the action of the Senate or su~render it be-
fore action of the Senate, or that he would see Jo~nso~ again 
at any fixed time on the subject. 
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"The performance of the promises alleged by you to have 
been made by me", he aontinued, "would have involved a resis-
tance to law, and an inconsistency with the whole history of 
my connection with the suspension:df Mr. Stanton." 
Grant, then revealed the rea.l reason why he had accept-
ed the appointment of Secretary of War ad interfm. When Stanton 
was suspended from office Grant had feared that the President 
[~ 
would appoint some one who would embarrass the a.rmy in the 
Reconstruction Acts. "It was to prevent such an appoint-
ment'', he declared, "that I accepted the office of Secretary 
of War ad interim, and not for the purpose of enabling you 
to get rid of' Mr. Stanto·n by my withholding it from him in 
opposition to law, or not doing so myself, surrendering it 
to one who would, as the ·statement and assumptions in your 
communication plainly indicate you sought. n '1And it was to 
avoid the same danger'', he asserted that he had urged the 
appointment of Governor Cox. He stated amso that, now he 
could not advise Stanton's resignation, "lest the same dan-
ger I apprehended on his first .·removal might follow". 
"The course you would have it understood I agreed to 
pursue", he continued, "was in violation of law, and with-
out orders from you; while·the course I did pursue, and 
which I never doubted you fully understood, was in accor-
dance with law, and not i~ disobedience of any orders of 
my superior.· 
"And now, Mr. President, when my honor as· a soldier 
and integrity as a man have been so violently assailed, 
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pardon me for saying that I can bu·t regard this whole matter, 
from the beginning to the end, as an attempt to involve me in 
the resistance 'Of law, for which you hesitated to assume the 
responsibility in orders and thus destroy my character before 
the country. I am in a measure confirmed in this conclusion 
by your recent orders direotin~ me to disobey orders from the 
Secretary of· War--my superior.and your subordinate--without 
having countermanded his authority to issue the orders I am 
to disobey.u 73 
Secretary Welles comments in his Diary on this letter 
as follows: "It is throughout highly discreditable to Grantts 
integrity, honor, ability, and truth. He is in this matter 
the tool of Stanton and the victim of his ovm selfish aspir-
ations. He has vulgar tl.unning, is deceptive and unreliable~·· 
"The corresuondence shows that he played a false and trea-. . . . -
cherous part with the President throughout. From the first 
he has studied to deceive the man who trusted him ••• Prevari-
cation and down:·right falsehood, with deception and ·c~reachery 
towards his ·chair, mark the conduct of u. s. Grant.n74 
On February 4, the President.submitted the correspondence 
to the cabinet. It evoked expressions of denunciation. At-
torney General Stanbery said that a~ide from the facts in 
the oase, the tone and taste of Grant's letters struck him as 
extraordinary. . . ~' Secretary Browning remarked that, it was the 
.," 
~rnakest and most disrepLttable ,letter that he could\have wri tt-
en. 
, \ 
Secretary MoCullock asserted that Grants conversation in 
the Cabinet;. meeting of the 14th of January was exactly the cc) 
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contrary of what he said in the letter; that General Grant 
seemed so greatly disturbed at the Cabinet meeting that.it 
was not surprising that he did not recollect what he had 
then said. 
A suggestion was made that an answer should be returned 
simply stat~ing that the character of Grant's latest letter 
was such. as 'to preclude any further correspondence upon the 
subject. This met with the approval of the members present. 
Attorney General Stanbery thought that the acknow~edgment of 
the letter should be made by the Private secretary--not by the 
President. 
"How does he explain why he entered into an explanation 
as an excuse for not having called on Monday?" asked· Secretary 
Browning, "If he had not promise·i, there was no. necessity for 
any excuse~n?5 
Disregarding the· advice of his Cabinet, the President 
decideq to reply to Grant's let~er of. the 3rd February. ttyou 
here admit," Johnson wrote, "that from the very.beginning_ of 
what you term 't:tre whole history' of your.oonnection with Mr. 
II 
Stanton's suspension,> you intended to circumvent the Presi-
dent. It wii's to carry out ·that intent that you accepted the 
appointment. ·This was in your mind at the time of your accep-
tance. It was notj;. then, in obedience ·t.o. the order of your 
superior, as has been heretofore been supposed, that you assum-
ed the duties of the. office. You knew it was the President's 
purpose to prevent Mr. Stanton from resuming the office of sec-
retary of ·war, and you in tended· to defeat that purpose. You 
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accepted the office, not in the interest of the President, 
but of Mr •. Stanton.,.. The 'history' of your_ connection with 
this transaction, as wr{tten by yourself, •.. shows that you 
not only concealed your design from the .President, but induced·· 
him to suppose that you would carry out his purpose to keep Mr. 
Stanton out of office, by retaining it yoursefuf·,-.arter an attempt-
ed restoration by the Senate, so as to require Mr. Stanton to 
establish his right by judicial decision.~ 
Johnson now charged Grant with holding the War office for 
the object of defeating 8:Il appeal to the courts. "You perfect-
ly understood," Johnson continued, ttthat in this interview 
'sometime' after you accepted the office, the President,·not 
content with your silence, desired an expression of your views, 
and yo~ answered him, that Mr. Stanton 'would have to appeal 
to the courts'"· "At the date o~ this conversatio~", Johnson 
asserted, "you did not intend to hold the office with the pur-
pose of forcing Mr. Stanton into court, but did hold it then, 
and had accepted it, to prevent that course from being carried 
out •••• The excuse you made ••• that afterwards you changed 
your views as to what would be a proper course, has nothing 
to do with the point now under consideration. The point ~s, 
that before you changed your views you had secretly determin-
ed to do the very thing which at last you did--surrender the 
off ice to Mr. Stant.on. n 
To the statement in Grant's letter of the 3rd of February 
to the effect that performance of the promise alleged to hade 
been made by Grant would have invClved him in the resistance 
of the law, Johnson answered, "I know of no statute that would 
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have been violated had you--carried out your promises in good 
fai th--:-t.endered your resignation when you conc.luded not to be 
made a party in any legal proceedings.n 
In the letter of 3rd February Grant had complained Of 
Johnson's recent orders directing him to disobey orders from 
the Secretary of War 'twi thout having countermanded his author-
ity to issue the orders ••.. " The President answered as follows~ 
"On the 29th, in compliance with your request, I did give you 
instructions in writing not to obey any order from the War De-
partment assumed to be issued by the direction of t.he PresidenLt, 
unless such order is known by the General commanding the armies 
of the United States to have been authorized by the Executive.;" 
"There are some orders which a secretary of War may issue 
without the authority of the President; there_ are others which 
he issues simply as the agent of, the President, and which pur-
port to be 'by direction' of the President •••• Mr. Stanton 
states in his letter of the 4th instant, ••• 'No orders have 
been.issued from this Department in the name of the President 
with my knowledge and I have received no orders from his." 
My order to you had only reference to orders 'assumed to be 
issued by the direction of the President'. It would appear 
from Mr. Stanton's letter that you have received no such or-
ders from him. However, in your note to the President o~ the 
30th ultimo, .. · • you say that you have been informed· by Mr. 
Stanton that he had not received any order limiting his author-
ity to issue;~:.orders to the army, according to the practice of 
the Department, and state that 'while this authority to the 
132. 
War Department is not countermanded_, it will be satisractory · 
evidence to me that any orders issued from the War Department 
by direction of the· President are authorized by the Executive'. 
You will not obey the direct order of the President but will 
obey his indirect order. If, as you say there has· been a 
practice in the War Department to issue orders in the name of 
the President without his direction, does not the precise or-
der you have requested, and have received, change the practice 
as to the General. of the Army? Could not the President co~nter­
mand any such order issued to you from. the War Department? If 
you should receive an order from that Department, is~ued in the 
name of the President, to do a special act, and· an order direct-
ly from the President himself pot to do the act, is there a 
doubt which you are to. obey? Yo\l answer the question when. you 
say to the Pres id en t, in yoµ_r.'.ietter of the. 3r.d in.stan t, the 
Secretary of War is 'my superior and your subordinate'; and 
yet you refuse obedience to the superior out of deference to 
the subordinate.n76 
Grant answered Johnson's last letter with a note dis-
claiming any intention of lilnsubordination, or any purpose ttto 
disobey any legal order of the President distinctly given •.•• " 
He claimed that he had received a letter from Stanton direct-
ing him to carry out.a request of the Secretary of the Treasury. 
With Grant.'s letter were two enclosures showing reaognition of 
Mr. Stanton as secretary of War by both the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Postmaster Generai.77 
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ANALYSIS OF THE CORRESPOl\TDENCE 
To those who read the story of the controversy between 
President Johnson and General Grant, two questions naturally 
1' 
arise. First, the question of veracity. In the several con-
troversial points in which each asserted he was right and the 
other party wrong, was there simply a misunderstanding or was 
one or the other party untruthful and if so which one was un-
truthful? Second, did General Grant intend to deceive and cir-
cumvent the President by inducing him to suppose that he would 
assist him in one way or another to carry out his design to 
keep Mr •. Stanton out of the War office, while determining :ln 
his own mind not to aid the President in his purpose? 
The que.stion of veracity is one which is difficult to 
answer with certainty. However, a careful analysis of the 
correspondence, the conversations of Johnson and Grant, and 
other pertinent rources will reveal very significant truths. 
There are six points in which the question of veracity is in-
valved and these will be considered individually. 
1. GRAWr '3 ORIGINAL PROMISE TO :rm~ PRESIDENT. 
Johnson: "The interview terminated with the distinct 
understanding that if, upon reflectiori,. you should prefer not 
to become a party to the controversy, or should conclude that 
it would be your duty to surrender the department to Wir. Stanton, 
upon action in his favor by the Senate, you were to return the 
office to me prior to a decision by the Senate, in order that, 
if I desired to do so, I might designate some one to succeed 
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you." (cTohnson to Grant, Jan. 31, 1868)78 
Grant:- "Finding that the President was desirous of keep-
ing Mr. Stanton out of office~~ whether sustained in the sus-
pension or not, I stated that I had not looked particularly 
into the tenure of office bill, but what I had stated [t~hat Mr. 
\ 
Stanton would have to appeal to the courts to be reinstate~ 
was a general principle, and if' I should change my mind in this 
partimilar case I would inform him of the fact." {Grant to John-
son, Jan. 28, 1868) 79 
General Grant's promise to the President no doubt includ-
ed the agreement to let Johnson know of his change of mind· in 
. . 
regard to the method w~. Stanton would have to use to secure 
the War of~ice but that ~not his only promise. In his con-
versation with the President Wednesday, January 15th after 
Stanton had come back into office he admitted that there was 
more to the agreement. In this interview Grant tried to ex-
plain his conception of the agreement to the President. "Now, 
Mr. President", he said, "I remember, when you spoke to me on 
this subject last summer, I did say ••• that Mr. Stanton could 
not regain his office except by a process through.the courts. 
I said if I changed my opinion I would give you notice, and 
J?Ut things as they ~ befo~ !£Z ~intment as Secretary 
of War ad interim."80 ---------
Whether, Grant couched his agreement in these general and 
ambiguous statements or definately and uneq_uivocally promised 
that if he changed his mind he would resign before the action 
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of the Senate as Johnson 'Said that he did, there is no pos-
itive way of te
0
lling •. But other references to the agreement 
are enlightening. On January ?th, before the reinstatement 
of Stanton, Johnson remarked to his Secretary Col. Moore, 
"that General Grant had told him that his action would be lim-
ited to withdrawing from the Department and leaving it in the 
hands of the President~ fully~ when it ~conferred upon. 
him •••• n81 
On the day of the famous cabinet meeting of the· 14th of 
January Col. Moore· wr ate in his ttno te s '' as fallows: " ••• the 
President ••• referred to the War Department asking the General 
if he did not distinctly tell the President that should the 
Senate reinstate the Seqretary of YJ'ar, and he (Grant) should 
not feel himself a.t liberty to resist such action, he would 
at least leave the office at the 'disposal of the PresiQ.ent. 
This, the President said, the General acknowledged!•••"82 
Thus, there are several references to Grant,. s, promise 
being worded in.a general statement that he would put the 
offic~ in the hands of the President, but nowhere, outside of 
Johnson's controversial letters to Grant, is there evidence 
to ·show that Grant d~finately and distinctly promised to re-
tain the possession of the War Office in order to force Stanton 
to resort to the courts for reinstatement or resign before the 
action of the Senate so that the President might appoint a suc-
cessor who would carry out his purpose to test the constitution-
ality of the Tenure-of-Office Act. 
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If Grant's promise was in the form of a general state-
ment that if he changed his mind he would give Johnson notice 
"and :put things as they were before fll.i§ appointment as Secre-
tary of' War ad interimtt the President might very naturally 
assume that he had Grant's promise to.resign before the action 
of the Senate. 'I1he President knew that Grant understood his 
plan to prevent Stanton from oomipg into possession of the of~ 
fice. The President also knew that Grant understood that in 
case his views did.not accord with the President's it was 
Johnson's purpose to fill his place branother appointment.83 
Yet this very promise could be interpreted to mean sim-
ply turning the office over to the President upon the action 
of the Senate and it was so interpreted by Grant who fulfilled 
this meaning by locking the doors of the Wrir Office and send-
ing notice to the ·President. 
The fact that this original promise was not in def inate . 
terms but ambiguous in character would easily lead. to a mis-
understanding. And the very reiteration Of this promise in 
general terms would lead to further misunderstanding. 
It ~ay be safely inferred, therefore, that Grant's ori-
ginal promise~ in general terms, capable,of multiple in-
terpretation. And since each interpreted the agreement acc-
ording to lb.is own interests further misunderstanding continued. 
In this first point of veracity therefore there was probably 
·no intentional untruthfulness. Johnson thought he had Grant's 
definate promise but was mistaken. Grant's .story of the agree-
ment in his letter to Johnson January 28th i~ probably· correct 
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except for the omission of an acknowledgement of his promise 
"to put things as they were before ~i~ appointment as Secre-
tary ad interim." 
2. GRANT'S RElTER.A.TION OF HIS PROMISE 'rO fiIE PRESIDENT ON SAT-'i, -
URDAY EVENING, JANUARY llTH. 
Johnson:- "After a protracted interview, during which 
the provisions of the tenure-of-office bill were freely dis-
cussed, you said. that, as had been agreed upon in our first 
conference, you would either return the office to my possess-
/ 
ion in time to enable me to appoint a successor nefore final 
action by the senate upon Mr. Stanton ts suspension, or would 
remain as its head, .wa.i ting a decision of the question by jud-
icial proceedings.n (J"ohnson. to Grant Jan. 31, 1868)84 
Grant: . ttYou l<now that we parted on Saturday, the 11th 
ultimo, without any promise on.my part, either express or im-
'plied, to the effect that I would hold on to the office~Cff;Sec-
of War ad interim against the action of the Senate, or declin-
ing to do so myself, would surrender it to you before such 
action was had •••• tt ( Grant to John son, Feb·~ '. $ (;<186 8 ) 85 
Badeau was at Grant's office when the General· returned 
from his interview with Johnson on the 11th January, and re-
lated what Grant stated had occured. "He declared," says 
Badeau, "that he told Mr. Johnson that on no account could he 
consent to hold the office after the Senate should act. The 
I President pleaded and argued, and would not be satisfied with 
138. 
Grant's decision. 1t "The President .•• would not accept the 
refusal, and when Grant left the room Johnson said he should 
expect to see the General again."86 
Col. Moore relates in his "notesn ·that on January 14th 
Johnson declared "that no later than the preceding Saturday 
Grant had distinctly told him that if he foun~ he could not, 
in his own opinion, properly resist the act.i.on of the Senate, 
he would at least leave the office of Secretary of War in the 
condition in which it was when he had· been appointed to the· 
position. •t87 
On close examination these two accounts of what was said 
at the Saturday interview are not so contradictory as they at 
first seem. General Grant might refuse ttto consent to hold 
the off ice after the Senate should act" and still agree to 
"leave the office of Secretary of War in the condition in which 
I 
it was when he had been appointed to the position.tt 
Johnson in his letter to Grant, Janurary 31st says, ''I 
then asked you at the Cabinet meeting January 14th if, at our 
conference on the preceding Saturday, I had not, to avoid mis-
understanding, requested. you to state what you intended to do, 
and further if, i~ reply to that inquiry, you had not referred 
to our former conversation, saying that from them I undersmood 
your position and that your actions would be consistent with 
the understanding which had been reached. To these q_uestions 
you also .replied in ·the affirmative." (Johnson to Grant, J'an. 
31, 1868)88 
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Now, it is clear that at the interview of Saturday Jan-
• 
uary 11th the President and Grant misunderstood each other; 
each taking a different view of the original promise. Accord-
ing to Johnson's idea of the promise if Grant was unwilling 
to hold on to the off ice after the action of the Senate he 
should resign then. Since the General did not offer to do so 
the President very likely did ask him, ttto state what he in-
tended to do" in order to avoid a misunderstanding. And if 
Grant did answer by refering to their former conversations 
and stating that his ttaction would be consistent. with the 
unq.erstanding which had been reached, 0 it would only lead 
to further misµ.nderstanding. Such a remark vrould be· quite 
natural for Grant to make even though he sincer~ly wished 
to avoid rnisunder~tanding, since to carry out his version 
of "former conversationstt would mean simply
1 
to return the 
office to the President upon the action of the Senate. If 
Grant made any remark whatsoever to the effect that his action 
would be consistent with their former understanding, this re-
mark coupled with the fact that Grant did not then.and there 
offer to resign would naturally lead Johnson to suppose that 
Grant in another interview might be persuaded to hold on to 
the War off ice. Badeau tells us that afterwards Grant ''was 
at first willing to admit that the President might have per-
suaded himself ••• that in another interview he could induce 
Grant to take the step he asked.n nGrant with his usual char-
..iness of speech," continues Badeau, "having said what he in-
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tended saw no need to confirm, or repeat, or amplify; and when 
Johnson said he would see him again, Grant did not refuse. rt89 
There is no proof; no good reason to believe that either 
Johnson or Grant was consJ-ously untruthful in his statements 
regarding the interview of Saturday January 11th. While, con-
sidering the vagueness of the original promise there is mucn'· 
evidence in support of the view that here aa well as in the 
case of the original promise, there was simply a misunderstand~ 
ing on the part of the President of Grant's intentions. 
3. TH~ UNDERSTANDING THAT GRANT SHOULD C.ALL ON THE PRESIDENT 
AGAIH ON MONDAY JANUARY 1$T:h FOR ANOTHER INTERVIE7l. 
Johnson ass~rted: ttlt was then understood that there 
would be a further conference on hlonday, by which time I sup-
posed you would be prepared to in~orm me of your final decis-
ion. (Johnson to Grant Jan. 31, 1868.)90 
General Grant denied this, saying, ttYou know that we 
parted on Saturday, the 11th ultimo, without any promise on 
my part, either express or implied, ••• that I would see you 
again at any fixed time on the subject.tr (Grant to Johnson, 
Feb. 3, 1868)91 
Here again, there was probably a simple misunderstanding. 
It will be noticed that the President did not say that Grant 
promised to see him on Monc!ay. He simply stated that there 
was an understanding, which could have been a one-sided under-
standing. Badeau says that "when Johnson said he would see 
h-im again, Grant did not refuse. But neither did he assent.n92 
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Wh~l~ it very probably is true that Grant did not misstate 
the facts when he asserted that there was no promise on his 
part to call on Monday, yet he had let the President think 
tha. t he could expect to see him then •. 
4. GRANT:.! S ADMISSION AT THE CABINET MEETING TUESDAY J"JWU..;;,; 
·ARX 14TH OF THE C0RRECTN1!lSS OF JOHNSON'S VERSION OF THE 
ORIGINAL PROMISE· 
.Johnson:: rtrn the presence of the Qabinet I asked you~ 
First; if in a conversation which took place ·shortly after 
your appointment as Secretary of War ad interim, you did not 
agree either to remain at the head of the War Department and 
abide any judicial proceedings that might follow non-concur-
rence by the Senate in Mr. Stanton's suspension; or, should 
you wish not to become involved ~n such a controversy, to 
put me in the same posit ion with re-spec t to the off ice as I 
occupied previous to your appointment, by returning it to me 
in time to anticipate such action by the Senate. This you 
admitted." (Johnson to Grant, January 31, 1868)93 
Grant: nr in no wise admitted the correctness of the 
President's statement of our conversations, though, to soft-
en the evident contradiction my statement gave, I said (al-
luding to our first conversation on the subject} the Presi-
dent might have understood me the way he said, namely, that 
I had promised to resign if I did not resist the reinstate-
ment. I made no such :promise." (Grant to Johnson January 28, 
ls68-) 94 
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There are five witnesses to what was said at the Cabi-
net meeting on Tuesday January 14th. Secretaries Welles, 
McCulloch, Seward, and 3rowning and Postmaster-Gene~al Randall 
were present. Each was later requested by President Johnson 
to state what was said in that Qonversation.95 Welles, Mc-
Culloch, and Randall affirm the correctness of the President's 
version of the conversation as given in his letter to Grant, 
Jan. 31; without giving their own recollections of what was 
said. ·They simply, in general staten:;ents endorse the Presi-
dent's account. Seward and Browning are more explicit and 
their letters are conciliatory to Grant's point of view. 
Seward testifies as follows: "I did not understand 
General Grant as denying or explicitly admitting these state-
ments (in the President's conversation) in the farm and full 
extent to which you made them. H1s admission of them was 
rather indirect and circumstantial though I did not under-
stand it bo be an evasive one." 96 
Brovming gives his re-collections in detail of what 
;Jolin.son and Grant both said. Hi:s narration of what Grant 
declared at the cabinet meeting was his promise:,ta,""'·J"ohnson 
follows so closely Grant's version of his promise in his let-
ter of January 28th to the President that it is practically 
a reiteration of the same •. Browning says nothing about 
Grant admitting the truthfulness of the President's statements.97 
The three witnesses, therefore, who did not write out de-
tailed recitations of what was said at the cabinet meeting 
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testify to the truth of Johnson's statements in their sweep-
ing endorsements of his whole account. The testimonies of 
the two secretari~s who took the trouble to be explicit ad-
mit the possibility of Grant's statements as to the promise. 
being different from those of the President and ·hence that 
Grant's admission of the correctness of the President's state-
ments was q_ualified and endorsing only part of the President's 
assertions. 
5. GRANT'S ADMISSION AT rrHE CABINI~T MEETING rrUESDAY, ~TANUARY 
14'.11H OF THE CORR3CTNESS OF JOHrmON'S V'ERSION OF GRANT'S PRO-
MISE OF THE PRECEDING SAI'URDAY EVENING. 
Johnson: »I then asked you ~t the Cabinet meetin~.if, 
at our conference on the preceding Saturday, I had not, ~o 
avoid misunderstanding, req_ueste~ you to state what you in-
tende-d to do, and further, if, in reply to that inquiry, you 
had not rererred to our former conversations, saying that 
from them· I understood your position, and that your action 
would be consistent with the understanding which had been 
rendered. To these questions you •.• replied in the affir-
mative." (ffohnson to Grant Jan. 31, 1868) 98 
Grant~ "After hearingtthe President through, I stated 
out conversations substantially as given in this letter •••• 
I in nowise admitted the correctness of the President's 
statements of our conversations .•.• rt (Grant to Johnson Jan-
99 
uary 28, 186?) 
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Welles, Randall, and McCulloch through their blanket 
endorsements of the whole.of Johnson's letter of January 
1'7.1 t li . th h.. . - lOO v s ne up vn · im on this quest ion. Secretary Seward 
testifies as follows : ttyou claimed that General Grant ~in-
ally said in that Saturday's· conversation that you understood 
his views, and his proceedings there after would be consistmt 
with what had been understood. General Grant did not contra-
vert, nor can I say that he admitted this last statement. Ger-
tainly General Grant did not at any time in the Cabinet meet-
ing insist that he had in the Saturday's conversation either 
distinctly or finally advised you of his _determination to re-
tire from the charge of the War Department, otherwise than un-
der your own subsequent direct ion. ttlOl 
Secretary Browning in his lengthly account of the Cabi-
net meeting verifies the President's statements in his lette~ 
January 31 as to what he (the Presi~ent) asserted in the meet-
ing was the conversation of the previous Saturday evening. 
However Brovming does not say that Grant admitted the correct-
ness of the President's assertions in regard to. the Satur-
day evening conference. Browning recounts what Grant said at 
the Cabinet meeting and it agrees with Grant's version of Sat-
urday evening conference as narrated in Grant's letter to 
·Johnson, January 28th. 102 
Here again the three cabinet members who wrote general 
endorsements to the President's side of the controversy agree~·: ' 
with him.· ·while the two who wrote out their o.wn versions of 
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what was said at the Cabinet meeting testify to no statements 
made at the meeting which would brand Grant as being untruth-
ful. 
6. GRANT'S AIJMISSION AT T".tl.E CABINET MEETING TUESDAYT JANUARY 
14TH TH.AT THZRE V''IAS AN UNDERST.A.NDING AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE 
SATURDAY EVENING CONFERENCE THAT HE WAS TO INTERVIEW 1rHE 
PRESIDENT AGAIN ON MONDAY. 
Johnson: "I next asked if, at the conclusion of our 
interview on Saturday it was not understood that we were to 
have another conference on :Monday, before final action of the 
Senate in case of Mr. Stanton. You replied that such was the 
understanding, but that you did not suppose the Senate would 
act so soon; that on Monday you had been_ engaged in a confer-
ence with General Sherman, and w~re occupied with 'many 11 ttle· 
matters," and asked if General Sherman had not called on that 
day." (Johnson to Grant, January 31st, 1868)103 
General Grant nowhere in his letters to the President 
specifically denies this assertion. 
All of the five cabinet members agree that Grant admitted 
that there was an understanding that he was to visit the Pfes-
ident again on Monday. Seward writes that "He IQ.rant! acquiesc-
ed in your ~he President'~ statement that the Saturday con-
ver~ation ended with an expectation that there would be a sub-
sequent conference on the subject, which he as well as yourself 
supposed would reasonably take place on Monday •••. Grant ad-
mitted that i~ was his expectation or purpose to call upon 
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you on Monday. 0104 Browning testifies that Grant said that 
"he left the President Saturday without any conclusion having 
been reached, expecting to see the President again on Monday. 
He then proceeded to explain why he had not called on the Pres- . 
ident on Monday, saying. that he had had .a long interview with 
General Sherman, that various little matte:r;s had occupied mis 
time till it was late, and that he did not think the Senate 
would act so soon and asked, "Did not General Sherman call on 
you on Monday?'nl05 
Here the two witnesses who write the details of what was 
said at the cabinet meeting show that Grant acknowledged that 
it ~ exuected he was to see the President on Monday.- They 
do not say that Grant admitted it ~understood that there 
was to be another conference on Monday. 
The seo·ond question was: Did Grant intend to deceive 
and circumvent the President? · This may best be answered by 
proving certain propositions. 
First·, it may be shown that Grant never seriously in-
tended· to a.ssist the President Ez holdin~ 2E. to the War Office 
11! order that the Tenure of Office Act mightlfbe tested in the 
courts. 
In his letter to the President of February 3~ Grant makes 
the following significant statement: "The performance of the 
promised alleged by you to have been made ~Y me would have in-
vovled a resistance to law, and~ inconsistency with the whole 
histor:y: of my connection with the suspension of Mr. Stanton.'' 
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{Grant to Johnson, Feb. 3, 1868) 106 
This is true. Grant had been working in harmony with 
Congress. He had suspmcioned the President of disloyal in-
tentions.107 He had felt it to be his responsibility to see 
that the Reconstruction Acts were administrated according to 
the intentions of Congress.108 The Tenure-of-Office law 
was passed to prevent the President from circumventing the 
will of Congress. Certainly it was not to Grant's interests 
to see the law annulled. He had declared hi~ opinion of the 
law in his letter of protest against the suspens~on of Stanton• 
"It certainly was the intention of the legislative branch of 
the government 0 hE3 had said, "to place cabinet officers be-
yond the power of executive removal, and it is pretty well 
understood that as far as Cabinet ministers are affected by 
the'Tenure-of-Office' bill it was intended especially to pro-
tect the Secretary of War, whom the country felt great confi-
dence in. The meaning of the law may be explained away by an 
astute lawyer, but common sense and the views of loyal people 
will give to it the effect intended by the framers.nl09 
In his letter to the President February 3rd Grant asser·ts 
that he did not take over the Ylar office "for the :purpose of 
enabling (Etie ~residenij to get rid of Mr. Stanton. u He took 
it rather for the purpose of preventing an appointment.of a 
Secretary who might embarrass the army in carrying out the 
reconstruction laws. (Grant to Johnson Feb. 3, 1868) 110 ; 
Badeau says that Grant "was determined to hold the post 
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only ad interim and to give no appearance of permanenoe .••• ttll.l 
Secondly, it is plain to be seen that Grant never intended 
to give up the office of Secretary of War ad interim before the 
action of the Senate. This, Gran-t admits in his letter to 
Johnson February 3. He says, nr,t was to avoid the same danger 
fi;hat the P-resident might appoint some one who would embarrass 
the army in carrying out the reconstruction lawiJ ••• that I 
nll2 .... urged the appointment of Governor Cox 
In his conversation ~ith General Sherman on the 11th of 
January Grant revealed this fact when h~ said that there was 
no hurry about notifying the President of his change of mihd 
"because he supposed Mr. Stanton would pursue toward him 
(Grant) the same course which he (Stanton) had required of him 
the preceding August, gis., would address him a letter claiming 
the office, and allow him a couple of days for the chartge.ttll3 
General Sherman in his conference with the President Feb-
ruary 3, said that General Grant seemed to have made u:p his 
mind to await Mr. Stanton's written demand for the office, and 
then to have referred the matter to the President.114 
Thirdly, it is self-evident that the statements which 
Grant admits that he made-would easily lead the President to --- ---- --- -- - . -- -- --
assume that he (Grant) would either hold ~ to the office ~ 
~Stanton would have to appeal to the courts .2£. that_ he 
would resign in time for the President to appoint ~ ~ who 
would carry out this procedure. 
He admits that he said to the President that Stanton 
would have to appeal to the courts ·to reinstate him.115 
J.49. 
He admits that he knew the President "was desirous of 
keeping Mr. Stanton out of office, whether sustained in the 
suspen~ion or not.nll6 
He admits in his conference with the President Wednesday, 
Jan. 15, that if he changed his opinion he would ·give the ·Pres-
ident notice "and put things as they were before (his) appoint-
ment as Secretary of War ad interim.nll? 
Johnson,in writing of Grant's promise to either hold on 
to the War Office or resign before the actio-n of the senate, 
says, ttEven ignoring the.existence of a positive understand-
ing these conclusions were plainly deducible from· our various 
conversations:n118 
If Grant did not intend to carry out his implied promises 
to the President why did he make these statements? There is 
, . 
but one conclus·ion: Grant really meant to deceive the Presi-
dent. It is clear that he understood the President's plans 
and that he permitted him to believe. he (Grant) would cooper-
ate in carrying them out. While, there is no evidence to show 
that Grant was literally untruthfu.l {l.:nd, t'here is muc:P~·1e~~dence 
to show that .there was simply a misunderstanding, yet it is 
clear that Grant allowed this misunderstanding in the first 
place and permitted it to continue. 
In taking the course that he did Grant's motives were 
mixed. He distrusted Johnson and probably thought it was his 
:patriotic duty to prevent him from carrying out his pl~ns. At 
the same time he was anxious to keep in the popular favor him-
1.50. 
self. Years later Johnson commented as follows: "Grant did the 
proper thing to save Grant, but it pretty nearly ruined me. 
I might have done, the same thing under the same circumstances. 
At ~ny rate most men would.nl.19 
GRAl'."r lil\fD THE PRESIDENCY 
The personal and political relationship between Presi-
dent Johnson and General Grant cannot be fully comprehended 
without an understanding of Grant's aspirations for the office 
of President. 
Grant came out of the War the most popular of its heroes. 
As such he would be an fdeal candidate for the Presidency and 
the leaders of both parties began to consider his availability. 
Even as far baclc as 1863 many suggestions were made to 
Grant that he should be a candidate for the Presidency. But 
having no ambition at that time to be President he refused to 
consider these proposals and would not allow himself to be 
quoted on political issues. He believed that as an officer of. 
the army he had no right to give his views concerning political 
affairs. 120 
As early as 1865 the Democrats were endeavoring to secure 
General Grant as their candidate for the Presidency in the 
coming election of 1868. 121 General Richard Taylor, formerly 
of the Southern army proposed to Grant, through General Badeau, 
Grant's confidential secretary, that Grant should become the 
candidate of the Democrats, .promising the support of the South 
in mass if it were permitted to vote. The leaders of the Dem-
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ocrats in the House, James Brooks, also suggested to Badeau 
that General Grant be the Democratic candidate.122 But Grant 
apparently was not interested in politics at this time and 
in no way responded to these proposals.123 
The Republicans were of course greatly interested in 
Grant as a possible oa'ndidate for their party. But, because 
of his trip through the South in December 1865 and his con-
servative report of conditions there, and because of his ac-
quiescence to Johnson's reconstruction program they mistrusted 
him. He was not a Republican. By M~rch 1866 however, Grant 
was letting it be known that there was a difference between 
the President's plan of reconstruction and his own. "It is 
probably, also," says Garland "that Rawlins, Babcock, and 
others of the politicians on his, staff had produced an effect 
by harping on the belief that he was to be the irresistible 
choice for the Presidencj at the end of Johnson's term." 
Grant admitted .his aspirations for the office at this time 
but said he was too young to become a candidate in 1868, but 
he might think of becoming a ~andidate in 1872.124 
The Republicans worked assiduously to win Grant over to 
their ranks. In July 1866 Congress passed a law. revi v:ing the 
grade of General in order that Grant might be honored vii th 
that distinctive title. 125 We have seen how Stanton used his 
influence to secure the passage of this act.126 
Grant's friends tried to dissuade· him from accompaJing ,... 
Johnson on his "Swing Around the Circlet'. It was their pur-
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pose to create an estrangement between Grant and the President.127 
During this trip the Republican p~ess tried to ·Convince the 
public that Grant was not in harmony with the President and 
he accompanied Johnson only in obedience to orders. 128 The 
Radical leaders worked hard to win Grant over to their ranks 
during the tour and were at least partially successful.129 
Probably the most enthusiastic promoter of Grant's can-
didacy was General Rawlins his chief of staff. Since 1861 
Rawlins had served on Grant.·' s staff. Grant valued him very 
highly and became very much attached to him. 130 At times 
131 Rawlins exerted enormous influence.over Grant. Rawlins 
seemed to consider himself as a self-appointed manager of 
that 
Grant's career; his ultimate purpose being to make Gra~t Pres-
ident. 
Rawlins was glad to have Grant accompany Johnson on his 
trip to Cijicago because, he said, nit will' do Grant good, 
132 whatever may be his aspiration in the future .••• " Rawlins 
saw that· Grant's popularity vms being enhanced by his being 
exhibited throughout the country and that he was making a good 
impression with the people. By his determined silence through-
out the tour Grant acQuired a reputation for great dignity and 
wisdom.133 
Rawlins had been syinpathetic toward President Johnson. 
But when he saw the effects of the "Swing Around the Circler' 
upon Johnson's standing throughout the country his attitude 
changed. . ' 134 ' He now favored the Radical program. And no1:: 
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doubt he saw that Grant's political fortunes would be jeopar-
dized if he did not cut clear from a seeming allegience to the 
unpopular President and come out in favor of the Radical cause. 
l!,rom then on we notice that Grant let it be known in a more 
pronounced way that he differed with the President. 
Yet Grant still disclaimed any partisan bias and did not 
wish to be called either a Democrat or a Republican. He would 
not make any statement to the effect that he would be a can-
didate for the Presidency.135 
It was evident however, tlj.at if Grant were willing he. 
might be the Republican candidate in 1868. On 3anuary 10, 
1867, Welles commented in his Diary, "General Grant will like-
ly be the next President of the United states."136 On June 
27, 186'7 Welles expressed it as his opinion that Grant trvrn.s 
disposed to be a candidate, and if so would probably be elect-
ed. nl37 On liugust 22 Welles writes: nGeneral Grant has be-
come severely afflicted with the Presidential disease, and it 
warps his judg~ent.... O.bviously he has been tampered with 
a.nd flattered by the .Radicals, who are us~ing him and his name 
for their selfish and partisan purposes •••• It appears t6 me 
he was somewhat excited by appeals of th~ Radicals and fears 
that he might lose their lood will. None but Radicals, and· 
the most mischie'fous of them, are hounding and stimulating and 
cautioning him. 0 138 A fev; days later Welles comments that he 
"had been v1illinr,~ to be courted, but i~ not quite prepared to 
have it published that the parties are engaged and to be 
married".139 And' on September 5, Welles says that "Grant ••• 
is more in the hands and the control of active Radical party 
managers than he or the country is aware. Hence he is mi~-
led, blunders, misconceives, and takes feeble positions. 
I think he is committed to the Radicals but gets his lessons 
imperf'ectly.ul40 
But if Grant.had such aspirations as Welles attributed 
to him he was careful not to mention them. He told General 
Sherm~n that ·h~ did not want to be President "that fifty 
millions of dollars woul~ not cm~ens~te him therefore, but. 
(,0 
that events might force him spite of inclination--just such 
A 
events as would 'compel him to throw himself into a breach~," 
"If. the Republicans can find a good nominee he {Qranfilwill be 
content" Sherman believed. 14~ -
With the fall elections of 1867 going a~ainst them the 
Republicans were greatly concerned about the next presid~ntial . 
election. It was not at all improbable that the Democrats 
might elect the next President .142 ''The danger now i_s," 
John Sherman wrote to his.brother, ttthat the mistakes of the 
Republic.ans may dr.if,t the Democratic party into power. ul43. 
The Republicans were now all the more anxious to receive the 
popular Grant as their standard bearer. 
When impeachment was in the air in the fall of 1867 the 
Radicals in Congress were talking of arresting the President 
prior to his trial. After Grant had declared in Cahinet 
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meeting that the President could not be arrested before im-
peachment and conviction, Boutwell, who was much in favor of 
Grant's candidacy began to disavow any intention of arrest-
ing the President. It is very probable as Welles suggests 
that Boutwell learned that Grant would not support the pro-
position to arrest the President and therefore opposed the 
action himself .144 The Radicals could not afford to alienate 
Grant or let him appear in the role of defender of the Presi-
dent .• 
On November 1, 186~ Senator John~$~erman wrote as follows:-
"··· Grant, I think is inevitably the candidate. He allows 
himself to drift into a position where he can't decline if 
he would, and I feel sure he don't want to decline. My judg'-
ment is that Chase is better for, the ·country and for Grant 
himself. But I Will not quarrel with what I cannot contro1.ul45 
Grant took care to let it be known whenever he seriously 
disagreed with the President. He would not permit the public 
to think he agreed with Johnson in all of the latter's po-
licies~ Ylhen Johnson proposed to suspend Stanton and Sheridan, 
Grant protested in writing against it. This letter was later 
published.146 After Sheridan and Sickles had been relieved 
of their posts Grant gave them a reception to show his approv-
al of their course.147 When Grant accepted the office of Sec-
retary of Ylar ad interim he assumed the attitude··.that he ;Was 
ordered to do so and therefore had no choice in the matter but 
to obey.148 
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lmd in notifying Stanton of his appointment he took the oppor-
tunity of expressing his appreciation to Stanton (and to the 
public for the letter was published) for his "zeal, patriotism, 
firmness, and ability.nl49 
On September 4th, 1867,the paper:S published the rumors of 
sharp differences between the President and Grant. Welles 
thought that there was "something more than a willingness on 
Grant's part" to have these differences known.150 
It is apparent that Grant was, as John Sherman b.ielieved, 
allowing himself ttto drift into a positiontt where he would. 
be the inevitable candidate of the Republicans. 
7velles on December 24, 186?, thought that Grant was not 
only willing to be a candidate but was daily growing more 
anxious for the honor. " ••• hi·s aspirations, n he says, ttal-
though he strives to conceal them, are eq_ual ··to and even sur-
pass those of the Chief Justice {9haseJ His reticence is all 
a matter of calculation, he fears to commit himself lest he 
should lose votes.nl51 
I It is quite probable that Grant's secret ambition for the 
Presidency made him all the more anxious to oppose the Presi-
deti 1t.tsr::I>o:lic ies for the .. sake of appearences. 
In the meantime Grant's Republican friends were carefully 
preparing the way for his candidacy. The chief of his pro-
moters was General Rawlins who, although he realized that 
Grant was not especially fitted for the Presidency yet ·nrely-
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ing upon the sound.judgement and unselfish patriotismtt of 
Grant considered the popular war hero.as ttfairly entitled to 
the succession~ttl52 
Since Grant was so reticent concerning politi.cal .a;Bfairs 
it was deemed proper by Rawlins and his friends that some one 
should spea.k for him. Rawlins, VJho was considered by his 
friends to be Grant's mouthpth~-ce on both civil ~nd military 
affairs and who was better able to speak than Grant himself, 
agreed to prepare an address upon the political questions of 
the times and give it at some suitable tiLle.153 
Rawlins prepared the manuscript with great care and sub-
mitted it to Gr~nt who gave it his approval. The speech was 
delivered by Rawlins on June 21, 1867 at Gaiena, Illinois, 
Grant's home town. It became known at the time that the 
speech was approved by General Grant. Therefore, it was given 
a greater i~portance and wider circulation than would otherwise 
have been the· case. 154 
The address reviewed the political causes of the war and 
dealt with the problems of reconstruction. It gave arguments 
for the 14th .Amendment and negro suffrage and in general sup- . 
ported the Congressional :program of Reconst:Duction. 155 . 
nrt was justly considered," says Wilson in his Life of 
John A• Rawlins, "as setting forth Gra.nt' s opinions and policy 
on the questions then utter~nost in the minds of all." It was 
published shortly after as a campaign document by the Union 
Republican Congressional Committee at Washington. In telling 
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about the speech in a letter to his wife Rawlins said "The 
Tribune says: tit is the platform of the army; it is the· 
platform of the Republican party; it is emphatically the plat-
form of the country, and it is unquestionably the platform of 
General Grant.tnl56 
With Rawlints Radical campaign speech before the country 
as Grant's platform and with Grant all0wing himself "to drift 
into a posi.tion" where he would be the logical candidate, the 
way was rapidly being prepaned for the launching of the Repub-
lican campaign. The stage was all set for a Radical triumph 
with Grant as the winning candidate,--except for one :particu-
lar. To the masses ·of' voters Grant ~as s~emingly still on 
friendly relations· with President Johnson. 
In other ways Grant was the,ideal candidate. He was re-
nowned as a military hero. The people had confidence in his 
integrity and judgement. His popularity was increased by the 
fact that he was not a politician.157 But he was not consider-
ed to be a Republican. It was well known that he had never 
voted for Republican candidates in all his life. 158 Certain 
other facts in his official career also stood out. His re-
port of the conditions in the South had favored Johnsonts 
program and had displeased the Republicans. He had accompanied 
Johnson on his ttswing Around the Circle." He was a member of 
the President's babinet, as the successor to Stanton, and as 
such apparently had the confidence of Johnson. Indeed, to the 
mass of peo ·-·le Gr-ant must have seemed firmly attached to the 
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unpopular President. 
As the Republican lead.ers prepared for their· National 
Convention they realized how awkward it might be for the mem-
bers when·they denounced the President in their platform to be 
reminded that their candidate and Johnson had seemed to be on 
terms of personal friendship. ttsuch a fact," wrote Blaine, 
''would embarrass the canvass in many ways, and would dull the 
edge of partican weapons already forged for the.contest.ttl59 
Many of the Republicans, therefore, earnestly desired 
that something might happen v1h i ch would remove even the sem-
blance of friendly relations of General Grant with the Presi-
dent.160 In _fact the Republican supporters of Grant could not 
have hoped for anything more encoura'ging to their cause than 
the quarrel whic~ arose between the President and Grant in the 
winter of 1868. 
The questions now naturally arise: Did the Republicans 
who wished for the estrangmen t between the Presiden·t and·.,Grant 
deliberately cause the quarrel? Did· General ~Grant; aware of 
the political consequences which would follow a disagreement 
with the President, voluntarily seek an altercation? 
The latter q_uestion may be answered with finality by re-
fering to General Sherman who says: "I know of my OVln know-
ledee that General Grant did strive all he could to avoid 
that unpleasant controversy with the President which he knew 
full well would be damaging both to him and the President.nl6l 
In answer to the first question it may be :pointed out that· 
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there are a number of contributing causes which brought on the 
quarrel. 
First, the anomalous situation of Grant:- a man unschooled in 
the arts of. politics holding an important political position; 
occupying a place of confidence and trust in th~ cabinet of 
him, whom he thought it his patriotic duty to circumvent and 
deceive. 
Second, the misunderstanding in regard to Grant's agreement. 
Third, the peculiar position in which Grant found himself un-
der the rein.stated Stanton whom the President had verbally ·in-
structed him to disobey but whom Grant respected as his legal 
superior. 
Fourth, the publication in the papers of the alleged unfaith-
fullness of Grant. 
Fifth, the "constant receipt of letters asking him @:ran fl if 
it was possible he had purposely betwayed the President.ttm2 
Now it is very probable that, had it not been for 'the 
strictures in the newspapers and the letters Grant received 
asking him if it were possible he had purposely betrayed the 
President, Grant would never have written the letter of Jan-
uary 28th giving his views of his understanding with the Pres-
ident. It is very probable also, that as Stryker suggests, 
Grant was in the hands of the Radicals and that they were us-
ing their influence to goad Grant into quarreling with 
Johnson.163 No doubt some of the letters Grant received ask-
ing him to explain his position were written with that end in 
view. 
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According to Wilson, General Rawlins, the chief promoter 
of Grant's candidacy, who was away from Washington returned to 
the city at the height of the discussion ''and at once became 
interested in mastering the facts of the case and giving aid 
and council to his chief ."l64 The letter of Fe~ruary 3rd in 
which Grant openly defies the President and says that he had 
accepted the war office only in order to thwart the Presi-
dent's purpose~ was. in the main the actual handiwork of Rawlins. 
Grant had written another letter "with less acrimony than the 
second, and \vhich ad.mi tted the possibility of the President ts 
misconstruction, but," says.Badeau, "Rawlins, who was a politi-
cian by nature, and.who had long forseen the result of all the 
political complications, felt that at last the time had come ..•• 
He took· the letter that Grant had v1ri tten and said: 'This 
will never do, 1 t ,is not enc.ugh; ' and then prepared th'e. draft 
of the important passages. directly contradicting and defying 
the President. nl65 "The language" continues Badeau, ttwas after-· 
ward modified, but the sentiment· remained, and this was sug-
gested by Rawlins. This made the rupture with Johnson per-
sonal, and reconciliation impossible. It was a stroke of gen-
ius, for it made any other candidate than Grant impossible for 
the Republicans."166 
.Nothing was said by those present about the political 
I 
consequences 'of the letter at the time it was written. ©rant 
recognized that Rawlins was expressing his (Grant's) own 
sentiment and acquiesed. . If Grant perceived th·e ·political 
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significance of the letter he did not let on, but after the 
publication of the correspondence he no longer declined to 
acknowledge the probability that he would be the Republican 
candidate and:~t;h~.'.party leaders now consulted him freely.167 
Now, the Radicals were ready for their convention. ttin 
every point of view," wrote Blaine, "the political situation 
was satisfactory to the Republicans. The last possible sug-
gestion of discontent with General Grant's expected nomination 
for the Presidency having been banished. from the ranks ctJf the 
party.ul68 
On May 21, Grant was unanimously nominated by the Nation-
al Republican Convention at Chi.c~go and the platform drawn 
up was substantially the same as Rawlins had outlined in his 
speech at Galena the year before .,169 Rawlins and the other 
aspiring friends had triumphed; had succeeded in making him 
the Republican candidate without Grant's· having lifted a fin-
ger in his own behald!. With Grant as the Republican c·8:-11di-
date, Republican success was assured. It was soon to appear 
what would be given to.Rawlins as a reward for his faithful 
service. 
Shortly before Grant's inauguration as Presiden~, Rawlins 
let Grant know thro~gh his friend General Wilson that he wish-
ed to be appoitited Secretary of War. Rawlins thought that he 
was "fairly entitledrt to the position. Grant had intended to 
assign Rawlins, who was ill with tuberculosis, to the Depart-
ment of Arizona believing that a prolonged residence in that 
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country would be beneficial to his health. But when Wilson 
made known to him Rawlins desires, Grant without showing 
surprise and without hesitation said, "You can tell Rawlins 
he shall be Secretary of War."170 
164. 
Chapter VI Active Hostility 
The relations between the President and General Grant 
were now entirely hostile, each having nothing to do with the 
oth~r. The break was complete and as far as Grant was con-
cerned, irreparable. Johnson regarded Grant as decei·tful and 
unfaithful to a trust imposed. Grant felt that .Johnson had 
tried to ruin his good name before the country; to destroy 
his reputation for veracity and trustworthiness and hence was 
unforgiving and implacable. 
Grant now conspicuously avoided the Pre·sident in society· 
and was to be found frequently with the Radicals. nThere is 
an.attempt to establish a Radical ton, or condition of society 
in Washington", wrote ~elles in his diary on February 13th., 
'!General G-ran t, ~3tanton, Colfax. and others show signs of this •••.• 
The two (Stanton and Grant) attended the last weekly reception 
of Colfax; the two were last night at Senator Chandler's. 
Neither of them attended the receptions at the President's 
or members of the Cabinet ..... 0 1 · 
Open cooperation with the Radicals and vmnton denunciation 
of the Fresident now characterized Grantts conduct and speech. 
The Radicals in Congress sought to find grounds ~o~ im-
peac~nent against Johnson in the correspondence between the 
President and General Grant. A Resolution by Representative 
Hubbard in the House of Representatives called on the President 
for the correspondence between the President, Secretary of war 
and General Grant • :Mr. Hub bard, a friend of Stan ton's intro-
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duced the resolution about an hour before Grant's letter of 
the 3rd. of February had reached the President. The object 
evidently was to close the correspondence with Grant ,having 
the last word, and to "foreqlose all opportunity for reply 
by the President". 2 ttThe whole shows an intrigue on the part 
of Stanton, Grant, and certain Radical leader~tt, wrote ·Nelles.~ 3 
Stanton imn1ediately furnished the requested letters. On Feb-
ruary 10th Thadeus Stev~ns led in a movement for the impe~ch­
ment of the President. But on that day Johnson sent his final 
letter--the letter of February 10th which so successfully ans-
wered Grant--together with the statements of the Cabinet mem-
bers, 4 and the movement toward impeachment carne to a stand-
still. The impeachment resolution was laid on the table by a 
vote of six· to three in Stevens committee. 5 
Had Grant actually connived,with Stanton and Radicals of . ... 
Congress to' entrap the President? Did he write his insubor-
dinate letters to provoke the President into the connnission of 
some rash act or the writing of some indiscrete statement? 
The evidence is inconclusive. It is probable that Grant was 
the innocent tool of the Radicals who used him, without his 
suspecting their purposes. ~Reckless and unprincipled men 
in ·congress", says Vlelles, "contrived to get General Grant, 
not unwilling, I apprehend, in their interest. He had en-
tirely changed his ground. Having been suddenly elevated to 
position without much culture, with no experience, knowledge, 
or correct information of the Principles of Govermnent, 
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Grant was intoxicated with his success and beginning to be-
lieve that with the army he could make himself permanently 
supreme. The Radicals consider him an instrument in their 
hands •••• They are acting together, however, at this time, 
and will until the crisis comes."6 
The crisis for Johnson was soon to come. Already, as 
. "' . we have noticed, Congress had pounced upon.the President's 
controversial correspondence with the General of the Army 
in hope that some evidence might be found which could be used 
as a basis for impeachment charges. 0 These things," wrote 
Welles, "and other occurrences fully convince me that ther~ 
is .a conspiracy maturing for the overthrow of the Adminis-
tration and the subver9ion of the Government and our Federal 
system. n7 
As early as November of the 'preceding year when Congress 
was considering impeachment there wa~ a proposal to remove 
the President from office untii after trial. 8 At the time 
the President had been so concerned that he brought up the 
question in Cabinet meeting, 9 and had attempted to sound out 
the loyalty of General Grant. 10 
Now, the same or a similar danger was threatening. some 
of 'the extreme Radicals intended~ Welles thought, "by any mea-
sure, no matter how unprincipled and violent, to get possession 
of and to exercise the executive authority.'tll On the 5th 
of February, the President and Secretary Welles discussed the 
situation. Welles asked Johnson if he was prepared for the 
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crisis. nshould the@.ad ioal§] attempt to seize the government--
to arrest him--, had he determined the course he would pursue?" 
Welles thought Grant would help the Radicals; that Congress, 
unmindful of the Constitution, would place the army at his dis-
posal instead of the President's. "Wh.on, Welles aslrnd the Pres-
ident, "had he got in whom he could confide, if a coll1sion took 
place?ttl2 
The President seemed nrevous and walked the room. He sug-
gested that Washington might be made· into a military district. 
and General Sherman ordered to it. Welles expressed his doubt 
as to the wisdom Of having Sherman·come to Washington. He 
thought he would follow Grant ra~her than the President. ttTheir 
military associationtt, Welles wrote, "and the t.ies. and obli-
gations of military fellowship and long personal intimacy and 
t'riendship would attaeh him to Grant, though I hoped not to 
the overthrow o,f:· the Government .nl3 
On the next day, February 6th the President issued an or-
der creating the Military Division of the Atlantic, to be com-
manded by Gen~ral Sherman who was to make his headquarters at 
Washington. General She~man was to assume command as early 
as practicable. 11his order was withdravm on the 7th but was 
again renewed the ffith, however the President now omitted the 
part of the communication which directed that General Sherman 
should assume ggmma.nd nas early as may be practicable.nl4. 
The President thought that with Sherman at Washington 
he would have an officer in command that would obey his orders, 
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Grant being .no longer dependable. On the 13th. of February 
the President nominated Sherman to be "General by brevet in 
the Army of the United States for distinguished courage, slcill 
and ability displayed during the war of the rebellion.Tr 
But General Sherman did not want either to come to V:lash-
ington or to be named brevit General. He telegraphed to·his 
brother John Sherman who was in the Sena~e to oppose the con-
firrna tion "on grounds that it is better not to extend the sys-
tem of brevets above Majo:i;- General". ·Out of deference to 
General Sherman's wishes, the Senate. took no action on the · 
President's nomination.15 
In a lengthy letter to the President which he sent through 
General Grant, Sherman expressed his displeasure with the order 
for him to command the newly created division of the Atlantic 
urging tha·t such a department was unnecessary ··~nd superfluous. 
The new arran~ement would be bound to cause a cloud to come 
between General Grant and himself and then he would have to re-
sign from the Army. He begged that his headquarters might be 
at New York or some other place rather than Washington.16 
To General Grant he wrote, "I never felt so troubled in my 
life.· ~ere it an order to go to Sitka, to the deyil, to battle 
with rebels or Indians, I think you would not hear a whim?er ~ 
from me, but it comes in such a questionable form that like 
Hamlet's ghost, it curdles my blood and mars my judgement.Tfl? 
Sherman's real.reasons for not wishing to.come to Washing-
ton were his fr!iendship for Grant and his fear that the Presi-
dent wished to use him to stir up trouble. He saw that the 
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creation of the new department with himself in command at ;7ash-
1 
ihgt,o,n v.ras an indignity to the General of· the Army who was al-
ready there. rtGrant and I were bound by such ties during the 
War"'· he wrote to Thomas :Ewing, tt--he acted so fairly and gen-
erously by me on all occasions ••• and if we continue as now, 
are likely to rise and fall together, that I would be mean in-
deed to allow myself to be used against him in the few short 
months remaining to President Johnson.18 n ••• he fiohnsoaj infers, 
I suppose, that because I gave him full credit for his first. 
efforts to reconstruct the South, on principles nea~er right 
than have since been attempted, that I will go with him to the 
death, but I am not bound to do it.n19 
On the same day General Sherman in writing to his bTother 
at 7lashington said, ttThe President would make use of me to 
begat violence, a condition of things that aught not to exist 
now. He has no right to use me for such purposes."20 
Grant advised 3herman that he would. be glad to have him 
in Washington if the public were not losing by bringing him 
away from his post in the West and if it were not for the 
annoying position in which Sherman would be placed. TtUnder 
no circumstances tender even ~ contingent resignation", he 
wrd>te, "you do not own :Mr. Johnson anything, and he is ·not· 
entitled to such a sacriaice from you.n21 
Considering all of the circumstances (Sherman's telegram 
to his brother asking that the title of Brevet General be not 
approved, his correspondence to the President through General 
Grant which the President thought showed that Sherman wished 
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to conciliate Grant and his disinclination to come to Wash-
ington}Johnson concluded that General Sherman could not be 
- l" d 29 . d re ie upon, ~ and so on February 19th he notifie Sherman 
that he might stay in St. Louis and retain.his old position. 23 
The President now planned to ~ring things to a crisis tn 
regard to Stanton and the War department. He thought that he 
had the constitutional right to eject ..... Stanton from office. If 
the latter should refuse· to leave the office or i'f he d.id 
leave and the Senate refused to concur in his removal the Pres-
ident thought the case would go to the courts, which was ex-
actly what he wanted.24 
Accordingly, on February 21 he appointed Lorenzo Thomas 
to the Off ice of Secretary of War ad interim and issued an 
order addressed to Stanton removing him from office.25 
Thomas went to the War Off ice and handed the letter of re-
moval .to Stanton. After reading it Stanton asked if he were 
to vacate the office at once or would he be given time to re-
move his private :property~ nAct your pleasure", Thomas re-
1 . d 26 p le • 
office. 
While they were talking General Grant Cfuue into the 
Thomas withdrew to his own room to have a copy made 
of the order of removal. When he returned Stanton said to 
him, "I do not know whether I will obey your instructions or 
notn,27 Upon ~tanton's refusal, finally, to give possession 
Thomas departed. It is possible as Stryker suggests that dur-
ing Thomas' absence from the room Grant may have said some-
thing to encourage Stanton to remain in the office. At any 
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rate Stanton during the.interval seemed to have ma~e up his 
mind to remain in possession of' the War Department. 28 
Both Stanton.and Johnson notified the Senate of the Pres-
ident's order of removal. The Senate adopted a resolution 
ttThat under the Constitution and laws the President has no 
power to remove the Secretary of War and to designate any 
other officer to perform the duties of that office ad interim," 
and refused to confirm Thomas' appointment. 29 
Grant now was working hand and glove with the Radicals • 
. Stanton had ordered Thomas nto obstain from issuing any orders 
other than in your capacity as adjutant of the army." He now 
sent an order to General Grant to arrest and confine General 
Lorenzo Thomas, adjutant General, for disobedience to superior 
authority in ~efusing to obey his orders as Secretary of War. 
tt.A. few minutes later," testified Col. Worthington of the ~Har 
Department, "General Grant and his side clattered into the 
hall. Holding· the order of arrest in his hand, Grant entered 
the Secretary's room and a private conference of perhaps half 
an hour followed. The nature of it can only be surmised, but 
the arrest was not put on file u30 .... 
It is n.ot lmown why Grant objected to the ar:eest of General 
Thomas at this time, but he certainly did not do so in the in-
terests of Thomas or in behalf of the President• He probably 
thought that it was not yet the proper time to act. At any 
rate Thomas was arrested the following morning. 31 When re-
quested to issue an order, as General-in-Chief to the heads 
of Departments to turn over to Thomas all letters, papers, 
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and documents in, and coming into their possession Grant re-
fused to bbey.32 But when directed by Stanton to detail a 
guard to protect the person of the Secretary of War and the 
War Department he complied with Stanton's request.33 Grant 
placed General E. A. Carr in· charge of the Yiar Department 
building and detailed a guard to act under his orders. He 
also empowered General C~rr to call upon any and all troops 
in and about the city.34 
In fact the whole military personnel at Washington seem-
ed to be pledged to support Stanton against any attem:pt by 
Thomas to secure the War Off ice or any possible movement on 
the part of Johnson to resort to force. General Emory was 
in command of the Department of Washington.~. On the night of 
February 22 a party was being given by a Mrs. Ray and a num-
ber of officers were in attendance. Aft.er the company had 
assembled an orderly appeared asking that all officers of the 
Fifth Cavalry appear at Headq_uarters. A little later, another 
orderly came with the order requiring all officers of General 
Emory's command to report at Headquarters.35 
When the next morning Secretary Welles reported these 
happenings to the President, Johnson said that he had not is-
sued the orders. 1rsome one h&.a't, said Welles, "Who is it and 
what does it indicate? While yqu, Mr. President, are resort-
ing to no extreme measures, the conspirators have their spies, 
--have command of the troops. Either Stanton or Grant or 
both issue orders which were proclaimed aloud and peremptorily 
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at this large social gathering.n36 Johnson sent for· General 
Emory. When questioned by the President as to whether or 
not there had been any tDoop movement in and about Washington, 
Emory replied that he thought no changes had been made.and re-
ferred to the recent order issued for the government of the 
army which provided that all orders must be "transmitted through 
General Grant of the Army, tt and that as any such order would 
come necessarily through him, he would know. 3.7 
Under the authority of the Army Appropriation Act of March 
2, 1867, General Grant could control the military. since all 
orders would have to go through him. On Monday February 24 
General Emory instructed the officers commanding the garrison 
of the city to send verbal orders to officers in charge of 
troops that all orders must ~,through proper channel:s.38 
With the House pressing forward the impeachment proceed-
ings there was great alarm thr6ughout the city of Washington 
that the President might resort to arms. "Not since the assas-
sination of Lincoln", says Rhodes, "had Washington been in 
such a state of excitement and each new move added fuel to the 
flame.u39 The President on March 14, was informed tllat for 
two days the troops had been under arms, furnished each with 
forth rounds of cartridges. 40 
General Grant had originally been greatly opposed to im-
peachment. Not until after his quarrel with '"Tohnson did he 
favor the movement to impeach the President. 41 nHe took the 
liveliest interest i:n the proceedi-ngs", says Badeau, ttand 
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though he preserved a proper reticence in his public utter-
ances, he did not scruple with those in his confidence to 
express his opinion that the· action of Congress was entirely 
justified.tt42 But did Grant observe 11 a. proper reticence in 
his public utterances"? On .April 4th. the New York Tribune 
printed the following: HWe have assurance from Washington 
that General Grant finds it not inconsistant with his duty as 
a soldier to announce it as his opinion that the only hope 
for the peace of the country is the success of the pending 
impeachment trial. He feels that the national security de~ 
mands the removal of the President. If the trial should fail, 
the people can only expect more assumptions of poTier, and a 
more· determined resistance of lav1. When the General of our 
armies entertains this conviction, there is no room fo~ doubt 
as to the duty of the Sena t~. The Loyal Ifa t ion demands the 
President's rem.ova1.u43 The General of the Army was using 
his influence in civil and political affairs to a remarkable , 
degree • 
. :.:Pres id en t Johnson after reading the above article remar1c-·. 
ed ~ "7lha t a fev1 years since would have been the fate of the 
General commanding the military forces if he had done what the 
Tribune, Vlith such an air of authority, says Grant has done?" 
Johnson was inclined to doubt the accuracy of the statement 
in the Tribune. He thought Grant could hardly be so indiscrete 
as to express himself thus. The President thought the purpose 
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of the Radicals was a rnilita!!y despotism. He commented freely 
on Grant saying that the 'General seemed to_ be dai ly growing 
guiltier in the estimation of the public and predicted that 
the time would come when Grant would be held in contempt by 
the people.44 
Grant was at one time summoned before Congress- to testi-
fy as to statements he had heard the Pr~sident say. It is 
only fair to him to s~y that he did not exagerate in his test-
amony but confined himse1:4 to simplJ stating the truth.45 
When there was doubt as to the outcome of the trial, and 
pres~ure was being brought to bear on the Republican senators 
who seemed uncentain how to vote, Grant was urged to use his 
influence with therri. Grant did converse with those whom he 
thought he might influence arguing in favor of conviction. 46 
He even visited Senator Frelinghuyser at his home.4'1 Senator 
Henderson was another whom he asked.to vote for conviction.48 
During the heat of the trial the lawyers for the President 
sought to reassure certairi Senators as to the disposition of 
the ~ar Off ice by having General Schof ields name presented to 
the Senate for the position of Secretary of Tiar. This would 
possibly win votes for the Defense. 49 Before agreeing to his 
appointment General Schofield consulted General Grant to ob-
tain his sanction to the proposal. Grant gave Schofield his 
opinions~ 
General Grant asserted that he did not believe in any com-
promise of the impeachment q_uestion. The President should be 
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convicted or acquitted fairly and squarely on the facts proven. 
He predicted that if Johnson were acquitted, :that as soon as 
Congress adjourned he would'trample the laws under foot and.do 
whatever he pleased. Congress would have to remain in session 
all summer.to protect the country from .. the lawless acts of the 
President; the only limit to his vi6lation of law had been and 
would be his courage which had been very slight heretofore hut 
which would be vastly increased with his ac'qui ttal. He (Grant J 
'f 
would not believe any pledge or promise Johnson might make as 
to his future conduct. The only safe course and the rnost.p9pu~ 
lar one would be to remove the President~ 50 
How similar to the radical views of the Radicals were 
Grant's. Yet it is :probable that his remarks to Schofield ex-
pressed actually what he thought" of Johnson at this time. The 
air was so full of excitement and rumor as to· what the ·Presi-
dent might do, 51 ·one aan scarcely wonder at Grant believing 
them. 
It will be noticed in respect to Grant's conversation with 
Schofield that while he assented that the President "ought to 
be convicted or acquitted fairly and squarely on the facts of 
the case", he also argued that conviction was "the most popu-
lar" course. Grant was urging the course which the people were 
demanding, because it w~s popular. 
Grant was probably sincere when he declared that "the ac-
quittal of Johnson would threaten the country and especially 
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the Sou th with revolution and bloodshed. tt52 But that was when 
se~t!~ent was running_strongly against the President. Later, 
Badeau says, tthis judgment changed and he thought on the whole 
it was better for the country that the President should not 
have been removed. He believed that Johnson had .been taught a 
lesson which he would not forget, and that the precedent of a 
.successful impeachment would have been a greater misfortune to 
t.he "State than any evil that Johnson might still have been able 
to accomplish. rt53 
Grant'•-_s ·opinions and ideas unquestionably were reflect'ions 
of the opinions and ideas of those who influenced him. " ... 4.s 
years went by Grant's judgment chang-ed on several points" says 
Badeau.54 As the years passed he must have looked back upon 
the days of the Johnson ad~inistration and realized that he 
had been mistaken,--as the men who had surrounded him had been, 
--about Andrew Johnson and his ~olicy. _ Grant in particular 
changed his ideas about the Tenure of Office Act which he as 
President found to b~ an obstruction. 
In order to bring pressure to bear on the Senate to pass 
the bill for the repeal of the Tenure of Office Act, Grant let 
it be known that as long as the law was in force he· would 
neither make appointments nor remove men from office except for 
flagrant misconduct. The Republicans were anxious to get 
Johnson's appointees out of office and fill the vacancies thus 
created with faithful Republicans.55 
The Senate proposed an amendment for the suspensionoof the 
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. Act until the next session. This would give Grant the oppor-
tunity to dismiss the offensive Democrat Office holders. But 
this proposal was so "shamelessly partisantt that ·the men with 
principle turned against it. 
The law~finally adopted, permitted the Presidertt during 
any ·recess of the Senate, to suspend civil officers until the 
end of the next session, but if in the mean time the Senate 
were to refuse its consent to such sus1Jension or to the appoint-
ment of a successor, the sUS})ended officer was to be restored. fffi 
trCasting Off all political disg_uises and personal pre~enses, rt 
Blaine wrote later, "the silU-ple truth remains that the Tenure of 
Offic~ Law was enacted lest Presid~nt Johnson should ~emove Re-
publican office holders too rapidiy, and it was practically re-
pealed lest President Grant should not remove Democrat office-
holders rapidly ehough.n67 
But the amendment to the a.ct did not please President Grant 
who wanted total repeal. He thought the law contrary to "the 
intentions of the framers of the Constitution .. n In his annual 
message in December :1;~69 he said, ttThe law is inconsistent !.i.!h 
~faithful and efficient administration of the Government. Vl11.at 
faith~£!!. Executive nut in officials ·forced upon him, and 
those, too, whom he has suspended for reason? How will such off-
icials be likely to serve an administration which they know does 
not trust them?»58 
Johnson had objected to the Tenure of Office law for these 
same reasons. But Grant had taken a different stand then. He 
had sided with Cbngress. He had believed irt the wisdom of Con-
gress. "Was. not Congre~fo superior to the President?" he had 
asked. 59 Now,· when he found Congress obstructing the will of 
the President he took a diff~rent view of affairs. After the 
quarrel and the correspondence Grant could not fchrgive Johnson. 
He refused to have anything t6 do .with him. He avoided the mem-
bers of the cabinet who had testified in behalf of the President. 
In November 1858 a dinner was given by the New York Bar 
association in honor of Attorney General Evarts, to which all 
the membe:es 9f the 'cabinet were invited. Grant, who was to be 
a guest, announced that he would not attend if Secretaries Mc-
Culloch and Welles and PostMaster General Randall were to be 
:present. "Everyone seems disgusted with Grant's conditional 
acceptance •••• '', comrnen ted Welle~, ttNone of his friends attempt 
to befriend him. 'The little man is exhibiting his true traits. 
Very.malignant, revengeful, because exposed in his eq_uiv,ocation 
and falsehood. .An enemy of truth and those who assert it. n60 
The Radicals contrived to have a rival dinner irl the city.so that 
Grant might attend it in case any of the cabinet members object-
ed to. accented their invitations to the Evarts.dinner. But as 
' .J. 
none of the members attended, Grant had no excuse and so was 
present at the Evarts banquet.61 
President Johnson showed a different spirit. He appoint-
ed Grant's brother-in-law to the Chilean Mission. 62 During the 
Christmas holidays of 1868 he invited Grant's grandchildren to 
his dinner celebrat~ng his sixtieth birthday. Two or three 
hundred young people met at the ·President's Mansion. But Grant.'s 
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grandchildren were not among them. The President-elect would 
not permit them to attend. 63 
General~Grant was invited to the President's New Yearts 
reception. But Grant left Washington with his wife to speµd 
New Years Day in Philadelphia. The papers announced that he 
did this to avoid calling on the President that day according 
to custom. 64 
ttHe Grant has never called on tr~e President, nor exchanged 
a word with him since the deception which he practised in the 
Stanton matt.er and his detection an~ exposure" writes i:;velles, 
!I apprehend he has neither called on nor spoken to any of 
those who witnessed that occurance; (except Seward who debased 
and belittled himself to get in communication with Grant), he 
has not with me. The President-elect proposes to fight truth; 
is mad that he was exposed."65 
As the time for the inauguration of Grant was approaching 
and a committee on ceremonies was making arrangements for the 
affair, General Grant informed the corolnittee that he would not 
ride in the same carriage with Johnson nor speak to him. The 
committee planned, therefore, to have the President and the 
President-elect p~oceed up Pennsylvania Avenue in separate 
carriages, the former on the right, the latter on the left.66 
The President took the ground that he coftld not with self res-
pect take. part in the ~nauguration ceremonies of the man he 
deemed to be faithless and untrue and who had attempted to im-
pugn the varacity of the President and members of the cabinet67 
181. 
. 68-i 
so remained at the White House while the inauguration took place• ~) 
When Johnson returned to Washington as Senator from Tennes-
see during Grant's second administration he did not hesitate to 
attack the President because of the abuses in his administration. 
In particular he spoke against Grant's reconstruction policy. 
In March 1875 a resolution was introduced in the Senate to 
approve Grant's conduct in supporting his military favorite Gov. 
Kellogg in the election difficulties in Lousiana. 
"The President of the United States", said Senator Johnson, 
"assumes to take command of the state and assign the people a 
governor .••• It has been bitterly alleged that Kellogg wa~ not 
elected. Whether he was or not is not altogether certain, nor 
is it any more certain tl1at his competitor McEvery was chosen. 
The Election was a gigantic fraud and there are no reliable re-
turns of its r.esul t." Because ot' the election fraud both con-
testants, declared Johnson, were disqualified, "but the Presi-
dent finds a usurper in power, and h''e takes it upon himself to· 
mak:e the government of the United States a party to his usur-
pation.... Is not this monstrous in a free govermnent?n69 
Thus, in their later relationship the scene is changed. 
Positions are reversed. Grant is on .the defensive and Johnson· 
is attacking. It is significai:it that Andrew Johnson, once 
abused, despised, and discredited, has now regained favor with 
the people and is representing his native state in the highest 
capacity possible. While General Grant although serving his 
second term as President is under fire; the gross corruption 
in the federal government :f~flecting upon his wisdom and states-
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manship, if not upon· his character. The evils of military 
reconstruction under Republican rule are now realized. In the 
light of these later events one oan gain a clearer understand-
ing of this interesting relationship. 
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Chapter VII Conclusions 
1. At the outset of Johnson's administration Grant was 
in harmony with the President on all important policies of 
Reconstruction except Johnson's proposal to try the confeder-
ate leaders. 
2. Until the fall of·l866 Grant avoided taking sides 
actively in the political controversy but he ac.quiesced gen-
erally in the President's conciliatory program or reconstruc-
tion. 
3. Although Grant had begun to differ somewhat with the 
President by March 1866, the real turning point in thei.r re-
lations was d,uring the election campaign in the fall of 1866. 
4. The important contribut~ng factors which,i~alienated 
General Grant from the President and made him sympathetic 
with the Radical cause were as follows= ( 1) .Johnson's petty 
manoevering to implicate him in an apparent support of his 
policies. (2) Johnson's loss of public esteem·due to the events 
of the "Swing Around the Circle". (3) ~he ridicule of Johnson 
and his policies by the Radical campaigners. (4) The overwhelm-
ing Radical victory at the polls. (5) The subtle personal in-
fluence or his Radical friends. 
· 5. Johnson's purpose back of his :plan to:;\send Grant to 
Mexico in'october 1866 was to get rid of Grant temporarily so 
that General Sherm{3.n, who was more friendly to the Presidentts 
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program might be more gracefully elevated to the position of 
Secre~ary of War. · 
6 •. Grant's mistrust of the President and his fear that 
Johnson might attempt some disloyal act against Congress were 
the important factors which influenced him to refuse to go to 
Mexico. 
?. Grant's distrust of the President. and his sympathy with 
the Radicals, ~oupled with a sincere desire to promote peace 
prompted him to object to the President's request that troops 
be sent to Baltimore tonprevent election disturbances in the 
fall Of 1866. 
8. Grant coopera.ted v.ii th Congress and Se ere tary Stan ton 
in the preparation of the Congressional program of Reconstruction 
and worked whole-heartedly to carry out the purposes of Con-
Sress, in spite of interference by the President~ 
9. Grant instructed the military commanders to enforce 
the reconstruction acts in accordance ·with their own views as 
to the purpose of those laws, and by inference directed that 
they should disregard the President's and the A.ttorney General's 
opinions as to the methods which should be used in carrying 
out reconstruction. 
10. In whatever the District military commanders did which 
was clearly in harmony wi ~h the reconstructioh ,'aqts of Congress 
Grant supported them and defended them before:~the President 
when the l~tter was disposed to criticise. 
11. Grant considered himself responsible to the people and 
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to Congress for the faithful exe.cution of the Reoonstruo'tion 
laws. 
12. Grant accepted the off~ce of Secretary of .War ad 
interim in ord~~ that the President might not appoint another 
to the place who would not be in sympathy with Congress. 
13. Grant objected to t·he removal of Stanton, Sheridan, 
and Sickles partly because he'had approved of their actions, 
partly because he really believed their removal would not be 
to the best interests of the country. 
14 •. mrant received his·political ph;tlo,_sophy from the 
Radicals. His ignorance of political principles made him.ac-
cept the popular viewpdint. 
15. Johnson. expected Grant to either hold on to the War 
office and thereby force Stanton to resort to t4e courts to be 
reinstated, or resign before the action of the Senate so that. 
the President might ·appoint another who would carry out this plan. 
16. Grant understood what·Johnson expected of him even 
though the President may not have explained his desires to him 
.. 
defin11.tely. 
17.. Grant's original promise was couched in general terms, 
capable of multiple interpretation. It was to th~ effect that 
he believed Stanton would h~ve to appeal to· the courts to be re-
instated; that he had not looked particularly into the Tenure 
of Office bill but what he stated was a .general principle; thatt 
if he changed his mind he w:>uld inform the President of the fact 
and return the office to him in the same condition it was in 
when he was appointed to the position. Returning the office to 
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the President "in the same condition it was when he was ap-
pointed to the positionn might simply mean relinquishment of 
the office to the Eresident after the action of the Senate~ 
18. Grant in subsequent conversations with the President 
regarding what he intended to do with the War office reassured 
him b~ referring to his original pro~i~e and stating that his 
action v1ould be.in accordance with this understanding. Thus 
Grant prevented any possible movement on the part of Johnson to 
replace him with someone who was not sympathetic with the Rad-
icals. 
19. Grant never seriously intended to hold on to tlle War 
office after the Senate had reinstated Stanton. 
20. Grant never intended to relinquish the War office 
before the action of the Senate. It was his purpose to pre-
vent Johnson from making another appointment until after the 
Senate acted. 
21. Yet the statements which Grant admits that he made 
would easily lead the President to assume that he would easily 
lead the President to assume that he would either hold on to 
the office so that Stanton would have to appeal to the courts 1 ,;' 
or that he would resign in time for the P~esident to appoint 
a man who would carry out this procedure. Because Grant'per-
mitted Johnson to interpret a different meaning than his own 
conception of the promise, and because he let this.misunder-
standing continue until the Senate acted he was guilty of de-
caption. 
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22. Grant believed he was fulfilling his promise in a 
literal way by giving the President notice at the Saturday 
evening intervi~w that· he haa changed his mind and by locking 
the door of the War off ice on Tuesday and sending immediate 
notice of this action to the President. 
23 • There was no c6nni vance b etv1een Grant and Stan ton 
that the former should turn the 'lfar office over to the latter. 
Stanton realized the importance of taking immediate possession 
and acted accordingl¥· Grant was not anxious to see Stanton 
back in office. He Was anxious to carry out the wishes of the 
Radicals and avoid breaking the law. 
24. The fact that.Grant, after asking for and receiving 
written directions from the President not to obey Stanton's 
orders, declined to obey the President shows conclusively that 
he was under the influence of Stanton and the Radicals. 
25. The immediate aauses for Grant writing his contro-
versial letters to the President were the publication in the 
newspapers of his alleged unfaithfulness, and the receipt of 
many letters asking him if' it was po.ssible he had purposely 
betrayed the President. 
26. rrhere is evidence to show· that the 'Radicals encour-
aged the quarrel with the end in view of its political effects 
upon the country. 
27. While Grant had allowed himself to drif.t into a 
position where he was the logical candidate of the Republi-
cans he did not deliberately quarrel with the President for 
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the sake of the political consequences which would follows 
Nevertheless he guietly permitted his friend Rawlins to make 
the quarrel personal and reconciliation impossible. Rawlins 
did this to make Grant President and Grant rewarded him for 
his efforts. 
28. Grant was the aggressqr in the quarrel. Johnson did 
not take up his :pen to answer.until Grant had written his in-
subordinat.e note of January 29 in which he said 'he would not 
obey the.President's orders. 
29. Iri the several controversial points in the uorrespon- . 
dence, in which each asserted he was right and the othe~ party 
wrong, there is no evidence to prove that either party was 
purposely untruthful; there is much evidence showing that there 
was simply misunderstanding in. e~ch case. However each made 
the best of his side of the question. 
30. The ambiguous terms in which Gran·t' s promise was first 
couched, led to this misunderstanding. 
31. Grant's motives for deceiving the President were part-
ly patriotic and partly personal: He sincerely wished to pre-
vent Johnson from appointing a man to the War office who would 
be out of harmony with Congress and unsympathetic toward Con-
i3ressional reconstruction. At -the same time it was to his wvm 
personal and political interests to govern his conduct in accor-
dance with the will of the Republican majority. To aid and 
support the unpopular Johnson would detract from Grant's popu-
larity and his chances for the Presidency. 
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32. After the quarrel Grant and Johnson were openly and 
actively hostile toward each other~ 
33. Grant now refused to obey the Presidentts orders, 
. but complied with ·the directions of Stanton in the management 
of the military. 
34. Not until after the quarrel did Grant favor the im-
peachment of the President. Then he worked to bring about the 
success of the trial. 
35. .i'\.fter Grant's elect ion J"ohnson was willing to be 
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